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This thesis is concerned with approaches to policymaking analysis. It argues that 
dominant neo-pluralist theories of policymaking have limited explanatory force. 
This arises from the method of inquiry, which necessarily limits the scope of 
analysis. The emphasis on inductive methods, coupled with a narrow focus on non- 
formalised sub-state networks, produces a model which is a useful way of 
identifying non-state policy actors, but which has no explanatory capacity outside 
such networks. 
In particular two weaknesses in network analysis are highlighted as significant. The 
first is that neo-pluralism does not account for the possible constraint on meso-level 
activity by the state. The state's ability to constrain individual agency may arise 
either from its position as a distinct social actor, or from it being an aspect of 
structural constraint. As this latter point implies, the second key weakness with 
neo-pluralist network analysis is owing to its structural indeterminism. 
The thesis argues that an adequate account of the policymaking process must 
recognise the possibility of limits to actor autonomy which arise from individual 
interaction with structure. Although the argument is made for a structural 
dimension to policymaking analysis, it concedes the dangers of functionalism and 
determinism which can arise from the application of structural frameworks. 
Consequently, the thesis argues for a duality of structure and agency as the core of 
political analysis. This argument is made on theoretical grounds, and via discussion 
of an empirical case study of the EU Task Force Environment: Water. 
The argument then is for a dual approach to policymaking which utilises both 
inductive and deductive methods. It is argued (a) that a Marxist analysis of the state 
and the structural constraints of capitalism can be combined (although not 
integrated) with networks analysis in a dual approach, and (b) that this 
combination provides the best model of policymaking. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is about policymaking. Political decisions have a significant impact on 
society, on the lives of people who comprise it and on the environment in which 
they interact. Given the importance political choice has, it has been considered 
important to understand the means by which political decisions are reached, or in 
other words to understand the policymaking process. 
Political inquiry into the nature of policymaking has produced a variety of 
interpretations of the process of political decision making which have resulted in 
rather different conclusions about the transparency, legitimacy, accessibility and 
fairness of that process. Despite being directly concerned with the meso-level, 
investigations into policymaking necessarily involve judgements about the power 
of policy actors, and thus are concerned with the capacity of groups and individuals 
to affect political processes. This capacity for individuals to effect change may or 
may not be conditioned by the structure of the environment within which social 
action occurs. In other words, although policymaking analysis has a particular 
focus, the different interpretations of the nature of that process reflect a 
fundamental conflict within social science about the autonomy of social actors 
from the social system. 
Contemporary explanations of the policymaking process have been 
dominated by a perspective in which the explanatory capacity focuses on the role 
of society-based groups as policy actors. These type of approaches, therefore, 
emphasise the non-formalised interactions of core groups and individuals in 
policymaking. They propose that networks of interested and policy relevant 
groups, individuals and organisations are powerful policy actors such that political 
choices will ultimately reflect the concerns of the dominant policy network actors. 
In addition policy interaction is seen as relatively open and competitive, with 
dominant groups able to be challenged, for example by new cohorts of actors or by 
new expertise which may effect a policy change. 
Network type theories are very much society-centred accounts which have 
their foundations in pluralism. Consequently, network approaches perceive social 
actors as being able act relatively unconstrained by formal political arrangements, 
and they also view the range of political possibilities as being open. Further, 
networks are policy specific and their composition will change over time. In other 
words, on this view, policymaking and politics in its broadest sense, is not 
dominated by an elite or a class, but instead reflects the changing and competing 
demands of groups and individuals in society. 
Significantly this indicates that policy reflects something of the dynamics of 
society, fragmented by the sheer diversity of needs and preferences. Consequently 
each policy domain warrants its own investigation as at different moments, in 
different contexts, the policy outcomes in a given domain could reflect changed 
preferences. So there is no singularity of means, ends or purpose in this perspective 
on policy formation. This presents a reasonably democratic picture of the political 
process - only encumbered by some resourcing constraints on network actor 
capacity which may be economic, political, expertise-based or similar. This points 
to a second important feature identified for this type of perspective, that political 
outcomes do not reflect the continued dominance of a single set of preferences (for 
example, a class interest). 
The difficulty with this type of network formulation is twofold. Firstly, 
given that it is a society-based account, neo-pluralist network approaches do not 
recognise the potential constraint on network actor autonomy by the state. 
Constraints by the state may arise from either its importance as a key social actor, 
or as being identified as part of any structural constraints on network autonomy. 
The analysis of preference competition is limited to groups forged in society, with 
little or no attention paid to the potentially decisive role played by the state in 
determining political outcomes. ' Two alternative interpretations of policy 
formulation are possible then, one which places the state (as a key social actor) at 
the centre of its analysis, and one which theorises structural context and thus 
locates the state as a part of potential structural constraints on actor autonomy. 
Political inquiry which emphasises the state as a key actor - statism - has 
provided a counterweight to the dominance of society-centred accounts of 
In later chapters (Five and Six) I shall discuss several different theories of the state. There is a sense 
in which each of these theories defines the state differently, and I shall argue that we should adopt a 
version of Marxism in which class struggle is seen as central. However, for present purposes, we 
need a working definition of the state which does not presuppose this later conclusion. Hence I shall 
adopt Giddens's definition: 'A state can be defined as a political organization whose rule is 
territorially ordered and which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule. ' 
(Giddens, 1985: 20) Defined in this way the state is not identical to, but is partly constituted by, the 
government and the personnel of state institutions. For more on the state see chapters Five and Six. 
policymaking, such as network theory. According to statists, although the state 
may be subject to countervailing social preferences expressed by dominant socio- 
economic groups, it has the capacity (autonomy) to implement its own, different, 
preferences in the face of such opposition. However, most statist analysis concedes 
that it is important to understand the state's capacity more in relational terms (vis- 
a-vis socio-economic groups) rather than in very strongly autonomous terms. 
Statism gives a different interpretation of the political dynamic but retains the 
notion that the process is reasonably democratic in ways not dissimilar to 
pluralists. The definition of the state in terms of the officials of whom it is 
comprised, makes it possible to make claims of diversity of interest which, in 
addition, will change over time. Consequently state preferences do not conform to 
a single interest or reflect any socio-economic bias. 
The emphasis on diversity of interests found in both pluralism and statism 
highlights a common difficulty in the application of both of these type of 
approaches. The notion of a fragmentation of needs and preferences within society 
or the state, any of which have potential to be converted into political reality 
through the political process, is important for emphasising that political outcomes 
do not necessarily reflect a dominant or sectional interest. This further provides a 
basis for broader claims about the democratic nature of political outcomes. 
Although neither position reflects true democracy (there are resourcing constraints 
on interest groups within pluralism and within statism the possibility of state 
bureaucrats being powerful enough to convert their preferences despite 
countervailing social pressures is hardly an indicator of democracy), they can still 
make claims that the process is more or less `good for democracy'. 
Part of the explanation for the claims of pluralism and statism about the 
multiplicity of interests which can be served by the political process, lies in the 
method each uses. In both cases the use of an inductive approach results in the 
omission of any analysis of the social organisation of the system, as a key variable. 
The suggestion that capitalism, as a particular mode of production, can place 
macro-level constraints on the autonomy of social actors - whether they be at the 
level of society or at the level of the state - cannot be expolored. The strong belief 
that sectional - or class - interests are not being served in policy formation (to the 
exclusion of all other interests) is based on observations of the diversity of political 
outcomes, state formation and state actions which are found in contemporary 
capitalist societies. These differences in actually existing capitalist societies have 
fuelled an on-going critique of Marxism as a valid interpretation of political 
economy. 
Despite this, it will be argued that Marxism provides a persuasive alternative 
perspective on the political process which, additionally, entails a useful critique of 
the limits of pluralism and statism. As an analysis of political economy which 
inlcudes the use of deductive methods, the emphases within Marxism diverge from 
those of both pluralism and statism. In the particular case of public policy 
formation, Marxism has the potential to unfetter the analysis from the limited 
conclusions which can be made through a pluralist or a statist perspective. As 
already noted, the first area of weakness which can be identified within networks 
approaches is the lack of an analysis of the state's role in policymaking. This can be 
partially solved by the statist perspective, which places the state at the centre of 
political analysis. However, statism, by definition, tends to overestimate state 
capacity vis-a-vis society. The application of both these models has shown that, in 
fact, the roles of both socio-economic groups and the state are important in policy 
analysis. Indeed the extent of the successful policy reach of either can, at least 
partly, be explained by the strength and organisation of the other. In other words, 
the key is to understand the relationship between the state and society. 
It is possible through an integration of neo-pluralism and statism (in other 
words through introducing a theory of the state into network analysis) that this 
particular problem of network analysis can be successfully overcome. However, 
the second area of weakness, that of structural indeterminism, can be found in both 
pluralism and statism, and thus cannot be solved by the kind of integration of 
theory noted above. Structural indeterminsim relates to the lack of analysis of any 
potential structural constraints to the autonomy of any and all social actors. The 
social organisation of the system, that is capitalism, is not considered as a relevant 
variable in shaping political outcomes in either the networks or the statist 
formulations. 
This lack of investigation of the system stems from the purely inductive 
method used by both approaches. This creates problems for conceptualising 
structural constraints in two ways. Firstly an inductive approach generates theory 
from observation. This indicates that there is no prior theorisation of the social 
structure. However, a deductive approach is necessary as the type of claims we may 
wish to make about the impact of the social organisation of capitalism on 
something like individual agency, may not be directly observable in the way 
required by inductive approaches. The second problem arises from the findings 
from the application of the inductive method. Direct observations of the 
policymaking process or of state activity highlight the variability of group 
dynamics and of state organisation and action. The discovery of such differences is 
taken as evidence that capitalism does not shape outcomes (as the assumption that 
they did, outcomes would be very similar in all capitalist economies) and thus 
indicates that a particularised elaboration of states, policymaking, network 
dynamics and so on, is needed. So application of the inductive method has the 
further consequence of reinforcing assumptions about the validity of that method. 
However, the existence of differences between contemporary capitalist societies is 
clearly not evidence in itself that capitalism is not important in understanding the 
nature of political outcomes in those societies. Specifically, the notion that 
capitalism, as a mode of production with a unique social relation which underpins 
it, may place macro level constraints on the autonomy of social actors, is not 
properly explored in either case. The claim is made then for the necessity of a 
theory of capitalism, within which to locate investigations of social actor 
autonomy. 
On this basis, Marxism has distinct advantages as a method of inquiry. Not 
only can it provide an explanation of macro constraints on meso level autonomy, 
but it also provides a framework for understanding the state-society relationship 
which, it will be argued, holds the true explanatory force in policymaking analysis. 
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However, some caution is required, as Marxism has also encountered significant 
criticism, notably from pluralists and statists. In particular critics claim that the 
singularity of the explanation in sectional (class) terms (class struggle is the heart of 
Marxist analysis) creates a simplistic economic functionalism and/or determinism. 
Although it is possible for Marxism to fall into these traps, it is not inherent in the 
framework itself. It should be possible to make use of a Marxist analysis of 
capitalism without having simultaneously to assume that political outcomes are 
predetermined by some intangible force. This point will be pursued in this thesis. 
Thus the central argument of this thesis, is that network theories of 
policymaking are of limited utility. This arises from the omission of two key areas 
of analysis: the state and structure. Although the strong society bias can be 
countered by introducing a theory of the state to network analysis, a theorisation 
of structure means stepping outside the inductive method. It is suggested that 
Marxism provides the most appropriate solution to these two problems as 
identified. Not only does Marxism have an historically-rooted analysis of structure 
(which lends weight to the claims it makes about capitalism as a particular mode of 
production) but, consequently, it can illuminate the possible constraints on agency 
which arise from the logic of capital accumulation. In addition, given Marxism's 
conceptualisation of the social relations of production, this perspective can also give 
substance to both the state and state-society relations. In other words, Marxism can 
overcome both weaknesses identified in the networks approach. 
Marxism has exhibited some difficulties in releasing itself from the charges 
of functionalism and determinism. It is important that these tendencies are avoided 
and, it is argued, that this can be achieved by highlighting the necessity of empirical 
investigations as providing substance for the claims made about the significance of 
the structural context of the social system. It is claimed, therefore, that in order to 
fully understand the nature of political outcomes, both an assessment of the roles of 
all social actors as well as an understanding of the macro context within which 
social activity takes place is essential. In other words, a dual approach to 
policymaking is desirable: one which harnesses the benefits of network type 
approaches which uncover the detailed interactions of the meso-level; with the 
necessity of a prior theorisation of capitalism which provides the context of 
policymaking. 
It may be helpful to locate this contribution within the broader debate 
about the validity of Marxist and pluralist assumptions in political science, the 
argument for a dual approach reflects some of the more contemporary assessments 
of the state of the discipline. It has been argued (see Marsh and Stoker, 1995) that 
most recent contributions to political analysis represent something of a 
convergence between what have ordinarily been understood as the opposing camps 
of pluralism and Marxism. Within neo-pluralism, the application of network type 
approaches to policymaking, has presented a picture of a much more hierarchical 
and regularised policy terrain than the vision found in classic pluralism. Neo- 
Marxism, by contrast, has begun to introduce non-class social divisions into its 
analysis, removing what should be an essential focus of Marxist analysis - the social 
relations of production, or class struggle. 
It would seem then that pluralists are increasingly factoring rigidities into 
their analysis whilst Marxists are casting off their distinctly economic analysis in 
the face of a perceived fragmentation of classes around gender, race and nationality 
issues. However, it is argued here that in spite of these developments it is unlikely 
that a true convergence between pluralism and Marxism is possible. As discussed in 
the opening section of this Introduction, the method, and thus the ensuing 
assumptions about (the power capacity) of structure and agency, indicate that the 
convergence implied by Marsh cannot occur. Rather, political science is finding 
ways to conceptualise seemingly new social divisions and social relationships, 
which are thought to be difficult to account for within the established elitist, 
pluralist and Marxist frameworks. This additional dimension to political science is 
concerned to reflect the apparent (increasing) fracture of social and political life and 
the complex variability of structures and outcomes as between capitalist societies 
and within societies over time. In attempting to make sense of such difference, the 
conclusions inevitably shift away from unidimensional explanation to ones which 
account for the potential impact of any and all factors. 
The organisation of the thesis 
Chapter One discusses the range of network type approaches to policymaking 
analysis. It considers the original, broader, formulation of issue networks and the 
more focused analyses of policy communities and epistemic communities. The 
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chapter highlights two weaknesses of the networks approach which require some 
adjustment to the model. Given the domination of policy domains by core groups 
often found in network analysis, the policymaking picture looks more static than 
dynamic. It is argued that a fuller elaboration of possible constraints on the meso- 
level, fundamentally involving a theory of the state, may provide additional 
explanatory space for both the means by which certain groups come to dominate 
policy domains and, in light of this, how we might still observe policy change. 
That is, the role of the state may be important in this regard either as a key social 
actor or as a structural constraint on action. So, the first weakness of network 
analysis is its lack of a theory of the state. 
The second weakness of network approaches is argued to be its lack of 
engagement with structure. In addition to a need to understand the state as a 
potential facilitator or inhibitor of network policy impact, the macro context of 
policymaking may also be relevant to the type of political outcomes achieved. This 
partly challenges the method adopted by network type approaches. Consequently, 
this chapter also considers the epistemological issues involved in pursuing an 
alternative perspective: one which requires a prior theorisation of social structure, 
and thus something which falls outside the remit of pluralist approaches. 
In light of the claims made about the desirability of a broader analytical 
framework than that provided by pluralism, Chapter Two considers the relevance 
of debates about the conceptualisation of power, structure and agency. Given the 
arguments made about the limitations of network analysis, the core of the critique 
lies in network theory's emphasis on individual agency rather than an assessment of 
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potential structural constraints on social action. It is proposed that structure and 
agency should be considered as relative terms, where social action is restricted in 
part by existing `rules of the game', but also that social structures can be changed 
through social action. This duality of power, represented through the power 
capacities of both structure and agency, adds weight to the arguments made for the 
necessary analysis of social structure and its potential impact on the exercise of 
agency. 
Chapters Three and Four introduce a case study of policymaking from the 
water policy sector. The precise case is a European Union Task Force which sought 
to address the long run issues of water quality and water management, with the aim 
of discovering the best means of exploiting future markets in these areas. The 
purpose of the case study is to map out the contours of a policy domain in which 
networks of interest were formally constituted to influence the EU's agenda in this 
area. In identifying the key network actors and the relationships between them in 
the policy consultation process, it is possible to examine some of the claims made 
by network theorists in terms of interest group hierarchies, insider groups and the 
existence of epistemic communities. 
In other words, the case study is a typical type of network investigation, 
which thus serves to highlight the types of information that such approaches can 
provide. In so doing, the case study also demonstrates the restricted nature of the 
type of questions which can be asked within such a framework. That is, the case 
study illustrates that observations of actor interaction in a given policy sphere 
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cannot be used to clarify the role of non-network actors such as the state or the 
possible impact of structural constraints on the capacity of network interests to act. 
The case study shows that network theory on its own does not have the 
explanatory force which it is argued is necessary for a complete picture of the 
policy process. In fact, the type of information gained through its application, may 
be secondary to a comprehension of states as social actors and social structure as 
providing macro constraints. Network analysis may be contingent on state action 
and structural context. 
In order to attempt to remedy the first significant weakness identified in 
network theory, its omission of a theory of the state, Chapter Five examines the 
contributions of state-centred approaches to political analysis. The statist 
perspective has gained increasing currency in political analysis, successfully 
challenging the dominance of society-centred accounts such as pluralism and 
Marxism. Clearly the emphasis within statism is on the potentially decisive role 
that states play in political outcomes. The identification of an autonomous state 
with not only its own preferences but the capacity to implement its preferences 
despite countervailing socio-economic pressure, is a particularly strong vision of the 
state as a social actor. 
Chapter Five contends that whilst statism provides a useful corrective to the 
society-centred focus of network theory, the criticism of a lack of engagement with 
structure can be applied equally to statism, as it has been to pluralism. That is, the 
type of structural constraints which may limit the autonomy of network actors, 
may similarly constrain the role of the state. If the definition of the state is one 
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which identifies the state as a distinct social actor (as is the case with statism) then 
this dislocation of the state from structural context inevitably weakens the analysis. 
This is due to the claim of significance made for the organisation of social structure. 
Chapter Six therefore considers the contributions of Marxist theorists to 
discussions of the state. The reason for this is that the critique of statism emphasises 
the disengagement of the state from its structural context within these approaches. 
Therefore, theory which considers the state not as a distinct actor, but as an 
integral part of the social relations of which it is constituted, seems to respond to 
this criticism. A number of different Marxist contributions to understanding the 
state are considered, reflecting the variation in Marxist interpretations. 
Functionalist and instrumentalist accounts are rejected for reproducing the same 
problem of separating the state from its structural context which is found in non- 
Marxist theory. Instead, theory which locates the state as a part of the social 
relations unique to the capitalist mode of production is the preferred interpretation. 
This is owing to the fact that only this type of formulation succeeds in avoiding the 
criticism of analysing social action (including state activity) in a structural vacuum. 
It is thus contended that Marxism is the analytical framework which is most 
likely to address the two stated weaknesses of the pluralist method. It is conceded 
that there can be dangers of functionalism and determinism in the application of 
traditional Marxist analysis in political inquiry. In order to avoid these difficulties 
as well as to conform to the stated advantages of a duality of structure and agency, 
the thesis concludes that investigations of the meso-level (policymaking) must 
attempt to operationalise this duality through a perspective which harnesses the 
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benefits of both agency-focussed and more structuralist accounts. That is, a theory 
of capitalism (as the structural context of activity inside a capitalist system) is 
logically prior to network type investigations of specific policy domains. The 
information rendered from the application of networks models retains its 
significance, since investigations of the operation of capitalism as a particular 
productive system, require detail of policy practice in order to add substance to 
claims made about the significance of capitalism for political outcomes, and to 
make predictions about its future stages of development. 
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Chapter 1. Pluralist Theories of Policymaking 
1.1 Introduction 
The following chapter will consider the range of pluralist and neo-pluralist 
contributions to understanding the policymaking process. With much of the 
original literature developed by American academics, it is perhaps no surprise that 
one of the central points of focus for pluralist theories of policymaking is the 
interaction of sub-state actors. Its translation into British politics in the late 1970s 
and 1980s saw even greater elaboration of the nature of group dynamics and a more 
open and competitive picture of policymaking than the entrenched politics of 
corporatism which it replaced. 
As policy networks analysis has developed, a range of interpretations of the 
precise locus of power within networks of actors has also developed. In other 
words, a sophistication of the approach has emerged through a more precise 
identification of the power capacities of different types of policy actor. 
This chapter will examine the development of policy networks, from the 
initial broadly constructed issue networks to the more specific elaboration of 
epistemic communities and technocracy, which identify `expertise' as a key source 
of power. The argument which will be pursued in relation to the networks method 
is that, although a useful tool for identifying key actors and the nature of their 
interactions its limited identification of policy actors, in particular its omission of 
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the state as a potential constraining factor, limits its utility. In addition, its reliance 
on an inductive approach limits its explanatory capacity in relation to structure. 
Both these factors, if found to be important, may indicate that the type of 
information discovered through the networks empirical approach is in fact 
secondary to assessments of the actions of the state and/or the structural context of 
society more generally. That is, it will be argued that the study of networks needs 
to be understood in a broader context than simply that of the policy domain under 
discussion. Chapter Two will elaborate the importance of this type of theoretical 
argument in respect of policymaking and will, therefore, provide the substance for 
the claims to be made about the significance of concepts of power, structure and 
agency for discussions of the policymaking process. 
1.2 Pluralism and Policy Networks 
Pluralism, as a method for explaining political phenomena, has always engaged on 
an empirical level insofar as it looks to observable phenomena in order to generate 
broader theoretical frameworks of understanding. The importance pluralism 
registers in the actually existing differences between political phenomena (within 
and between societies), points to an emphasis on particularisation and variability at 
the heart of its explanation, as opposed to a more universal or holistic approach. 
The tradition of pluralism then, is one in which empirical observation is the 
focal point of political investigation. This results from a particular understanding of 
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the nature of power and the way in which power is exercised through both agents 
and structures. This is of particular importance in discussions of the policymaking 
process, in which explanations of political outcomes are an exercise in identifying 
and attributing power to some actors rather than others. With respect to the 
networks method in particular, any prior theorisation about structural power 
(rather than simply attributing power to agents) necessarily changes the assessment 
of the capacity of the network to have a real impact on outcomes. However, 
precisely as a result of the way in which power is operationalised within pluralism 
and neo-pluralism, as well as its empiricist foundations, structural power cannot be 
effectively factored in. This results in the actions of power holding agents being 
interpreted as free and autonomous rather than constrained from without. This is 
partly explained by understanding that the aim of pluralism is not to provide a 
universal theory of capitalist society for example, rather it is to be continually 
engaged in understanding how a particular part of it works, at a particular time, in 
a particular context. Further in not attributing meaning to the nature of the 
system, pluralism is concerned with observing political phenomena in order to 
generate conclusions about, say, how democracy operates in practice. This can be 
achieved because direct observation, within this method, is valid without prior 
theorisation of structural context. 
Policy networks as a manifestation of neo-pluralism in the investigation of 
the policymaking process reflects these key characteristics. Policy networks is 
clearly a meso-level concept which is intended to provide a link between the micro- 
level and macro-level of political analysis. As it has developed, the networks 
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method has highlighted the importance of increasingly specialised groups of policy 
actors as having a more than equal input into the policymaking process. This 
indicates a drift away from the original incarnations of pluralism which provided a 
vision of truly plural politics in which access was possible by a wide range of 
groups, through the access points provided within the political system. The more 
recent neo-pluralist interpretations of political decision making, indicate something 
of a more hierarchical system of resource (and thus power) distribution across 
groups and, more particularly, access to decision makers is something which is 
more restricted and implies political manoeuvring to an extent which you do not 
find in the work of, say, Dahl (see Dahl 1957 and 1961). 
From the initial issue network frameworks provided by American political 
scientists one can find in more recent British contributions, a more closed picture 
of policy access by relevant publics and group subgovernment than one might 
expect from classic pluralism. However, the guiding principles of the conflictual 
nature of the terrain of interest group lobbying and the dynamic, changing 
character of the dominant groups over time, remain an essential part of the new 
pluralism. 
The evolution of issue networks, as already indicated, has produced a range 
of variants which isolate a key characteristic of policy actors as a relevant resource 
for gaining greater input into the policymaking process. This has included 
professional interests, shared normative beliefs and policy relevant knowledge or 
expertise. This chapter will now consider each of these variations in turn and will 
indicate some of the continuing limitations of the networks method, despite its 
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shift away from classic pluralist analysis. This will provide the foundations for the 
discussion of the importance of prior theorisation in Chapter Two, in contrast to 
the inductive approach used by neo-pluralists. 
1.3 Issue Networks 
... a group will [also] try to establish ongoing relationships with 
policymakers to gain access more easily. Ideally, such efforts by the 
interest group will evolve into a subgovernment in which a small group 
of legislators, lobbyists, and administrators working by consensus will 
make policy in a particular area. In contemporary Washington though, 
many policy areas are populated by so many participants with such 
fundamental disagreements that they cannot be controlled by a 
subgovernment. In such a case, we're likely to find an issue network 
instead. Issue networks are composed of organisations and individuals 
who share expertise on a policy and frequently exchange information. 
Berry, 1989: 164-5. 
As a development from Heclo, the idea of issue networks was a reaction to the iron 
triangle framework which placed its emphasis on the stability and predictability of 
group-department-legislative committee relations. Instead, Heclo argued that 
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political administration is `fragmented' rather than `segmented' Gordan and 
Richardson, 1987: 117). 
Heclo claimed that `looking for the closed triangles of control we tend to 
miss the fairly open networks of people that increasingly impinge upon 
government' (Jordan and Richardson, 1987: 121). Theories which developed in 
response to the more rigid, hierarchical and power-centred explanations of public 
policymaking, have thus tended to de-emphasise the notion of unequal power 
relations in the political process. These approaches suggest that there exists an open 
and competitive arena for the interaction of different sets of interests, which are 
thus able to impact on political outcomes. Understanding the extent of the impact 
of interests, and the interaction of different types of actor, can be uncovered 
through an investigation of the relevant policy domain. 
Following from the work developed by Beer, McConnell and Lowi, Jordan 
and Richardson go further in their estimation, describing the participation of 
groups in the policy process as `the structured, regularised participation of organised 
interests in policy making' (Jordan and Richardson, 1987: 107), but participation 
which is not in any way corporatist. However, without a theory of the state it is 
difficult for network theorists to conclude, beyond dispute, that the nature and 
scope of the policy arena is not in some way determined from without. That is, it is 
difficult to be confident about the extent of interest group impact on policy 
outcomes without considering the potential constraint of, say, the state in this 
regard. The fact that there is no investigation of the state nor of the context within 
which policies are made, arguably limits the utility of the networks approach in 
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general. Partly the difficulty arises from the unchallenged assumptions about the 
macro-level - that it is more fluid, accessible and unrestrictive than other 
perspectives may claim. Precisely because of what might be considered as two key 
omissions from the neo-pluralist method, a theory of the state and an analysis of 
the structural context of the polity, then it is likely that such an approach would 
overestimate the power of individual agents. 
In light of this possible interpretation, a central criticism of the issue 
networks construct is that its weakness lies in its adherence to a pluralist 
interpretation of the distribution of power and resources. That is, the conclusions it 
draws only make sense within a pluralist perspective: 
The policy process is seen as more open, more decentralised, more 
conflictual, more dynamic and broadly more participatory. In short, 
issue networks come much closer to fulfilling the pluralist prescription 
for democratic politics. 
Berry, 1989: 195. 
A further criticism of Heclo's very broad issue networks construct is that it is so 
imprecise as to tell us very little about policy formulation. For example, even if we 
were to accept the assumptions about the competitive and open nature of the 
political arena, issue networks cannot explain why certain groups at different 
points in time appear to exercise more influence in a policy sector than others. The 
changing fortunes of interest organisations suggests that policymaking is not 
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equally accessible by all groups and that resources, organisation, experience and 
political relationships may restrict the interaction of policy actors in a network. 
The recognition that policy impact is uneven resulted in attempts to move 
away from the very open access implied by classic pluralism, and led to the 
identification of sub-governments within the policy process. This is a less naive 
approach than previous interpretations, in that it admits the possibility of different 
types of access to policy or policymakers, by virtue of the type of interest or 
network of interests represented. Clearly this development seems to imply a more 
elitist picture of policy than had previously been envisaged. However, this 
implication is tempered somewhat by the fact that it is not the identification of an 
elite but of elites - fragmented according to the different policy areas and policy 
areas over time - and thus is still evidence of democratic, plural politics. 
Once the possibility of constraints on the effectiveness of interest groups 
has been accepted, they can begin to be identified. This occurred within network 
analysis insofar as there has been a recognition that, within each policy domain, it 
is possible to identify some groups which seem to have privileged access to the 
policy machine and thus have an increased chance of policy impact. The notion of 
privileged access colours the work on policy communities and, additionally, has 
formed the basis of major contemporary developments or trends within the 
perspective: economically-derived privileged access (which can inform, potentially, 
New Right or neo-Marxist accounts of policymaking); improved access derived 
from close links between network actors and political brokers (civil servants) and 
knowledge based privilege (fuelling work on epistemic communities and 
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technocratic approaches). In each case, the range of groups with the ability to 
influence policy is more limited as some groups come to dominate and, 
consequently, other actors in the policy process are marginalised or reduced to 
observer status. The following sections consider the main work of those concerned 
with these two, more limiting, trends within network theory. 
1.4 Policy Communities 
The ideas of policy community Gordan and Richardson, 1987) or group 
subgovernment (McConnell, 1966: 7) see policy being made in specialist sectors of 
substantial autonomy. This interpretation of the political process therefore dwells 
on the `sectorised negotiations between government departments and their (often) 
clientelistic groups rather than one which sees government as a single entity, facing 
the full breadth of competing group demands' Gordan and Richardson, 1987: 8). 
The implication here is that different government departments, potentially, 
have differing levels of influence within the context of their own policy 
negotiations. This may further imply that there is a greater degree of flexibility and 
autonomy in policy formulation and negotiation for each government department 
than is the case if one assumes a more unidimensional state actor. So, the policy 
community is more coherent and has a closer relationship with decision makers in 
the policy sector and thus is more influential than other, less well placed and less 
coherent, interest networks. In addition, this formulation offers up more power to 
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government officials, as the relevant government department has an interest in the 
policy outcome as well as perhaps having to impose government limitations on 
policy development, for example exercising budgetary constraint. This is a more 
empowered vision of government than classic pluralist formulations which see 
government more likely to be at the behest of pressure groups. 
Policy communities are networks characterised by stability of 
relationships, continuity of a highly restricted membership, vertical 
interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities, and 
insulation from both other networks and, invariably, the general public 
(including parliament). 
Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 12-13. 
However, the restricted nature of Jordan and Richardson's definition of what 
constitutes a policy community, allows little room for explanations of a changing 
composition of membership, which may be part of an explanation of policy 
change. Also, if policy communities are characterised as being stable with restricted 
membership then one may have to assume that they would remain static rather 
than dynamic. This limits both the possibility of policy change (or any explanation 
of it) and marginalises the role of any competing interests in the policy domain. 
In more general terms policy communities, as with the broader concept 
of issue networks, is based on several assumptions which are open to direct 
challenge. This is found in terms of the accessibility of decision makers, and the 
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relationship between government officials and policy communities as a 
partnership, rather than any notion that such officials may be able to pursue 
their own interests without needing to court the relevant policy community. 
A further interpretation of government-network relations is provided by 
Grant, where more allowance is made for constraints on the pressure groups by 
external factors and other parts of the state, and this is coupled with a more explicit 
statement of the imbalance between groups in the policy process. Grant's concept 
of `insider groups' (see Grant, 1995) establishes a slightly different power relation in 
the political process, but still rests on a notion of policy development through 
consultation with interest groups or policy networks. Thus it still fails to provide 
explanatory space for a fundamental change in policy direction. Insider groups are 
the dominant interest within policy negotiations as they have such a close 
relationship with decision makers that they are brought inside the policymaking 
process at this level. This prevents such groups from being very radical or 
oppositional (relative to groups outside the formal policymaking process) as they 
are keen to maintain their insider status and the thus the privileged access and 
leverage that this implies. This concept retains a pluralist conception of state- 
society relations, highlighted by Grant thus: 
Pressure groups do make a significant contribution to democracy, one 
which can be understood if we visualise a situation in which pressure 
groups were either banned or disregarded. 
Grant, 1995: 165. 
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So despite acknowledging that the cards are often stacked in favour of established 
insider groups, this interpretation of a democratic policymaking process, only 
makes sense if one accepts the assumption that pressure groups can have negotiated 
inputs into the policy process, and that this is evidence in itself that democracy is 
being served. Again then, the notion that somehow the state is above `interests', 
does not, for example, have distinct preferences of its own, is open to a variety of 
different agendas, and does not represent a structural constraint on actor agency, 
runs throughout this line of argument. 
1.5 Professional Networks 
Professional networks are placed near the `highly integrated' end of Rhodes's 
continuum of policy networks (Rhodes, 1992). They are similar to policy 
communities in their composition which indicates that they also demonstrate 
stability, restricted membership, vertical interdependence and limited horizontal 
articulation. The added component is that their mobilisation is designed to serve 
the interest of their profession. In this sense, professional networks are likely to be 
more resistant to change, although the degree of change will be a function of the 
salience of the particular issue. 
It is assumed that professional groupings, by their very nature, are apolitical 
as they organise and operate according to professional standards and ethics. There is 
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a further assumption that the professional in a given policy area will provide the 
best solution to a given problem, and can do so without the involvement of the 
general public in a policy debate. These assumptions are, in fact, about perceptions 
(or misperceptions) of the role which professionals play in the political process. As 
Maloney points out, in an area such as the water sector: 
Since the mid-1970s, professional hegemony has come under threat for 
three main reasons. Firstly, the rise of the environmental movement. 
Secondly, and closely allied to the first, is the growing disenchantment of 
the role being fulfilled by professional groups in society and the validity 
of their esoteric claims to competence. Thirdly, the financial 
retrenchment from the mid-1970s, which became particularly acute from 
the 1980s onwards in the water sector. 
Maloney, 1995: 18. 
Much of the literature on the reorganisation of the water sector describes 
the significant role played by `water professionals' both in the 1974 reorganisation 
and again in the privatisation process in 1989. The legitimacy of their involvement 
clearly lies in their perceived policy expertise as engineers, scientists and water 
managers. But, in order to actively participate in what was essentially a politically 
motivated organisational change, it is worth considering that the experts were 
`allowed in', and these same professionals accepted that they were involved in 
political decisions. In this way the notion of objective professional interests is 
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compromised, allowing the government could ensure a technically efficient new 
structure which accorded with a particular political framework of how the water 
sector should be organised. 
In this sense `professional networks' may provide a useful template for how 
one should approach epistemic communities and technocrats: professionalism or 
expertise is no guarantee against being politically compromised. The fact that 
professionals can be used as a means of communicating `what's best' for the policy 
domain, implies that professionals and experts may not always be detached from 
the political context (even if they would prefer to be). The status of professionals 
and experts in the process of policy consultation delivers a veil of `best practice' as 
well as legitimacy for change, but the `end' to which this is applied so often remains 
wholly politically determined. 
This leads us into more direct discussions of the role of particular interests 
within the policy domain, in particular knowledge-based interests and expertise. 
1.6 Advocacy Coalitions 
Sabatier maintains that within policy subsystems advocacy coalitions 
emerge. These are, as he puts it, aggregates of individuals who share a set 
of normative beliefs, and who form groups in order to further their 
policy objectives. 
Hann, 1995: 20. 
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Advocacy coalitions have consistently been defined as `people from a 
variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, 
researchers q], who [1] share a particular belief system - i. e. a set of basic 
values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions - and who [2] show 
a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time'. 
Sabatier, 1998: 115. 
Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), picks up from two of the 
stronger elements of Heclo's issue networks construct: policy subgovernments' 
(communities) responsiveness to socio-economic change, and a context of `over 
time'. It has five main elements which are set out in `Policy Change and Learning', 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These five main premises are: the need to 
understand the impact or role of technical information in policy processes; a need 
to understand policy change through a time perspective of a decade or more; a 
focus on `policy subsystems' which seek to influence government; government is 
used to describe all levels of government; and, public policy can be conceptualised 
as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realise them 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 16; Sabatier, 1998: 99). 
All of these elements are instructive, and a positive development from those 
types of networks already discussed. It is certainly important to consider policy 
change over time, that is, to understand the changing context within which 
decisions are taken, and to gain some insight into changing group dynamics and 
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differences in the groups which dominate in a particular policy domain. ACF 
subsystems are a useful means of focusing the analysis, in order to further clarify 
whether all policy subgroups can have an observable policy impact, or whether it is 
a particular kind of subgroup which is more effective. One of the most interesting 
feature of Sabatier's ACF however, is his point concerning policy options as value 
priorities. Clearly public policy is a matter of political choice, something which is 
informed by judgements about what is and is not an acceptable or desirable course 
of action. This indicates, therefore, an idea of `interests' and, as such, a choice of 
which interests to serve. If policy options are considered as value priorities then 
this, at least partly, demystifies the policymaking process as not one in which 
`what's best' always triumphs over `what do we want'. 
In the same way that the concepts of issue networks and policy 
communities attribute a degree of importance to a competition between subsystem 
organisations in informing political debate, a similar element of the ACF construct 
is the notion of opposing, or conflicting, coalitions operating in a given policy 
sphere. Again the significance of the relative positions of such coalitions is 
important. That is, as with other more restricted interpretations of the relationship 
between interest groups (in this case, an Advocacy Coalition (AC)) and 
government, if one AC, one policy community, or one issue network continues to 
dominate then policy outcomes are likely to be more static and incremental than 
dynamic and radical. This is problematic in all network approaches as a lack of 
analysis of context limits their capacity to explain how new groups enter the policy 
domain or replace the dominant group, but raises a particular difficulty for 
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Sabatier. A key element of his Sabatier's model is his incorporation of the concept 
of policy oriented learning as a means of explaining policy change. The dominance 
of a core group in a policy subsystem however, may undermine this essential part 
of Sabatier's framework. As Hann points out: 
... within any given policy sub-system there 
is likely to be a dominant 
advocacy coalition, and while this advocacy coalition remains dominant, 
the basic attributes of government policy are unlikely to change 
significantly. It follows from this that a minority advocacy coalition has 
little hope of changing its place within the sub-system and that the expert 
discourse which is so essential to Sabatier's policy oriented learning may 
also be dominated by a powerful group which has the ability to 
manipulate the flow and status of information coming into the system. 
Hann, 1995: 21. 
Policy change and the related idea of policy-oriented learning in Sabatier's 
construct are, according to Sabatier, two of the more compelling elements of the 
ACF idea and certainly provide an advantage over the more static picture of policy 
arenas already discussed. However, the genuine capacity of the ACF to explain 
these is questionable. In terms of explaining policy change, Sabatier lists two sets of 
exogenous factors, which he considers to be relevant: `relatively stable parameters' 
and the more dynamic `system events' (Sabatier, 1998: 102). It is the latter group of 
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variables which are described as essential prerequisites for major policy change, and 
which are listed as: 
1. Changes in socio-economic conditions 
2. Changes in public opinion 
3. Changing in systemic governing coalition 
4. Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems 
Ibid. p. 102 
Other policy change can occur as a result of either policy learning (for example the 
introduction of new evidence which challenges the initial perspective and cannot 
easily be disputed), or can occur from the introduction of new AC members, which 
can alter the political resources of the AC (Sabatier, 1998: 105) 
The basic structure of Sabatier's ACF looks like this: 
' 
1 There are some non-affiliated actors, but these are considered unimportant because they will join 




AC AC AC AC 
ft ft ft ft 
individual actors individual actors individual actors individual actors 
where n (act of joining AC by individuals) is determined by: 
(a) `share a set of normative and causal beliefs', and 
(b) engage in a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity, over time' (Sabatier, ` 
1998: 103). 
Figure 1: Characterising Sabatier's policy subsystem. 
In addition, each AC is organised according to a hierarchy of belief, as follows: 
" DEEP CORE 
(for example, individual freedom versus social equality) 
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" POLICY CORE 
(normative commitments and causal perceptions of policy domain) 
" SECONDARY ASPECTS 
(narrower beliefs, for example the seriousness of the problem) 
This hierarchy represents a more to less rigid set of beliefs which are, therefore, 
more or less open to change (from deep core as most rigid to secondary aspects as 
more open to change). This type of hierarchy may further indicate that policy 
change is less likely to flow from ACs. 
A final significant descriptive element of Sabatier's ACF, which is also 
relevant to the dynamic of policy change, are his conflict resolution actors. Once 
the different ACs within the policy subsystem have chosen their instruments and 
strategy for achieving the outcome they most want from the policy process, there is 
pften likely to be a difference of perspective, on preferred outcomes, as between 
ACs. In those situations Sabatier describes a mediating role by a third group of 
actors, `policy brokers', who find a compromise position in order to minimise 
conflict. The outcome of this process is government programmes or policies 
(Sabatier, 1998: 102). 
Despite the more recent revisions to Sabatier's framework, which he 
undertook in response to problems or new findings in the application of the ACF, 
difficulties remain particularly around the issue of policy dynamism. As indicated 
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above, Sabatier places significant emphasis on the capacity for ACF to explain 
policy change, which has been a problem in other network approaches. However, 
it has been argued that the dominance of a particular AC in a policy subsystem is 
likely to prevent the development of ACs who could challenge the dominant 
group, particularly if that group can manage the process such that policy oriented 
learning does not take place (as Hann argues). This therefore limits the potential for 
internal shocks within the ACF to produce the desired change. That leaves external 
shocks, which Sabatier describes as system events. If one has to rely on external 
shocks as an explanation of policy change, then it is necessary to accept that the 
ACF or policy network itself has no explanatory capacity with regard to policy 
change. 
Other areas of difficulty in the ACF model, which resonate with network 
type approaches more generally, are worth highlighting. Firstly, the overarching 
framework of the policy subsystem may have a significant impact on the nature of 
the ACs which form within it (in other words the terrain of policy domain may 
determine the types of groups who emerge to challenge it). This affects Sabatier's 
framework in two dimensions: (a) the composition of ACs; and (b) the conflict 
resolution as between two or more ACs in any given subsystem. 
It is clear that with any set of competing ACs, one AC may come to 
dominate the subsystem. The reason one AC may dominate could be as a result of 
pre-existing relationships with precisely those decision takers whom the AC is 
seeking to influence. Particularly given Sabatier's `over time' element (a decade or 
more), internal subsystem relationships may significantly distort the competition 
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between ACs (for example, the emergence of an AC with insider status). This has 
further implications for competing ACs vis-a-vis the significance of policy brokers. 
Sabatier does not provide any guarantees that this third group of actors are neutral 
and, therefore, that the compromise achieved by their involvement is a genuine 
one. 
The second problem arises from the way in which individual actors and 
organisations coalesce in order to form ACs. As noted in figure 2 above, one of the 
key hierarchical features of the AC is sharing normative and causal beliefs. At the 
highest level ('deep core' in Sabatier's terminology), this is presented as a more 
generally pervasive belief system, which Sabatier likens to religious belief but 
which might equally be ideology. Even at the next level the idea of `policy core' 
beliefs, which operate across a particular policy domain, seems to indicate 
something more significant than just a set of beliefs to which any individuals or 
groups can accede. In this way each AC seems to be self-selecting in terms of the 
value system they share. This makes the AC more exclusive than inclusive. 
Two points in Sabatier's defence need to be made here: firstly, it seems clear that 
without this type of value coherence, the AC would not be able to function as 
effectively as a lobbying organisation. Secondly, a conflicting value system or 
ideology can, within Sabatier's framework, simply provide the focus for a separate 
AC. However, if ACs operate on an ideological basis, then the role of the policy 
brokers is significantly enhanced (so it becomes more important whether or not 
they are objective), and the question of an overall agenda-led policy domain or any 
established internal political relationships, between subsystem actors and decision 
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makers, also becomes more significant. Further, the issue of the resources of ACs 
becomes relevant if we consider that, as groups are organised around value systems, 
the type and extent of their resources may affect their ability to lobby. In other 
words, actors who coalesce around a more marginal (to the policy domain, society, 
dominant political context) deep core or policy core beliefs, may be more limited 
in their ability to effectively lobby within a policy subsystem by virtue of a limited 
political and economic resource base. 
Since coalition actors (by definition) share a set of policy core beliefs, 
actors in different coalitions will perceive the world through different 
`lenses' and thus often interpret a given piece of evidence in different 
ways. 
Sabatier, 1998: 109. 
John Grin and his colleagues have criticized the ACF for focusing solely 
on actors' beliefs relating to public policy, forgetting that most actors have 
a much more important belief system (which they refer to as 
`professional beliefs'). 
Sabatier, 1998: 111. 
So, the same two principal objections to the previously discussed network 
theories could equally be applied to Sabatier's ACF. In effect, the ACF as a whole 
is only useful insofar as one accepts some baseline assumptions about the 
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overarching framework of decision making. In other words, the ACF makes sense 
and can provide useful information about subsystem actors (organised as ACs) only 
within a more pluralist interpretation of the policymaking process: viz. that it is 
open; ACs can compete with each other to lobby policy architects for their desired 
outcomes; and that pre-existing relationships and/or agendas either do not exist or 
do not have a significant impact on the outcomes of that process. The fact that 
there is no attempt to give depth or shape to the context within which decisions are 
taken (despite references to value systems, political resources and policy brokers) 
nor any analysis of the nature and role of the state, places limits on the ACF's 
application within other perspectives. 
Having considered some of the broader policymaking theories, the chapter 
will now consider ones which concentrate even more exactly on the role and 
power of particular groups within the policy domain. The following theories 
emphasise the role of experts, thus they represent something of a new trend within 
pluralism, which recognises the possibility that groups are not equal in the policy 
domain by virtue of the extent of their policy `expertise'. 
1.7 Epistemic Communities 
The development of the notion of epistemic communities has been very useful in 
providing a better explanation of policy change, and in particular emphasising 
learning as a policy dynamic. An on-going criticism of the variety of policy 
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networks theories has been their emphasis on stability, and therefore their lack of a 
satisfactory explanation of how new initiatives occur in a policy arena and, in 
particular, how the direction of policy as a whole may change if the area is 
dominated by a particular community of interests who have a shared vision. 
Haas (1992) develops the concept of epistemic communities in the context 
of international relations, using it to explain the cause and effect of international 
policy co-ordination, and the more problematic area of changes in a nation state's 
interests. He explains that decision makers will refer, or even defer, to scientific 
knowledge for policy resolution at times when they are unfamiliar with technical 
aspects in a policy area. The significant context is `times of crisis' or `political 
uncertainty': 
The concept of uncertainty is (thus) important to our analysis for two 
reasons. First, in the face of uncertainty, and more so in the wake of a 
shock or crisis, many of the conditions facilitating a focus on power are 
absent ... And, secondly, poorly understood conditions may create 
enough turbulence that established operating procedures may break 
down, making institutions unworkable. 
Haas, 1992: 14. 
This is an understanding of the policy dynamic which is based on a different 
conception of power than has been dealt with in the foregoing theories. Here 
knowledge, or specialist knowledge, is seen as a potential power base and this has 
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important implications for the identification of power and its distribution within 
the system. 
Haas is convincing in his analysis of an epistemic community's ability to aid 
policy formulation along established lines, as well as to change the goals of the 
decision makers, through the exercise of their knowledge-centred power. As Haas 
points out, epistemic communities do not equate with the scientific community, 
but can apply to any specialist knowledge groups. A particular interest here is the 
idea that the importance of a knowledge-based community is a function of the fact 
that its power lies in its control of policy-relevant knowledge. That is, that 
knowledge or expertise is in itself a power resource, which may be more significant 
than others in a network. 
Although Haas makes a useful point in emphasising the significance of 
knowledge-based power, the concept of epistemic communities arguably attributes 
too much importance to the possession of knowledge as opposed to the use of 
knowledge. Policy relevant or expert knowledge in itself is not power rather, the 
power lies in the ability to use and apply that knowledge in the policy process: the 
ability of technical-rational expertise to be translated into, or applied in public 
policy, stems from government. Choosing which knowledge to use, and putting 
the knowledge into practice is a power that only government, not experts, have. 
It is in this regard that the concept of epistemic communities, that policy 
initiatives and possibilities for problem resolution stem from technical-rational 
expert communities, is considered flawed as it is argued here that the application of 
the knowledge in practical terms, is a political function and therefore requires 
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political power. That is, policy power still resides with the application of policy 
proposals and expertise rather than in just ownership of knowledge. 
1.8 Technocracy 
... we argue that technocratic theory and practices are 
largely shaped at 
the level of the organisation and that much of postindustrial politics can 
be understood as an attempt to extend such technocratic managerial 
practices to the state. 
Fischer, 1990: 14. 
The mystique of scientists and of doctors serves not only to reinforce 
their role in the nuclear or health networks respectively, but also to 
strengthen the relevant network's claim of rendering policy free from the 
`irritating' constraint of political, especially electoral, legitimacy. 
Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 265. 
Technocratic theory has been useful in its illumination of the increasing role played 
by technocrats or policy experts in the political process, and seems to be near the 
front of the trend for highlighting the privileged role of expertise. Also, 
technocracy has a broader application than epistemic communities as it tries to say 
something about society as a whole, rather than just about the policymaking aspect 
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of the political process. Although there seems, at yet, to be little agreement over 
the precise details of a technocratic theory of government, the main strand in all 
arguments is that, as a response to the crisis of government, the same kind of 
technocratic rules which apply in the private sphere should be applied to the level 
of the state. In other words, political problems should be resolved with reference to 
technical solutions. 
The idea of technocracy accepts that there are still three observable spheres 
in the political process -a governing elite, a technocratic strata, and the general 
public - but claims that technocrats are becoming more and more autonomous, or 
independent from, the elite decision makers. Fischer (1990) makes clear that the 
technocrats are not yet a class in themselves but, given the system of inducements 
and rewards, do remain wedded to the dominant political and economic elites. 
However it is this implicit acceptance of the evolution of a sub-government 
technocratic strata into a dominant class which is less than convincing. Again, as 
with the foregoing theories, it does not adequately account for any constraining 
impact by the state, or the relative power positions of other elites, which may be 
significant in assessing the political importance of technocrats. 
In addition technocracy, given that it is driven by an acceptance of the 
positive good which a technocratic system would deliver to the governing system, 
surely accords experts a too beneficent role vis-a-vis the wider society. The role 
outlined for such experts is not one in which they are interested in gaining political 
power, just the `best', most rational solution to the problems the system throws up. 
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In a similar vein, technocratic theory seems to exaggerate the positives 
involved in this end-product in our new postindustrial societies: 
... this new social configuration 
is one in which capitalist values 
associated with property, wealth, and production are steadily giving way 
to values based on knowledge, education and intellect. 
Fischer, 1990: 148. 
Technocracy describes the decline of politics due to a preference for technical 
solutions to what are, increasingly, technical problems. However, lacking a 
thorough-going analysis of societal organisation, there seems to be little basis for 
such a fundamental change in societal power relations. 
A significant problem with technocracy then, is that it reduces political 
problems to the fact that they have not been defined in scientific terms. One may 
suggest that policy problems can occur as a result of political decisions being taken 
irrespective of expert advice to the contrary, but to extrapolate that into a crisis of 
governance is to deny the possibility of wider motivations for decision making. 
1.9 Theory and Evidence in Political Science 
Like other forms of pluralism, network analysis might be thought to gain support 
from its implicit empiricism. Empiricists take an extreme view of the relationship 
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between theory and evidence in science (including political science), arguing that 
theoretical claims are valid only insofar as they summarise the results of empirical 
observation. The widespread tendency of political scientists to adopt some form of 
empiricist epistemology, if only implicitly, is one reason why they are often 
suspicious of theoretical claims that are proposed on the basis of theoretical, rather 
than inductive, arguments. However there are strong arguments against the 
extreme and one-sided empiricist view of the relationship between theory and 
evidence. This section briefly explains the view on this question which underpins 
the theoretical claims made in later chapters? Identifying the role of empiricist 
assumptions in political science, and questioning their validity, helps to establish 
the foundations of the argument pursued here. 
We can identify four main epistemological views about knowledge in any 
area. Thus with respect to political science, we can identify the following views: 
(i) scepticism: the view that knowledge of political phenomena is impossible in 
principle; 
(ii) empiricism: the view that knowledge of political phenomena is possible, but is 
restricted to what we can directly observe; 
21 am grateful to Christopher Woodard for discussion of these issues. 
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(iii) idealism: the view that knowledge of political phenomena is possible, but is 
significantly constructed by human minds, so that knowledge of the world `as it is 
in itself' is impossible; 
(iv) realism: the view that knowledge of political phenomena is possible, is not 
limited to what we can directly observe, and is genuine knowledge of the world as 
it is in itself. 
Most political scientists are not completely sceptical about political knowledge - 
although more limited forms of scepticism, for example about the possibility of 
cross-cultural moral judgements, or knowledge of the `laws' of history (Popper, 
1957) have often flourished. These limited forms of scpeticism aside though, most 
political scientists accept that knowledge of political phenomena is possible: the 
disagreement is over the source of knowledge, and its character. 
Although empiricism and idealism agree that knowledge of political facts is 
possible, they argue that this knowledge is limited in important ways. Empiricism 
restricts the scope of knowledge: it says that we can know only what we observe 
directly, and what can then be derived from this knowledge. Idealism does not 
claim that our knowledge is restricted in this way; but it says that the quality of our 
knowledge is limited: we cannot know the world itself, only how it appears in our 
minds. 
In contrast, realism portrays our knowledge as not limited in principle in 
either of these ways. Of course, any particular claim to `know' some fact may be 
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false, reflecting superstition, prejudice, bias, or other kinds of error. Realists are no 
less critical of our views than empiricists are. According to realists however there is 
no necessary limit in the scope or quality of our knowledge. In principle we can 
know the world as it is in itself, and our knowledge can penetrate the surface 
appearances which are `directly' observable. On this issue we can distinguish 
between `deep' and `shallow' forms of realism, where shallow realism has some 
similarities with empiricism (Collier, 1994: 6-12). Shallow realists are sceptical 
about hidden structures or mechanisms, preferring explanations which do not 
invoke these entities; deep realists on the other hand suppose that theoretical 
arguments implying the existence of these entities can justify belief in them. 
Perhaps the best-known form of `deep realism' is the philosophy of science 
developed by the Marxist philosopher Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1986; Collier, 1994: 
chs. 1,3,5). 
As Collier notes, the difference between these views can have important 
political implications: 
If history is just `one damned thing after another', then all the politics we 
need is a resolve to do better damned things than were done before. If, on 
the other hand, societies and their institutions have inner structures 
which generate and by the same token constrain their powers, then we 
can ask, first of all, what sort of thing can be done given existing 
structures and what cannot; second, what different sort of things could be 
47 
done given different structures; and third, how one sort of structures can 
be transformed into another. 
Collier, 1994: 10. 
The significance of structural constraints on human agency will be discussed in 
Chapter Two, and is a theme of the whole thesis. For present purposes, however, 
the important point has to do with the relationship between theory and evidence 
which is implied by each of the four broad views identified above. Scepticism 
implies that theory is always mere speculation, which can be justified neither by 
evidence nor by independent theoretical arguments. Empiricism implies that 
theory is justified only so far as it merely generalises inductively from direct 
observation - that is, it implies that logically speaking evidence comes before 
theory, which is justified only if it is supported inductively by evidence. Idealism 
implies that theory is justified insofar as it articulates the necessary structure of the 
mind or of language, and that this structure colours the `evidence' provided by our 
senses - that is, theory is logically primary, and evidence is logically secondary. 
Realism in its most attractive forms, meanwhile, implies that theoretical claims can 
be justified both inductively and by deductive (or `theoretical') arguments - that is, 
neither evidence nor theory is logically primary, but instead they are logically 
interdependent. 
If we leave aside scepticism and idealism, then, we have two different views 
about the relationship between theory and evidence. Pluralists tend to adopt the 
empiricist view that evidence is logically prior to theory, insofar as they do not 
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accept anything other than inductive arguments for theoretical claims. However 
this disregard of deductive arguments for theoretical conclusions - arguments 
which may ultimately have some empirical basis but do not proceed directly from 
observation - presupposes a controversial epistemological position. As we have 
seen, there are well-developed alternatives to empiricism, not least the sophisticated 
form of realism advocated by Bhaskar. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter 
into the philosophical debate between empiricism and realism; but the simple point 
is that we should not assume that empiricist epistemology is the only epistemology 
going, nor that it is the only epistemology which attributes due importance to 
empirical investigation. The epistemological position assumed here conceives of 
deductive and inductive arguments alike as capable of justifying theoretical claims, 
and as being ultimately logically interdependent. Thus we should not accept 
unreflectively the pluralists' tacit suggestion that only inductive arguments can 
justify theoretical claims, and indeed in Chapter Two we shall consider theoretical 
arguments bearing on the analysis of policymaking. 
1.10 Conclusion 
It is clear that network approaches to policymaking have some capacity for 
explaining political outcomes. Through their emphasis on the interactions of social 
actors within a policy domain, they seek to highlight the importance of 
relationships between actors as a means of understanding the nature of political 
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outcomes. Network type approaches are a useful means of identifying core and 
peripheral actors as well as providing insights into the type of resources which 
allow cohorts of policy actors to maximise their input into the policymaking 
process. 
The evolution of neo-pluralist models of policymaking has seen the 
development of concepts which point to a more closed picture of policy access than 
that implied by classic pluralism. Rather than a very open and competitive political 
arena, network approaches have found that policy hierarchies exist where the 
extent of policy access can be determined by the resource foundation of different 
actors. The type of resources which have been highlighted by neo-pluralists as 
being relevant are not only economic, but can be the result of particularly close 
relationships with government officials or the control of policy relevant knowledge 
or policy expertise. In each case the type of resourcing allows some groups to 
dominate the policy domain. 
Consequently, one of the shortcomings of these approaches is that they are 
limited in their capacity to effectively explain policy change. Given the tendency 
towards network domination by a core group, these models seem to indicate a very 
static picture of policymaking. This is exacerbated by a limited ability to explain 
how membership of core groups changes or how new groups could challenge the 
core. Internal network dynamics are not able to account for this type of change, 
which indicates a need to refer to external shocks to the network, which might 
provoke a directional change. Thus the networks themselves have a limited 
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explanatory capacity in this regard, and only work well if used as a template for 
identifying policy actors. 
A further area of difficulty is that neo-pluralism is built on certain 
assumptions about the distribution and exercise of power in society. As well as 
having a strongly agency-based account of power (power is something which can 
only be exercised by individuals), it is also very society-centred. This results in a 
more limited range of actors being included in network analysis. In focussing on 
groups and individuals, network approaches miss the potentially constraining 
influence of the state. The significance of the state may be such that if we were to 
define it as a distinct social actor, which may also have autonomous power, then we 
might expect that at certain junctures the state could successfully pursue its own 
agenda, irrespective (or in opposition to) the societal interests which surround it. 
This may be, at least partly, an explanation of policy change. This would also 
indicate that the autonomy of social, network actors could be constrained by the 
actions of the state, indicating an even less open and competitive picture of the 
policy process. 
In addition, a further assumption of pluralism and neo-pluralism which may 
be relevant to the types of political outcomes it recognises, is that it has no direct 
engagement with structure. In other words, to discuss the possibility that capitalism 
as a specific productive system may have some bearing on the types of political 
outcomes we might expect, is difficult terrain. It certainly would not be plausible 
within a pluralist context to make any assumptions about the nature of capitalism 
being relevant to outcomes, such that actors were constrained in the same way by 
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the social organisation of capitalism. At least part of the explanation for why this 
type of assumption is invalid outside a more Marxist framework, can be found in 
the method chosen by pluralist investigations. 
The empiricism which underpins pluralist theories of policymaking means 
that prior theorisation of the social structure is neither possible nor desirable. The 
possible delimiting of individual agency by the social organisation of capitalism 
does not fit into pluralist conceptions of policymaking and the operation of 
democracy. It would be difficult, to discover through empirical investigation alone 
the extent to which capitalism as a mode of production had inhibited actor 
autonomy in specific ways. Further, by focussing on the observable interactions of 
social actors, pluralists generate theoretical points about the contours of the meso- 
level, but are unable to make statements about their applicability across nation 
states, or even across the spectrum of domestic policy domains. Particularisation 
and variation in outcomes is evidence enough of pluralism, and is further 
interpreted as evidence that capitalism, as a mode of production, does not constrain 
meso-level activity in uniform ways. Thus, the conclusion drawn is that capitalism 
is not a relevant variable in the explanation of political outcomes. 
In light of the fact that network approaches do not account for these two 
possible constraining factors (the state and capitalism) they have limited utility for 
political investigation. Although the information which can be discovered through 
the application of the networks model is useful and interesting, it may be of 
secondary importance if we consider that the impact individual policy actors can 
have is not simply the product of meso-level competition, but is competition 
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conducted at a level which may be constrained by the actions or organisation of the 
macro-level. The next chapter will develop these points further, in part by 
examining some of the relevant theoretical arguments in the literatures on power, 
structure and agency. 
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Chapter 2. A Critique of Pluralist Theories of Policymaking 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One provided an overview of the main developments within network 
analysis. Throughout that overview, a number of points were made in relation to 
the limitations of the networks method, particularly in being able to present an 
overall picture of the policymaking process. The networks approach remains 
strongly pluralist despite the new directions in which it has been developing 
(epistemic communities and technocracy for example). The criticisms which are 
levelled at network theory then can be understood as criticisms of this style of neo- 
pluralism. 
The criticisms are on three levels which extend from more specific points to 
general difficulties with the neo-pluralist method. Firstly, in the specific case of the 
most recent incarnations of networks models, we can criticise the notion of 
expertise as the most significant power resource. This will be discussed in section 
2.3 below. Secondly, as a result of the society-centred nature of neo-pluralism, there 
are several points to be made about the identification and distribution of power 
within these approaches. Section 2.4 will therefore give an overview of the power 
debate within social science, with the aim of demonstrating the limited range of the 
power concept used by pluralists and neo-pluralists. A different conception of 
power would not only allow the possibility of introducing a wider range of actors 
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into the investigation, but would also bring more depth to the analysis of the 
relationships between actors. 
Thirdly, the logical next step from a discussion of power is to one of 
structure and agency. There is a general point to be made here about the 
perspective on structure and agency found within pluralism. The analysis of 
policymaking necessarily flows from the way in which one approaches the 
relationship between structure and agency. Neo-pluralism is an agency based 
approach and thus the focus of criticism here arises from its lack of engagement 
with structure or notions of structural power. This is a much more fundamental 
criticism of pluralist methodology, and the contemporary contributions to this area 
will be discussed in section 2.5. The chapter will conclude by raising the possibility 
of developing an approach which can successfully combine the flexibility to fully 
investigate both the macro and the meso-levels of political economy. The 
desirability of an approach which can successfully investigate these two levels 
should be clear. It has already been stated that the type of information which 
network models supply is useful, if limited. The argument has been that it may be 
secondary to some other features of social systems, such as state power or the social 
organisation of those systems. In spite of this it is clearly important to be able to 
identify key social actors and their interrelationships within the spectrum of policy 
domains. Consequently, it is desirable to attempt to overcome the limitations of 
neo-pluralism in developing a more integrated meso-macro approach rather than to 
do away with pluralism altogether. 
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2.2 Where are the constraints? 
It has already been stated that the basis of pluralist investigations is one of open 
politics, in which a wide range of outcomes are possible. Further, the way in which 
those outcomes are reached is identifiable through an examination of the interplay 
of actors in the policymaking process. In policymaking terms this indicates that 
policy outcomes are not determined, insofar as the policymaking process is open to 
the competing pressures of a spectrum of relevant lobbies, interest groups, policy 
communities and other networks of interest. The policy outcome is therefore, to a 
large extent, the product of the relative success of these policy networks, where 
access to policy makers is only restricted by network specific hierarchies or limited 
mobilisation abilities. 
The picture then is one of an open interplay of various interests at the meso- 
level, which thus does not identify the nature of the macro level as anything other 
than fluid and open to the ebb and flow of plural politics. It is not the aim of 
pluralist theory to characterise macro level concepts such as the state or structural 
context, as these are not the focus of their investigations. Rather they are society- 
centred accounts, which purposely seek to explain the less formalised relationships 
in policymaking. Consequently, it is possible to claim that this limited type of 
political inquiry into meso-level activity may in fact distort the explanation of 
political outcomes. This claim would be premised on the potential of macro-level 
factors to constrain the real autonomy of the meso-level. There are two points to 
be made in relation to pluralist conceptions of meso-level autonomy. The first 
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relates to the potential for constraints on the autonomy of the network (network 
actors) by the state, and the second is a wider point about pluralist methodology. 
The first point to make then is that the nature of network approaches as 
society-centred accounts, is such that the state is not a central area of concern. As 
part of the neo-pluralist reaction to state-centric approaches which preceded its 
development, the state has been removed from the analysis as a key social actor in 
its own right or as a potential structural constraint. The state as distinct actor, even 
if defined in more individualistic terms as the sum total of public officials, is not 
considered as a social actor with either its own agenda or with the power to 
translate its preferences into actions. If considered in such a way, the state could, 
potentially, be able to limit the range of possibilities or may, in some instances, 
change the preferences of organised interests in order to pursue its own agenda. 
The state as a key social actor could therefore be considered as a significant 
constraint on individual agency. It is possible, however, to reconcile this different 
position on the state within the confines of the pluralist method, and this will be 
the subject of Chapter Five. 
The second point is more directly a criticism of pluralist methodology and, 
if found to be persuasive, requires us to step outside the pluralist method and seek 
further approaches to policymaking. It has been noted that the empiricist basis of 
pluralism provides the explanation of the parameters of its analysis. At the same 
time, empiricism provides a focus for a critical assessment of the impact of that 
method on understanding the nature of the policymaking process and, thus, the 
nature of political outcomes. It should be possible to theorise about the nature of 
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the macro-level of the polity, and so provide some judgement of the context within 
which the meso-level of policymaking is taking place. Not only should that be 
possible but it is not unreasonable to claim, even at the outset, that a different 
assessment of the nature of the macro-level may have a bearing on the meso-level of 
political examination. In other words, it could be asserted that the central failing of 
pluralist and neo-pluralist approaches to understanding the policymaking process 
lies precisely in its method of inquiry, one which may significantly underestimate 
the constraints on the power of agents at the meso-level. This, it can be claimed, 
arises as a result of the lack of a direct engagement with the macro-level or 
structural investigations of the polity. In other words, pluralism is not a structural 
theory and, as a result, does not seek to explain in any general terms the ways in 
which the system (capitalism) may constrain meso-level decision making. Further, 
this flows from the point already made about the lack of a theory of the state, as it 
has already been indicated that the state may also provide a constraint on actor 
autonomy, as an aspect of structure (if it is not defined as a distinct social actor, as 
in the preceding formulation). As noted above, this type of criticism - as it is a 
critique of the method of inquiry - is one which cannot be resolved without 
adopting a non-pluralist approach. This will be the subject of Chapter Six. 
A range of more specific critical points can be made in relation to the broad 
spectrum of networks approaches outlined in the previous chapter. All such points 
can be seen to originate in the more fundamental criticism of their failure to 
account for the possibility of contextual or structural constraints on the ability of 
the network to genuinely exercise autonomy and power in the policymaking 
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process. In other words, the focus of the critique is on the claim that all outcomes 
are open. Some of these limits can be demonstrated using examples of the 
approaches outlined in Chapter One. 
The interpretation of the macro-level as non-consequential, produces an 
implication in the earlier formulations of network analysis that the policy process 
is accessible to any range of interests which organise to participate in that process. 
This seemed to indicate, for example in the case of issue networks, that all or any 
group could have some input into policymaking, and that it should be possible for 
any group to compete with any other group for access. In other words, any limits 
to their ability to act effectively would be self-imposed, for example through poor 
organisation or quality of argument. Despite the development of analytical tools 
such as policy communities, which recognise more distinctly the reality of external 
advantages accorded some groups and not others (in particular close relationships 
between certain communities of interest and relevant civil servants), and which can 
thus be the difference in being able to effectively engage in the policymaking 
process, there is no real on-going assessment of the ability of certain groups to 
dominate in any given policy field. 
Again the answer to this area of potential difficulty can be found in neo- 
pluralist analysis: given that the macro-level is not of primary consideration which 
thus allows the claim that the meso-level is plural and competitive, then the 
domination of any group is not entrenched. Network analysis maintains, despite 
accepting that different political and economic resourcing of groups will affect a 
group's ability to impact on political outcomes, that this unevenness does not result 
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in domination by a single sectional interest in policymaking generally. Rather there 
will be a different core group in each of the different areas of policy interest and 
within any particular policy area over time. The fact that the claim is for a 
circulation of elites rather than the domination of a single elite within the polity as 
a whole, seems to be evidence enough for claims to be made about the plural nature 
of politics. 
The issue of what have been referred to as `insider groups' however, does 
raise the question of the extent to which there can be any real dynamism both 
within the membership of any tight policy network or community and, thus, the 
degree to which that would produce policy stagnation rather than policy change. 
Further, the potential for a circulation of dominant groups over time, which seems 
to be the claim of neo-pluralism, does not fully address the question of the 
possibility of any structural constraints on the participation of any and all interest 
groups. For example, it may not satisfactorily explain the continued exclusion of 
the same groups in the policy process. As a consequence of the method, network 
analysis is much better placed to explain the positive inclusion of groups rather 
than negative `selecting out'. 
This is a significant limitation, as it is possible that obstacles to access for 
some groups may be irreversible for the `lifetime' of any particular political 
context. In other words, the inclusion of some groups who may aspire to insider 
status, and the continued exclusion of others, may be the result of structurally 
determined factors which, thus, are unlikely to change whilst the structures of the 
society remain the same. This would necessitate a conclusion that the policy 
60 
process is not open as pluralists claim but may be restrictive in ways which are 
determined at the macro-level. Again, the empiricist method does not have the 
capacity to sustain this type of claim nor to investigate it further. 
The example of Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) only 
serves to further underline this point. This particular framework of analysis 
comprises all the elements of the network approach and its evolution towards the 
acceptance of group hierarchies within the policy process. Again, despite 
acknowledging the dominance of any particular advocacy coalition at any given 
time within the ACF, the underlying question of the means by which any group 
comes to dominate remains unanswered. The same reliance on empiricism prevails: 
policy investigations may show that one particular advocacy coalition dominates 
through its close ties with the policymakers but, on the assumption that this is not 
the result of any `unobservable' structural factors, then this dominant position can 
always be challenged by another advocacy coalition within the ACF. 
A further point of difficulty with Sabatier's ACF is that it is clear that each 
advocacy coalition is self-selecting in terms of its composition, as a result of the key 
mobilisation factor which Sabatier refers to as shared normative beliefs. So 
entrenched are these that he likens them to religious belief. Such strong principled 
bonds mean that the changing membership of any given advocacy coalition is 
unlikely to produce any real shift in its preferred goals for policy outcomes. 
Further, any connections it has with policymakers which allow it to be successful, 
may indicate something about shared normative beliefs extending further than the 
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advocacy coalition, to the policymakers also. This would represent a coalition of 
interests which would be difficult to challenge from within the ACF. 
A final significant point can be made in relation to the full range of network 
theories. That is, in considering that political outcomes are open, and that access to 
the policymaking process is something which, over time, is possible for all or any 
network of interests (with varying levels of success); network approaches do not 
accord any particular status to the state. As already indicated, the omission of the 
state from policymaking analysis may distort explanations of political outcomes. 
Given that networks can partly be understood as a reaction to the more 
statist theories which preceded them, neo-pluralists do not address the state as 
having the potential to have a significant and different power capacity in terms of 
placing constraints on policy subsystems. Neo-pluralism, as it is manifested through 
the networks models, seeks to explain the policy process through the range of 
actors who can be seen to be directly involved in the policy process. Given the 
nature of its method, this new pluralism also does not seek to explain the nature 
and role of the state as a unique actor with either a self-interested agenda or as a 
possible constraining factor in terms of the range of policy outcomes which are 
achievable. An assessment of state activity along these lines is possible and has been 
pursued by more contemporary statist theory. So, although a criticism of network 
approaches is their failure to address the potential for the state to be a constraining 
factor in policymaking, at least the possibility that the state is a powerful and 
autonomous social actor, is possible within the framework of the empiricist 
method. 
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As previously indicated, there are specific points which can be made about 
the limits of any particular manifestation of the policy networks approach, but the 
broad criticism of the approach which underpins all such points lies with its 
concept of the nature and distribution of power, and its consequent structural 
indeterminism. It should be clear that the claims of neo-pluralism about the open 
nature of the political process only make sense in terms of the approach it adopts, 
that of concentrating on observable interactions and thus developing theory from 
this type of empirical investigation. Despite this, it is possible to challenge this 
inductive method and thus the analysis of political outcomes which result from the 
application of network formulations. 
The following sections will concentrate more specifically on the issues of 
power and structure, beginning with a discussion of the very particular use of 
power used within the epistemic communities approach, as this is an example of 
the limited way in which power is understood in the pluralist method. 
2.3 The power of experts 
In addition to what has been identified as the more general problem of an absence 
of significant contextual or structural constraints in the pluralist picture of the 
policy process, there are some significant points to be made about the particular 
development of the theory of epistemic communities. This highlights the way in 
which power is used within network type approaches. It was noted in Chapter One 
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that the evolution of network theories has seen the sophistication of models 
according to the identification of a particular knot of actors in the network, who 
can have more power relative to other actors. One particular example of this 
development highlights the specific role of knowledge or expertise in the 
policymaking process: in other words, attributing greater power to actors or a 
cohort of actors who have policy relevant knowledge or expertise. Such approaches 
consider ownership of knowledge or expertise as a power base in itself. It is this 
core of such approaches which is challenged here. 
There are two approaches in particular which focus on the exercise of 
knowledge as power, epistemic communities and technocracy, which were 
identified in Chapter One. The interesting element of these approaches is that they 
seek to explain knowledge-based knots of actors in terms of `special access' to the 
policy process. 
It may be the case that experts have always been important to 
policymaking, so the assumption is not necessarily that there has been an increasing 
involvement by experts in the policymaking process, but that the nature and extent 
of their involvement is something which needs to be explained. Existing theories 
about the input of knowledge-based communities are compelling insofar as they 
point to the special place of experts in decision making. However, there are two 
key reasons why it is important not to over-estimate the apparent power of policy 
expertise in decision making: 
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1. Available knowledge is not necessarily `correct' knowledge - given that people 
with `mistaken' knowledge can also be powerful, it is not the knowledge itself 
which is powerful but instead the capacity to have it applied / taken on board in 
the process of shaping policy; 
2. Policy knowledge or expertise cannot tells us what the `ends' of policy should be 
- ends-setting is an exercise of power which is not at the disposal of experts. 
To take the first point, one set of expert knowledge is not necessarily `correct' 
knowledge. It is often the case that there is a range of equally defensible theories 
about the best means of addressing or solving a given problem. If that is the case 
and the government chooses one course of action over another, the importance lies 
in discovering why that particular choice was made. Secondly, even if we could be 
sure that the expert knowledge was both objective and the `truth' about the best 
means, it cannot tell us what the ends are. In other words, if we know perfectly 
how something works, then that will help us pick the best means to achieve 
whatever the ends are, but it does not tell us what those ends should be. 
In other words, the adage that knowledge is power is not true. The ability 
to apply knowledge in real situations - to implement knowledge for a particular 
end is where the real power lies, and this is a function retained by decision makers. 
It may be possible to argue that knowledge in the policy process is a power base if 
it is the only knowledge or expertise available to policymakers - in other words, if 
a single organisation has the monopoly of control over the production of policy 
relevant knowledge. The first thing to say here, is that such a contention does not 
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alter the fact that knowledge in itself does not deliver power in the policy process, 
just that it may deliver some power to some experts in certain conditions. Further, 
it is certainly accepted here that policy experts can, potentially, have more power 
in the policy process than other individual actors. However this still does not make 
them the `power-houses' of the policy process, as choosing to use or choosing not 
to use that available knowledge is still a function which lies with political power 
brokers. For example, even if a water company has the monopoly of knowledge 
for a particular aspect of water management improvement, the decision makers do 
not have to implement it. 
So, it may be the case that experts have better access to decision makers 
because of their control over specialist knowledge in a given field. `Specialist access' 
may even derive from their perceived monopoly of policy relevant knowledge in 
certain circumstances. In this sense there is a policy network or community 
available for consultation or to provide new research/ideas for policy. But 
policymakers still have the monopoly of control over the direction of policy, the 
long-term goals for the economy and society, the `ends' for which they consult to 
discover the means. This is true even if one maintains a pluralist vision of 
policymaking. In other words, this particular development in the networks 
approach is something which can be challenged even within a more limited 
pluralist interpretation of the political process. 
So, perhaps the advantage in attaching some importance to the presence of 
knowledge-based communities or knots of experts as policy consultees is that it 
allows for an investigation of more precise, even the key, policy actors and some 
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assessment of their impact on policy. It highlights the particular importance of a 
specific type of meso-level actor who may have `special access' to the policy process 
and, therefore, the ear of the policymaker. The special access which they enjoy 
may derive from their perceived control over expertise or `correct' policy specific 
information. However, the contention that expertise can be equated with power 
gives a clear indication of the way in which power is identified in pluralism: agents 
have it and exercise it unencumbered by structural constraints. They approaches 
stop short of an explanation of the wider context within which decisions are taken 
which means that they can only tell us something about the influence of these type 
of network actors, relative to others. They cannot tell us anything about the 
different ways in which power might be exercised as they retain a limited, 
individual concept of power. 
Technocracy attempts to do something more ambitious than the epistemic 
communities approach, as it bases its discussion around a transformation of societal 
power relations rather than making an assessment of the interaction of sets of 
policy actors. As already outlined in Chapter One, there are two main areas of 
difficulty with this particular development. Firstly, as with the professional 
networks approach, there seems to be a general point to be made about the way in 
which the participation of `experts' is seen in politically neutral terms. That is, that 
experts can be relied upon to provide the best solutions to political crises through 
the application of technical-rational solutions, rather than be politically 
compromised. The involvement of either professionals or experts in the policy 
process should not necessarily produce any assumptions about neutrality and 
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objectivity for reasons already stated: being `allowed in' or rising to 
dominant/insider status may in itself be evidence of pre-existing relationships or of 
agendas which are politically motivated. This simply reproduces the means / ends 
distinction again. 
The second point has already been made in the discussion of technocracy in 
Chapter One. The literature on technocratic society has yet to produce any 
analysis of existing societal relations in order for us to understand the evolution 
towards technocratic decision making. They also do not provide evidence of a new 
class of technocrats in the upper reaches of society, who are relied upon by the 
political elite for objective guidance on policy matters. Without either of these it is 
difficult to find the technocratic approach persuasive. 
Given the range of criticisms which have been forwarded in relation to the 
development of network approaches and the particular examples of knowledge 
based power analysis, it seems that the fundamental points at issue are two. Firstly 
all investigations into the policymaking process make judgements about the 
amount of power available to and exercised by different actors at the meso-level. It 
seems important then to give an account of the way in which the power concept is 
used by pluralists and neo-pluralists as, in forming part of their method of inquiry, 
this presents one of the key limitations of such approaches. 
It should also be clear that the way in which power is used in political 
analysis is enmeshed with the most enduring area of conflict within political science 
- structure and agency. It has been highlighted throughout the discussion on the 
limitations of network approaches, that a potential area of significant insight into 
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the policymaking process is an understanding of the possible contextual or 
structural constraints on the autonomy of policy actors. An empiricist method 
cannot account for non-observable political phenomena which, it can be argued, 
therefore leads such approaches to discount the possibility of both structural power 
(and in the case of network approaches, also state power) as pre-determining, or at 
least limiting, the range of possible political outcomes. A realist approach which 
would allow a certain amount of prior theorising on the nature of the structural 
context of policymaking may, therefore, be more instructive. 
In order to demonstrate the importance of taking a different view on the 
significance of making a prior assessment of the macro-level, which thus allows 
some judgement about possible structural constraints, it is important to consider 
the range of perspectives on power as well as structure and agency. Together these 
should provide a basis from which to consider the best way of improving on the 
neo-pluralist method in order to counter the limits which undermine its general 
application. 
2.4 The political science literature on power 
It has been indicated in the previous section that perhaps the central issue of 
contention with the application of pluralist approaches to policymaking lies in 
their conceptualisation of power. It is the different definitions power found in 
competing perspectives of the policymaking process, which makes any attempt to 
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reconcile the desirability of a conceptualisation of structural power within a neo- 
pluralist analysis impossible. That is, the way in which the power concept is 
operationalised within neo-pluralism indicates that, as a theory, it cannot answer 
the questions raised about structural constraints on actor autonomy. 
However, the problem of structural indeterminism arguably cannot be 
overcome by simply replacing neo-pluralism with a more structuralist method, as 
this can encounter a different set of problems related to over-structuration. Finding 
the middle ground between these two positions then seems to be persuasive. 
However, it has been the case that social science inquiry so far, has demonstrated a 
preference for either a structural or an agency-based approach, rather than a serious 
attempt to harness the benefits of both. In the case of research into the nature of 
the policymaking process, the method chosen will, to a certain extent pre-empt the 
conclusions which can be reached. This has been clearly demonstrated in the 
literature on power, where it has been shown that the method used can shape the 
explanation of political outcomes and thus also colours the interpretation of larger 
concepts such as the nature of democracy. 
Approaching the question of power takes us to the heart of questions of 
structure and individual agency, observable and non-observable formulations as 
well as more radical interpretations. The significance of the relationship between 
structure and agency is a logical development from the discussions about power and 
will complete the argument being developed about the limitations of pluralist 
analysis. Firstly however, the community power debate will be discussed, thus 
demonstrating its relevance for arguments about the utility of network approaches. 
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Dahl (1957) is the theorist most closely associated with the more empirically 
observable explanation of power (the one-dimensional view in Lukes's 
terminology, see Lukes, 1974) and, thus, with pluralist interpretations of the 
policymaking process and democracy more broadly. His study of the decision 
making process in New Haven, USA, confirmed his view that power was 
something which you could see being exercised, and the power of social actors 
could be measured along the path of decisions taken. He went on to conclude that, 
given the typicality of New Haven's politics, this reflected a wider system of 
democracy in America. To test his assumptions about policymaking, Dahl 
conducted his research through observing and then cataloguing the discussions and 
outcomes of meetings of local government through secondary sources as well as 
limited direct observation. By simply recording victories and defeats and adding up 
wins and subtracting the losses for each item on the agenda, Dahl found that the 
elected officials had the most power. Thus, citizens had indirect influence over 
policy and, in this sense, democracy was being served. Dahl's method of only 
considering the observable exercise of power as actual power and seeing outcomes 
as a result of competitive politics, ensured that he succeeded in his own terms of 
showing a polyarchal model and, therefore, that an elite does not control the 
political agenda. This was a straightforward example of the empiricist method, 
where Dahl's observations of the political process generated a theory about the 
nature of the political process and its inherent democracy. 
Problems with Dahl's account were swiftly identified, and his work was 
significantly critiqued by Bachrach and Baratz (1962 and 1970). Bachrach and 
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Baratz identified problems with Dahl's analysis in terms of what they referred to as 
`agenda-setting' and `non-decisions'. In other words they identified the capacity of 
some individuals to exert indirect influence on the policy process which would not 
manifest itself in Dahl's empirically focussed study. Often considered as an elite 
theory response to Dahl, the central problem for Bachrach and Baratz, arising from 
Dahl's analysis, was his concentration on the agenda as already set (and thus a 
given, without prompting the need for further investigation) as well as his totalling 
of victories and losses based only on those discussions which were had within the 
formal political arena of the Council chamber. Bachrach and Baratz were able to 
point to events in contemporary American society to claim that Dahl's analysis was 
deeply flawed. The civil rights movements and, later, anti-Vietnam protests were 
attracting more and more attention in the late 1950s and early 1960s and it was 
clear that unnoticed protest had built up, thus demonstrating a lack of the 
consensus (the assumption of consensus had been based on an absence of conflict in 
Dahl's model) and therefore an absence of the democracy of which Dahl had 
written. 
It was clear to Bachrach and Baratz that a consideration of the power to set 
the agenda - which could therefore prevent issues from ever appearing in the public 
or the formal political domain, thus avoiding observable conflict - was necessary. 
Bachrach and Baratz proposed that a lack of conflict in the formal political arena, 
rather than indicating consensus, may actually indicate that power had already been 
exercised. Thus, of importance is the `mobilisation of bias' in the formation of 
political agendas (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 45-46) and an awareness' ... that 
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there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts' (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970: 9). The empirical work which Crenson (1971) carried out on steel 
industries in Gary and East Chicago, Indiana showed that power could be exercised 
in the way Bachrach and Baratz described, and so there was a second dimension to 
the power concept - agenda setting and non-decisions. This analysis of power also 
indicated that policymaking was not necessarily as democratic a process as had 
previously been accepted. Bachrach and Baratz's analysis retained the actor-based, 
agency account of power, however, in terms of the formulation that `a' has power 
over `b' to the extent that `a' can get `b' to do something `b' would not otherwise 
have done. In other words, 
Like their pluralist forebears, Bachrach and Baratz assume that power 
relations exist only insofar as there is actually observable conflict 
between those exercising power and those over whom it is exercised. 
Hay, 1997: 46-7. 
Although acknowledging the significance of individual or group actors in 
terms of their impact on policy within a given context, Lukes (1974) added a third, 
radical dimension to the power concept by introducing a more systemic analysis. 
Briefly, Lukes highlighted the need to consider `interests' and whether the interests 
of an individual could be manipulated so as to forge false wants and therefore 
prevent the expression of `real interests'. The first two accounts of power also 
consider `interests', but underlying each is a different conception of the individual: 
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as manifesting wants in actual observed behaviour (Dahl), or as having the potential 
to develop wants under a variety of conditions (Bachrach and Baratz). Lukes's 
alternative formulation introduces the notion of `real interests', highlighting the 
importance of conditions and relations independent of the individual. In other 
words, individuals can have false wants in the political process and the political 
system is designed in such a way as to prevent the expression of real interests which 
may conflict with the objectives of `the system'. 
This least observable form of power clearly has close associations with 
Marxian concepts of false consciousness and structural power, although Lukes stops 
short of developing a structural approach. As a result, and added to the difficulties 
in proving in actuality that such a power does exist, it has become a more difficult 
set of ideas to take on board for some political scientists. For example Hay writes: 
Lukes thus resurrects the spectre of false consciousness which many had 
thought exorcised from contemporary social and political theory. 
Hay, 1997: 47. 
Although this does not need to be considered a serious criticism of Lukes (more a 
dislike of intangibles such as false consciousness), Hay (1997) goes on to advance a 
more interesting critique of Lukes's radical view of power. 
Hay is concerned with the problems associated with perceived versus real 
interests, and attributes the difficulty to a problem of conflating the identification 
of power with its distribution within the system. According to Hay, this results 
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from the identification of power as a negative force: The fact that `a' exercises 
power over `b', subverts the real interests of `b' and, as such, this limits the 
autonomy of V. In other words, Lukes's identification of a power relationship 
involves the judgement that, in all cases, the exercise of power is negative: 
To identify A as exercising power over B is to identify a situation in 
which B's (real) interests are being subverted and to identify A as not 
only responsible but culpable. 
Hay, 1997: 48-9. 
According to Hay, this formulation leads Lukes into further problems when 
attempting to give substance to `real interests'. In order to be able to claim that real 
interests have been subverted in the exercise of power, we require some 
understanding of what constitutes both `real interests' as well as judgements about 
the motivations of A. For Hay this is an ethical dilemma which leads Lukes to 
conclusions which cannot allow for the legitimate exercise of power. Further, in 
order to make sense of Lukes's concept of power, it has to be understood as a 
relative concept, where the `ideal' is a system in which no individuals' interests are 
subverted (which is a normative statement about political life) (Hay, 1997: 49). 
For Hay then, the problems which arise from Lukes's formulation could be 
avoided if the identification of power was separated from value-laden judgements 
critiquing the distribution and exercise of power: 
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In short, the problems of Lukes' formulation reside in his failure to 
differentiate clearly between analytical questions concerning the 
identification of power within social and political settings, and normative 
questions concerning the critique of the distribution and exercise of 
power thus identified. 
Hay, 1997: 50 
Hay goes on to propose that the way to remedy this problem is to distinguish the 
consequence of the exercise of power (as an individual-agency based concept) from 
the context within which future actions must be taken as a result of that exercise. 
So power now has two main components: it is something which has an impact on 
the behaviour of `b' and it has consequences for the context within which future 
behaviour can take place, and this is posed in the negative sense `... which deprives 
the range of possibilities of others' (Hay, 1997: 50). 
What Hay outlines then is a dual concept of power which takes account of 
its different dimensions through reference to both structure (as context) and 
individual agency. Power for Hay then has two equally important strands to it, one 
of direct power, which is conduct-shaping and a second strand of indirect power, 
which is context-shaping: 
In the first formulation, power is a behavioural phenomenon which is 
immediate, directly observable, empirically-verifiable; in the second, 
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power refers to the capacity to redefine structured contexts and is 
indirect, latent and often an unintended consequence. 
Hay, 1997: 51. 
The main benefit which this delivers for Hay is that this dual concept of power 
does not require any judgements to be made about interests, responsibility or 
culpability. In addition, with Hay's useful introduction of a dual concept of power, 
which allows an investigation of power in both direct and indirect forms, a similar 
exercise or application of it should be possible for the purposes of a fuller 
explanation of the policy process. 
It is clear that there are identifiable weaknesses with the type of limited 
concept of power which is used in pluralist and neo-pluralist analyses. Network 
approaches utilise a method which relies on empirical investigation and thus allows 
no significant inquiry into what are more intangible concepts such as structural 
power. The problem which this produces is a possible underestimation of the 
capacity of contextual power resources to constrain the range of actions of 
individual actors. Lukes's third dimension of power highlights the potential 
significance of having a more structural approach, on the basis that otherwise we 
may be seeing a very limited picture of politics. The consequence of a limited view 
of the political process is the production of distorted conclusions about the nature 
of democratic politics in practice, a criticism levelled at Dahl's suggestion that 
democracy was being served not only in New Haven, but across the United States. 
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The more recent work by Hay on power takes issue with the work of 
Lukes, largely on the basis of reintroducing what is considered to be the 
undesirable, intangible concept of `real interests'. Although Hay makes some useful 
contributions to the debate, in particular in relation to some duality of the power 
concept, he essentially returns us to a very individual concept of power. The two 
elements which Hay identifies as conduct and context shaping power both refer to 
the capacity of individual actors to exercise power, either to affect the behaviour of 
other actors or to change the future context of other actions. This type of argument 
retains an agency-centred approach to power and thus leaves no room for any 
structural concept of power. In this sense it does not overcome the stated 
weaknesses in the application of agency-centred accounts of policymaking, that of 
not taking account of possible structural constraints on actor autonomy. 
Hay's style of argument takes us to the heart of the structure and agency 
debate and introduces the notion of a relationship between agents and their context 
insofar as agents can affect both individual behaviour as well as the context within 
which that behaviour takes place. This type of dynamic relationship between 
structure and agency has become a dominant theme of the literature in this field. 
However, the most recent contributions to this particular debate see a more 
significant, reciprocal power relationship between structure and agency where each 
impacts on the other. 
As it has been suggested that some ability to account for the potential of 
structure to impact on individual agency may be fundamentally important for our 
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understanding of the policymaking process, it is to the relationship between 
structure and agency that we now turn. 
2.5 The social theory literature on agency and structure 
The desire to find a middle ground between agency-emphasising and structure- 
emphasising accounts within social science is not new. There has been an on-going 
debate throughout the evolution of the political and social sciences about the 
validity of reducing political and social phenomena to either individuals or to 
society (see Giddens, 1979 and Archer, 1995). This is a distinction between the 
primacy of the meso- or the macro-level, which will inform the method of inquiry. 
As Archer (1995) points out, what is referred to as the debate about 
structure and agency in fact mirrors older debates of individualism versus holism 
which have always been a strong current within sociological discourse. There is an 
enduring epistemological issue about how far one can understand society through 
the character and actions of individuals, or whether it is necessary to understand 
the social context, and thus the constraints, which may shape the character and 
actions of those individuals. Given the centrality of this debate, and the steady 
rehearsal of the perceived flaws within each approach, it is unsurprising that there 
has been a third current within sociology which attempts to transcend these two 
positions. 
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Before discussing this alternative position, it is instructive to briefly outline 
the main points of the structure and agency debate. As already noted, social theory 
has traditionally fallen into one of two camps which have had different labels over 
time, but essentially refer to the same methodological/epistemological distinction. 
Those theories which focus on the `social system' tend to see social actors as being 
affected by the system, as Dawe explains, `In terms of their existence and nature as 
social beings, their social behaviour and relationships, and their very sense of 
personal identity as human beings, they are determined by it' (Dawe, 1979: 367). 
By contrast, sociology of social action `... conceptualizes the social system as 
derivative of social action and interaction, a social world produced by its members, 
who are thus pictured as active, purposeful, self- and socially-creative beings' (Ibid. ) 
These two positions have been, for the most part, considered as alternatives to one 
another and, as such, provide a basic tension within sociological thought. 
It is clear that there are some difficulties in both the individualist (social 
action) and the more structural (social system) approaches to social and political 
inquiry. Despite these difficulties, social scientists still tend to be more closely 
associated with one of these two modes of investigation, as the method which 
underpins each is a crucially important epistemological decision. The debate has 
retained its significance precisely because the method of generating general theory 
from the interactions at the micro-level and meso-level, or of admitting some prior 
theorisation of the structural context, informs any analysis of social or political 
outcomes. In other words, it forms a part of the explanation of social and political 
phenomena. 
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As previously noted, the difficulties of each method, which essentially 
revolve around the problems associated with reductionism: either to the level of the 
individual or to society, have produced a further dimension to the discussion: that 
of an approach which seeks to demonstrate a reciprocal relationship between 
structure and agency. That is, an approach which claims that it is not possible to be 
reductionist in your method, whether that be to the micro- or the macro-level, as 
the two are interconnected. To avoid statements about social systems being 
logically prior to and therefore conditioning social action or, alternatively, that 
social systems have no pre-determined form but arise and gain meaning from social 
interaction, a position which supposes that there is a two-way causality seems more 
appropriate. This type of `dual' approach to structure and agency again is not 
particularly new, although it has been further refined in its most contemporary 
version. 
Westergaard and Resler (1975) discussed two levels of power, which they 
thought essential for understanding the functioning of society. They indicated that 
it was necessary to have an approach which utilised two levels of power - one for 
individuals, another for structure - in order to understand the nature of the impact 
of individuals on their context, as well to understand that individual actions are 
limited by the constraint of structural power. In this way Westergaard and Resler 
were attributing different types of power to what they considered to be different 
types of actor - individuals and the social system. This can be seen as one particular 
dual approach to structure and agency which, although separating out the two 
levels of analysis, nevertheless points to something of a mutually dependent 
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relationship. With this particular approach it is possible to emphasise one type of 
power actor as being dominant in the relationship, but importantly highlights the 
validity of considering each in relation to the other, rather than focussing solely on 
structure or on individual agency. 
One criticism of this approach however, is that although it highlights a 
certain dualism of structure and agency, it doesn't articulate the nature of the 
relationship between the two levels of power. This type of criticism has also been 
made of Anthony Giddens's contribution in his theory of structuration. Giddens 
(1979) discusses structure and agency in relation to power, and develops a theory of 
structuration, which points to the false dualism of objectivism and subjectivism and 
instead indicates the unity of structure and agency. Giddens is concerned with 
social order and the recurrent social practices which comprise it. This leads him to 
ask questions about `what `action' and the sphere of the `social' must be like and 
how they should be conceptualised' (Cassell, 1993: 9). What Giddens then argues is 
that there are sets of actions (social practices) which are enacted by individuals 
through reference to a set of rules which, in their turn, are able to shape those 
(future) social practices. 
In this sense then, structure and agency are bound together, and only make 
sense conceptually if considered as part of a two-way relationship, where 
individuals behave according to social rules and this activity creates or reproduces 
future social rules. In this way social action and the social system are conjoined and 
each provides meaning for the other. So structure is external to individuals but also 
provides the means by which (through rules and resources) agency is produced. 
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Structure and action are conjoined - by applying the rules it has the 
unintended consequence of reproducing them. This is the duality of 
structure - as a medium and unintended outcome of social practices. At 
each point of structural reproduction there is also the potential for a 
change to the rules 
Cassell, 1993: 13. 
As Giddens explains, 
By the duality of structure, I mean the essential recursiveness of social 
life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and 
outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters 
simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and 
`exists' in the generating moments of this constitution. 
Giddens, 1979: 5. 
In this way structure and agency are inextricably linked so as to be considered a 
unified concept, in which structure and agency only make sense if considered as 
existing and, at that same time, generating the other. 
A further important element of Giddens's theory is his emphasis on the 
importance of spatial and temporal conceptions: ` ... as in the theory of agency - 
and in order to show the interdependence of action and structure - we must grasp 
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the time-space relations inherent in the constitution of all social interaction (Giddens, 
1979: 3). The time-space relations are significant in terms of the means of 
recognising the unity of structure and agency, and form a significant part of 
Archer's analysis in the same way. 
According to Archer (1995) the main problem with Giddens's theory is that 
it is not enough to recognise that there is a dualism of structure and agency, it is 
essential to be able to explain the relationship between them. For Archer, 
Giddens's theory has no means of explaining the way in which one 
(structure/agency) affects the other or the interplay of the two. 
In her work on structure and agency, Archer develops what she refers to as 
the morphogenetic approach (Archer, 1995: 5). Again she begins with a discussion of 
the need to avoid the perceived difficulties of both upwards and downwards 
conflationary approaches, through a social realism which seeks to transcend the 
two. The further dimension to Archer's approach is that she does provide an 
explanation of the relationship between structure and agency and the ways in 
which one affects the other. Her description of the approach indicates the nature of 
her model. `The `morpho' element is an acknowledgement that society has no pre- 
set form or preferred state: the `genetic' is a recognition that it takes its shape from, 
and is formed by, agents, originating from the intended and unintended 
consequences of their activities' (Archer, 1995: 5). 
The important elements of Archer's approach are the dynamic and 
reciprocal relationship between structure and agency, and the context of `over 
time'. Archer elaborates the reciprocal relationship through a discussion of her 
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proposition that, at any given point in time, either individuals or structures are 
logically prior to the other. In other words, firstly, individuals do not exist at any 
point in a context which is not previously determined by the pre-existing structure 
of society. She then contends that structure is not static, it changes over time, and 
the way in which it changes is explained by the actions of individuals. That is, 
individuals are able to impact on the shape of the existing structures such that their 
actions produce structural change. The new structural context then provides the 
environment for the actions of future individuals and so on. In this way Archer 
seeks to demonstrate that structure and agency are in a dynamic and reciprocal 
relationship where each affects the other in a formative way, and thus provide the 
societal dynamic. 
What is particularly useful in Archer's approach is the recognition of a need 
for a dual approach to structure and agency, which thus implies a dual approach to 
power. A difference between Archer's contribution and that of Westergaard and 
Resler for example, is that it indicates the significance of the exercise of power by 
both individuals and structures, in that individuals can alter the structural context 
of future individuals as much as structure can constrain the actions of individuals. 
In this way, neither social action nor the social system are primary, neither has the 
sole or `real' explanatory capacity. Further, it is impossible to conceive of either 
structure or agency in this way as current manifestations of social structure are 
formed by the prior exercise of social action and vice versa. Whether we should 
agree that this is always true or perhaps is equally true for any given context is 
maybe an area for discussion. For example, even a strongly structural school of 
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social science such as Marxism could argue that a particular group of individuals, 
having gained class consciousness, are able to change the structural context. They 
may also want to argue, however, that a certain conjunction of historical, structural 
forces needs also to be present in order for that to take place successfully. In other 
words, at any given time it may not be possible for individuals, even if organised 
and class conscious, to seriously affect the structure because the nature of structural 
power is of a different and greater magnitude than individual power or agency. 
2.6 Developing the idea of a dual approach to policymaking 
The benefit of the dual approach to structure and agency is that it expresses a 
conviction that to artificially separate structure and agency is to misunderstand the 
complex enmeshing of the two. In fact, it is claimed, in order to make sense of 
social systems it is essential to conceive of structure and agency as conjoined, where 
shaping power is afforded to both structure and agency in terms of their impact on 
one another. It is worth noting four points of commonality in these theories: 
1. The duality of structure and agency; 
2. The duality of power insofar as agency can change structure and structure 
provides the rules of social action; 
3. The ability to change the structural context may be an intended or an 
unintended consequence of social action; 
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4. To make sense of this type of duality, it is necessary to have a spatial-temporal 
conception. 
The benefits of this type of approach are clear in that they successfully 
avoid the problems of reductionism either to the individual or to structure. To 
highlight such a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between structure and agency 
is to avoid determinism, functionalism, individualism and structural indeterminism. 
Despite the fact that this type of interpretation provides a more sophisticated 
framework for conceiving of structure and agency, the way in which it 
operationalises power may still pose a problem. It may seem sensible to attribute 
power resources to both structure and agency, but the way in which this is 
formulated retains a concept of structure which is constantly open to the pressures 
of social action. In spite of the fact that the structural arrangements are understood 
as providing `the rules of the game', these are able to be challenged and changed 
through the actions of individuals. In other words, the emphasis on liberating social 
analysis from any form of determinism or reification of structure means that the 
`rules of the game' have no additional purpose, separate identity and so on. As 
Giddens explains, 
According to the theory of structuration, social systems have no 
purposes, reasons or needs whatsoever; only human individuals do so. 
Any explanation of social reproduction which imputes teleology to social 
systems must be declared invalid. 
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Giddens, 1979: 7, emphasis in the original. 
Whilst it is important to avoid the errors of functionalism and reification, however, 
we should be careful not to lose any grip of the particular character of structural 
constraints within certain historical epochs. In fact there is no reason why the 
retreat from functionalism must involve our denying that structural constraints 
have an historical character. 
The literature on structure and agency tends to leave the historical element 
out, as if we could have a purely ahistorical conception of the relationship between 
structure and agency. In contrast, it is argued here that we cannot properly 
understand this relationship without understanding the particular character of 
structural constraints which is specific to the epoch under consideration. So, the 
dualism outlined by Giddens and Archer may successfully navigate social inquiry 
through the pitfalls of an artificial distinction between structure and agency, but 
may not fully liberate us from real structural indeterminism. 
It is possible that ahistorical dual formulations could still fit with a pluralist 
methodology, if they sought to make some assessment of the state as a potential 
articulation of the preferences of system level actors, for example. However, it 
seems impossible to incorporate a view about the general character of structural 
constraints in different epochs in a pluralist approach. The formulations outlined 
above discuss structure and social action in general terms. There is no historical 
context insofar as structural arrangements reflect the organisation of the social 
system. Each transformation of structure presumably indicates a new era, the 
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development of the social system. Other approaches, notably Marxism, would 
want to emphasise the importance of the organisation of the social system. It is not 
necessary to fall into the traps of instrumentalism or functionalism in order to 
highlight the significance of type of system - feudalism, capitalism and so on - for 
shaping social action and therefore political outcomes. 
The notion of a certain dualism in power and in the relationship between 
agents and structures is a persuasive and dominant theme of most recent 
contributions to this field. If it is possible to retain some element of this type of 
dualism in our approach to understanding the policymaking process then there 
seem to be some clear advantages over network type approaches. 
In order to overcome what is claimed to be the central weakness of network 
approaches - that of considering that any outcome is possible within the political 
process - some introduction of a structural dimension to the power concept may 
overcome this difficulty. If the contention is that some assessment of the macro- 
level would inform our understanding of the meso-level political process, then a 
method which would admit such an assessment would be an improvement on 
network theory. 
It should be clear from the discussion throughout this chapter that the 
various incarnations of the networks approach only make sense within an 
overarching pluralist framework. Any differing assumptions about structural 
power or contextual constraints on actor autonomy cannot have any impact within 
pluralist approaches. The reason for this is that such assumptions are part of a prior 
theorising process about the nature of the polity, democracy and so on. Such claims 
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cannot be evidenced in observable phenomena, precisely because they are the kind 
of intangibles such as `false consciousness' which Hay finds a hindrance to political 
inquiry. Consequently they cannot form a part of an empiricist method and, as 
such, are not addressed by network approaches. 
Having proposed that some judgements about the structural context of 
political activity are a fundamental part of any method, the implication is not that 
all empirical investigation should thus be abandoned. The proposal is not that 
network approaches do not work because they are not structuralist approaches, but 
that perhaps a duality of these opposing methods, if possible, should be preferred. 
The reason for this is that structuralist arguments can encounter as many 
difficulties in application as network approaches. In particular, the tendency to 
determinism is a problem which has seen a steady trend away from wholly 
structural approaches, including some contemporary schools of Marxism. The 
criticisms of over-structuration are valid insofar as structurally pre-determined 
outcomes, which thus allow no role for agency, seem nonsensical. If it was possible 
to read off all answers from an analysis of structures without any engagement with 
day to day political interactions then there would be little point in social and 
political inquiry. However, most structurally focussed accounts do not entirely 
disengage with the empirical approach, but understanding the balance between 
structure and agency here is crucial. 
To summarise: 
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1. Pluralist and neo-pluralist approaches are limited by their method - in particular 
by their understanding of the concept of power and a certain structural 
indeterminism. 
2. A dual and dynamic relationship between structure and agency seems to have 
distinct advantages for political inquiry. 
3. Consequently, substituting a purely structural account for a pluralist one, simply 
produces new problems rather than providing a simple solution to the weaknesses 
of pluralism. 
4. A method which can operationalise a dual concept of power, and can thus 
account for a combination of structural power resources and individual agency in 
the policymaking process, is more desirable. 
2.7 Conclusion 
There are three areas which have been discussed within this chapter, which should 
enable us to establish more clearly the needs of policymaking theory and, thus, the 
apparent requirement of what we have referred to as a `dual approach'. The chapter 
began by further highlighting the unsatisfactory elements of the currently 
dominant neo-pluralist approaches to policymaking analysis. It was claimed that 
the weaknesses of the networks approach can be partly explained through reference 
to the range of actors considered within such approaches, and partly through the 
concept of power at the heart of pluralism more generally. 
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The first problem arises from the omission of a theory of the state which 
may identify it as a potential constraint on actor autonomy. Owing to the emphasis 
on non-formalised power relationships as well as the fact that they are a reaction to 
state-centric approaches, networks models do not consider the state as either a 
strong, unified, distinct social actor which is able to successfully pursue its own 
agenda or as a structural constraint in policymaking. The lack of investigation of 
the state in these terms could certainly produce a distorted explanation of political 
outcomes. 
It was noted that the issue of state theory could be resolved within a 
pluralist approach, if the state was defined as a distinct social actor. This possibility 
will be discussed in Chapter Five. What is more difficult to resolve is the 
distribution of power between structure and agency. Within neo-pluralism the 
focus is clearly on actor autonomy at the meso-level. Even if we were to include a 
strong state in that formulation we would be discussing the (relative) autonomy of 
those social actors (including the state) from their macro context (the social 
system). The social organisation of the system, it is argued, should also be 
considered as directly relevant to understanding political behaviour. However, 
although structure is considered important, a return to structural determinism only 
hinders the discussion as reductionism to either individuals or the system is 
considered problematic. Consequently the development of a dualism of structure 
and agency was considered. 
It was claimed that the benefits of a dual approach to structure and agency 
are essentially two. Firstly it allows us to begin to seriously engage with a notion of 
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structure once more; and secondly it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of both 
functionalism and structural indeterminism using this type of approach. Despite 
providing a framework for understanding the reciprocal relationship between 
structure and agency, the problem remains one of an ahistorical approach. One of 
the main issues of contention with the pluralist and neo-pluralist method is that, 
because it only truly engages with the meso-level, it does not provide a theory of 
social context. The contributions of Archer and Giddens, although allowing us to 
take structure seriously, do not provide a theory of specific social context - for 
example, capitalism. 
The following chapters will provide a case study of policymaking, which 
will serve to underline both the utility and limitations of pluralist approaches. The 
case study, considered through the lens of neo-pluralism, provides a reservoir of 
useful information about the management of a specific policy domain, as well as 
the actions and interactions of social actors in that field as they attempt to influence 
policy. It is suggested, however, that this type of approach cannot ask questions 
about other social actors, for example the possibility that the state may be an 
influential social actor, nor assess the relevance of the structural context of 
policymaking. If the argument that the state and the social system are relevant to 
political outcomes is persuasive, then the limitations of the network approach 
should be clear. 
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Chapter 3. An Outline of the Case Study 
3.1 Introduction 
The opening chapters have considered the contributions of pluralist and neo- 
pluralist frameworks to the analysis of the policymaking process. The discussion 
indicated that neo-pluralist network approaches are society-centred and, as such, 
concentrate on the informal interactions between policy actors as they attempt to 
exert influence on decision makers. The benefit of this type of approach is the 
mapping out of the actions of cohorts of policy actors in the policymaking process 
and an assessment of the types of actors who are able to have the greatest impact on 
political outcomes. As previously described, different network approaches focus on 
different types of resource - expertise, access to civil servants, economic resources 
(businesses) - which may improve the lobbying position of some interests in any 
given policy domain. These type of approaches then can identify the influence of 
non-formalised networks of policy actors, as well as make judgements about their 
motivation and capacity for policy impact. 
The purpose of the following two chapters is to provide an outline of part 
of a policy domain which should allow for a networks-type assessment of social 
actor interactions. The aim then, is to illuminate the type of information, in a 
specific case, which can be uncovered using this type of approach. It is clear that 
this type of focus on social actors in a policy domain provides a good indication of 
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the range of actors, and the ways in which consultation may be more limited than 
classic pluralist pressure group politics would imply. As well as identifying a 
hierarchy of policy actors, the marginalisation of other groups through the formal 
consultation process is instructive. 
This first chapter will provide an overview of the case study area: the EU 
Task Force Environment-Water. Chapter Four will look more closely at the 
experience and outcomes of this consultative Task Force, in order to indicate the 
constraints on real and open interaction of all interested actors in this domain. 
Although the use of Task Force initiatives is not a new policy tool for the EU, the 
Task Force Environment-Water is a relatively new area for action, only formalising 
its structures in 1995/96. One advantage of looking at a recent policy initiative is 
that the networks involved in the consultation also had to be newly formulated. In 
that sense the means by which different groups either accessed the area or were 
drawn into the consultation were visible, making the identification of core and 
marginal groups more straight forward. Also, the Task Force system of 
policymaking formalises the need for wide consultation within sectors, within 
member states and across the two key levels of governance: national and European. 
Further, this particular consultation called for concertation between technical and 
professional experts as well as consumer and environmental interests. Taking these 
two dimensions together adds to the possibilities for classifying access by types of 
actor according to means (that is, resource access - for example expertise, 
relationship with civil servants and so on) and motivation. 
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The discussion of the policy actors in this case study should thus enable a 
clearer indication of the types of information about policymaking which it is 
possible to discover using this type of empirical approach. We can test the utility as 
well as point to the limits of an inductive approach like pluralism, and thus further 
elaborate the case for an approach which considers both the full remit of social 
actors and which takes account of the macro context of policy behaviour (an 
approach which allows the use of deductive arguments). 
3.1.1 The context of the case study: EU water policy 
It can be noted that there has been an increasing policy reach by the EU into 
significant national policy domains. As such, much policy discussion and 
negotiation now takes place in pan-European arenas - whether those are led by the 
EU itself, or formalised business, labour, (or other) networks which are sector 
specific - and water policy is no exception. Consequently, the level of interaction 
between the domestic and regional (European) arenas is increasing and, therefore, it 
is important to be clear about the nature of the type of policy forum offered 
through EU policy tools such as Task Forces. 
As noted above, the water industry has not been immune from the 
expansion of EU policy competence. Environmental policy more generally has 
been an integral part of the EU agenda (in terms of regulation and targets) since the 
1970s through the development of the Environmental Action Programmes. In 
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industry terms within the UK, pricing and product quality issues have also been 
subject to review and regulation since the privatisation of the water industry in 
1989. 
Together these two factors have forced the UK water industry and the 
regulatory bodies (the Environment Agency, Ofwat) into the realm of enhanced 
strategic thinking in terms of long-run research to meet current EU and UK 
imperatives, as well as developing new technologies to meet future supply 
problems. In other words, the water industry has to be at the forefront of research 
and development in order to meet EU criteria around quality targets, as well as to 
maintain competitive advantage within the UK. (Since privatisation, the water 
companies in England and Wales have been operating in a competitive market of 
pricing, quality, supply and management of ground and surface waters, where 
expertise is no longer a shared commodity as all such information is deemed 
commercially sensitive). 
Consequently, as a result of the significance of research and development 
for the UK industry as well as the need to be profitable, the industry is hungry for 
external funding for research from any agency which has money available. The 
Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions in the UK (DTER: 
formerly separate government departments for transport and the environment) 
does support strategic research from the technical and scientific community in 
relation to water management issues. However, such support is constrained by 
other considerations, in particular, departmental spending limits and public 
recognition of the problem (which may be limited or inaccurate). These two factors 
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have had a negative impact on the ability of water research professionals to act as 
they see fit, in order to respond to the demands placed upon them. Firstly, as the 
DTER will admit, it isn't always a case of the best case getting funded, as the 
Department may often respond to those who shout loudest in the lobby rather 
than the best proposal for problem resolution. (Telephone interview with Tony 
Lloyd at DTER 19/5/97) 
This factor is further exaggerated by the problem of public identification of 
a water management problem. From the point of view of those leading the research 
and development within the industry, the public are full of misconceptions about 
what the `real' problems are for water companies and other regulatory bodies. In 
those cases, monies can be directed to areas which resonate with the public, rather 
than to those which would benefit most from resources. (Interview with Dr 
Packham, at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
Secondly, with the advent of competitive tendering for research and 
development, a call by the DTER for ideas for a particular policy issue can result in 
a series of responses from the industry which are then farmed out to other 
(cheaper) agencies to carry out. 
The net result of the difficulties which can be experienced in working with 
UK government funding, has been for the industry to look increasingly to the EU 
for assistance. The EU, as yet, is not constrained in the same way as national 
governments in terms of problems of resourcing and electability. Additionally, the 
relevant public (in terms of funding research for future markets) for the EU 
remains, essentially, the business sector. 
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The Task Force which is the subject of the case study presented here, then, 
is one of the `carrots' used by the EU in order to further embrace business and thus 
serve its own agenda of policy expansion and authoritative decision making. The 
EU documentation explicitly stated that the key objective of the consultation 
exercise engendered by the Task Force was to improve the competitiveness of 
European business in this policy domain. The research would be targeted to 
exploiting gaps identified in the international market for water management 
technologies in an ever-expanding global market. 
The nature of this particular policy area then is such that it should highlight 
the important relationships between policy actors in both national and pan- 
European fora. What is clear is that the location and interaction of UK water 
policy actors has changed as a result of two key developments. Firstly the 
expanding remit of the EU and the funding which it makes available, has increased 
the scope of some policy actor networks through the EU's emphasis on pan- 
European policy approaches. Secondly, the privatisation of the UK water industry 
is likely to have affected the importance of development and control of expertise, 
due to the more competitive nature of the policy domain. With strategic thinking 
being commercially sensitive information, the influence of leading policy experts is 
likely to be enhanced. 
This has a further consequence in terms of competing expertise. It has 
already been noted that the water industry is wary of public problem identification 
for water quality and water management. This may already push the role of 
organisations representing consumer interests to the margins. Also, if policy 
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expertise is significant network currency, water company professionals may be 
reluctant to be challenged by competing views on quality and management issues. 
One might expect then that environmental organisations would encounter 
difficulties in any such network if their `policy expertise' conflicted with that of 
water professionals. 
The purpose of the following two chapters will be to examine the actor 
interaction in the case of the EU's Water Task Force and to highlight the 
relationships between these different types of policy actor. The Task Force, as 
noted, was a means of conducting research into improving the competitiveness of 
European business. In addition it was very clear that the consultation required, 
prior to the drafting of proposals, should include consumer and citizen concerns. In 
this way the Task Force formalised a network of diverse actors. The following 
sections will outline the aims and organisation of the Task Force. 
3.1.2 The organisation of the chapter 
This chapter will set out the overall framework of the case study of the Task Force: 
Environment - Water. It will also provide an introduction to the UK organisations 
and individual actors who played a key role in the Task Force consultation process. 
As such, the chapter is divided into sections on the different aspects of the Task 
Force organisation. 
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The first part (section 3.2) gives an introduction to the philosophy behind 
the Task Force initiative. Section 3.3 looks more specifically at the particular Task 
Force under discussion: Environment - Water. It is concerned with the shape of the 
Task Force, its history and purpose. It further details the way the Task Force 
operated through the use of what are referred to as `Mirror Task Forces', organised 
around either national or pan-European professional nexuses. The major part of 
this section then profiles the central players involved from the UK and the 
different capacities in which they were invited to participate. 
Specifically under consideration are: the professional Mirror Task Force 
involving the UK base of Techware (a pan-European research organisation which 
serves the research needs of water professionals); the UK national Mirror Task 
Force, which conducted the day-to-day management of the UK submission to the 
EU's central Task Force (organised under the auspices of the Foundation for Water 
Research and headed up by Dr Ron Packham); and finally, the range of individuals 
and organisations contacted by the UK national Mirror Task Force and invited to 
form a part of the consultation process within the UK. (A more detailed 
breakdown of the involvement of different organisations within both the UK 
Mirror Task Force and the professional Mirror Task Force can be found in 
Chapter Four. ) 
Having outlined the broad structure of the Task Force and how it operated, 
and following the discussion of the various roles played by those involved in the 
UK, this chapter highlights the main issues for empirical consideration. Significant 
questions about the fundamental operation of the Task Force, the weight of inputs 
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from sub-national actors and the mechanism for forging a national network arise 
from this first appraisal of the Task Force. In addition, some more fundamental 
questions about the openness of the Task Force from its outset and the benefits of 
`imposed' consultation are considered. These begin to identify some of the 
constraints on the autonomous capacity of policy actors. 
3.2 The Task Force philosophy 
In June 1995 the European Commission created eight `Task Forces' to 
stimulate research and technology development and encourage a closer 
link between research and innovation in key areas for industrial 
competitiveness, employment and quality of life. 
Commission of the European Communities, Science, Research & 
Development: Research-Industry Task Forces 1/1 internet. ' 
The Task Force philosophy is wedded to the broader aims of the EU, which is 
evidenced in the Task Force mission statement. The consensus around key 
priorities of employment, competitiveness and sustainable development (using new 
technologies) is reflected in Directorate General XII's (the Directorate General 
responsible for Research) justification for launching Task Forces which are focused 
1 All references to internet pages within this chapter, refer to the following site: 
http: //europa. eu. int/en/comm/dgl2/tf-wati. html. 
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on meeting the goals of their own research agenda. As a means of finding new 
solutions to old problems, the Framework Programmes2 opened up the way for 
collaborative research and new ideas to be filtered into the system. 
The Task Forces are a way of accessing and then applying national `know- 
how' (which is located in the industries and universities of the member states) to 
European initiatives in a more telling way. In other words, the Task Forces are 
designed to highlight the key problem areas (to which the EU can apply itself) 
within a particular policy domain, as identified by researchers and the industry in 
the various member states. The EU then offers the incentive of research contracts 
to individuals and organisations which have the expertise to successfully execute 
the proposals. Task Forces are an exclusively European tool in the sense that they 
can only be used to generate research for pan-European problems and, thus, rather 
than undercut national initiatives, they are designed to have `clear added value'. 
The Task Forces are an instrument for consultation and coordination. 
They aim to improve the effectiveness of EU research by targeting the 
most strategically important areas; coordinating research across the 
Union and with other areas of policy; and demonstrating the relevance 
and value of research expenditure to Europe's citizens. 
Commission of the European Communities, Science, Research & 
Development: Research-Industry Task Forces 1/1 internet. 
2 First created in 1984, these are research programmes designed to provide a five year strategy in 
given policy areas. 
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The Task Force, as a more general process, has been developed as - what the 
Commission refers to -a `new approach to working' (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1996a: 1). Task Forces should consist of a formalised 
consultation towards directed policy `ends' through a mix of government, industry, 
scientific community, research community, and consumer inputs. The benefits to 
policy (and therefore EU citizens and also non-EU states) from this kind of 
network, should be immense. 
Of particular interest is that this kind of policy procedure, with its in-built 
consultative approach, thus incorporates a multi-layered approach to working on 
both the vertical (from national to international) and horizontal (the range of 
actors involved at each point) axes. Vertically this is managed through the national- 
regional (e. g. the Mediterranean)-European-international dimensions, channelling 
expertise upwards to promote both concertation and improvement of the 
competitive position. Horizontally, it is managed at each of the vertical junctures 
by the relevant socio-economic actors, stakeholders, users. This can be represented 
by the following diagram: 
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INTERNATIONAL EU interaction with other international markets 
a 
EUROPEAN Pan-European research organisations, e. g. Techware 
ft 
REGIONAL e. g the Mediterranean region has a collaborative 
submission 
NATIONAL Researchers, users, water managers; organised through 
national Mirror Task Forces 
Figure 2: The management structure of the EU Task Force 
Vertical axis : different levels of input into Task Force 
Horizontal axis: organisations relevant to each level of input 
The case study focuses on the national and the European level of input. This 
is because the interaction between the national and the European level of 
governance with regard to policymaking is of particular interest, as this should give 
some insight into relationship between the EU policymakers and the member 
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states. In this sense then, it should demonstrate the outcome of increased EU policy 
reach: the need to drive towards goals that can best be reached at the supranational 
level (penetrating new international markets), but doing so in close harmony with 
member states and sub-national stakeholders (to satisfy the requirements of clear 
added value and subsidiarity). It further acts as a means of legitimising EU action in 
a given field and, through initiatives such as the Task Force, the Commission 
should be made aware of national stakeholder and member state government 
concerns - particularly in areas where those individuals or organisations see a 
specific role for EU action. 
Further interest derives from the significant input in this particular domain 
of both government officials (represented through the DTER) and expertise (those 
researchers and water professionals who can offer up solutions to water quality and 
water management problems). Therefore, the case study should help to shed light 
on another area of interest, by illuminating the role and impact of `experts' within 
the policy process and their relationship with other actors. 
3.3 The case study: Task Force Environment-Water 
According to the Task Force Environment-Water documentation, its specific 
objectives were: 
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" to define research priorities in strict consultation with the socio-economic 
actors; 
" to reinforce the co-ordination between Community, national and private 
research activities; 
" to stimulate an environment favourable to innovation. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1997: 1. 
In other words, the objectives were to create a formalised network of expert actors 
across the EU, as well as to manage the input from all relevant socio-economic 
stakeholders (including consumers and environmentalists) and to encourage public- 
private networks to channel their energies directly into a pan-European research 
agenda. 
The aims of the Water Task Force reflect recognition of the increasing 
salience of global water management issues (supply, pollution, waste water 
treatment and so on), but they also reflect the EU's increasing remit to regulate this 
area. Having established the right to regulate the water sector in the 1970s, the 
boundaries of that remit have continued to move ever outwards. As the 
Commission notes in its Preliminary Report (1996), the very fact of EU regulation 
of water has added to the demand for new technology in the water sectors of the 
developed world and, additionally, the Commission therefore sees a future role for 
the EU in providing research and development in these growing water management 
sectors. 
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There are, however, significant differences between the various operators 
and between regions, which research and technology transfer could help 
to reduce ... 
The market is in full expansion ... On the global scale, the 
market will probably more than double in size over the next 15 years; 
the growth will be particularly strong in south-east Asia and Latin 
America. In order to meet the opportunities of this growing market, a 
particular effort is required in research, the adaptation of technologies, 
and innovation in the financing and organisation of international 
cooperation. 
Commission of the European Communities, Water: A European 
Priority, 1/1 internet. 
The Task Force process is not simply a set of measures which seek to 
accumulate the best knowledge, with the aims of improving water management and 
eradicating differences between states. The Commission has also recognised a gap in 
the market which it is particularly well positioned to exploit, assuming it can raise 
the competitiveness of its research and new product development in this field. The 
objectives of the Task Force Environment-Water were: 
... to contribute towards the development of a European strategy for 
sustainable management and rational use of water, to make European 
enterprises associated with this area more competitive on the internal and 
world markets and to refocus scientific and technological cooperation on 
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priority projects, inter alia in the EU's relations with the Central and 
East European and Mediterranean countries. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1996c: 1. 
To fulfil this remit and to maintain, or attempt to increase, the social 
capital3 element of Commission activity, the Commission outlined four axes 
within which inputs from the various Mirror Task Forces should be framed 
and which it also identified as the focus of citizen concerns. These were: 
" The Fight Against Pollution 
" The Rational Use of Water (Demand Management) 
" The Fight Against Water Deficits 
" The Prevention and Management of Crises 
Commission of the European Communities, 1997: 2. 
Within these broad citizen-focused axes there are a number of more 
detailed target areas. These are areas where, according to the Commission, 
the relevant actors (in this case decision makers and implementors) `.. . 
require specific types of knowledge to orientate their actions' (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1996a: 4). Herein we find the significance of 
the specialist knowledge which is required, in order to meet the concerns of 
3 Social capital is used here to refer to the knock-on benefits for citizens of the member states from 
policy and research initiatives enacted by the Commission. 
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water management. Thus the research know-how garnered from the experts 
is to have both the more immediate benefit of improving national and EU 
water management policy, as well as the longer-run benefit of being able to 
market that information for developing countries and so improve the EU's 
competitive position. 
TASK FORCE CHRONOLOGY 
October 1995 Start of Task Force 
March 1996 Initial Call for Ideas 
DTER designated UK National Contact Point (NCP) 
May 1996 DTER contacts Foundation for Water Research (FWR) to manage UK 
Mirror Task Force (MTF) 
FWR appoint Ron Packham as UK Mirror Task Force co-ordinator 
Ron Packham begins to make contact with potential participants 
Second Call for Ideas: deadline December 1996 
December 1996 Techware Forum, Marlow, UK 
Dr Packham contacts all `second wave' respondents 
February 1997 Submission of UK MTF's report 
May 1997 Summary of Progress 
June 1997 Meeting in Baveno, Italy 
October 1998 Publication of final document 
Figure 3: Chronology of main events in the evolution of the Task Force 
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The Commission began the consultation process through an initial 
`Call for Ideas' which provided information on the remit of the Task Force 
and the proposal for national (centred around the relevant government 
department or agency. In the case of the UK this was the DTER and the 
Foundation for Water Research) and industry (professional) based `Mirror 
Task Forces' (MTFs). The Commission suggested that there should be a 
National Contact Point (NCP) for the co-ordination and management of 
each national input. The NCP for the UK was Tony Lloyd at DTER. The 
initial task of the NCP was to find and appoint a national expert to head the 
national Mirror Task Force. The MTFs then created their own consultative 
network of interested policy actors (through the leader of the national 
MTF) with the purpose of drawing up a series of proposals for the key areas 
to target for the future of pan-European water management. 
Having received the various national, professional and individual 
submissions of priorities within each of the four axes, the central (EU) Task 
Force secretariat made a selection of proposals to pursue, making clear that 
it intended that the proposals (in this particular case) would find policy 
form through the Fifth Framework Programme which was to be launched 
in 1999. The fact that, formally, the consultation procedure and research 
agenda should transmit directly into the Fifth Framework Programme (and 
thus provide social capital in addition to the other benefits noted) should 
provide continuity between the network consultation and the policymaking 
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process, which is helpful when deciphering the extent of the impact of the 
different network actors. 
The selection will be made taking into account on-going activities at 
different levels, the importance and urgency of the problems, the 
perspectives offered by science and technology, the market opportunities, 
the competitive position of European and the potential for the 
exploitation of the results of the research. 
Commission of the European Communities, Cooperation and 
Concentration 1/1, internet. 
The UK was represented in the central EU Task Force through the creation of a 
national Mirror Task Force as well as a UK agency providing the focal point of one 
of the key professional Mirror Task forces, Techware. The structure of the UK 
involvement in the Task Force process is shown in the following diagram. 
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DG XII (Research) 
Bruno Schmitz (joint Research Centre' 
u 
u UK National Contact Point 
DTER 
Tony Lloyd 
Professional Mirror Task Force (DMTF) 
Techware 
Mr Alan Bruce / Mervyn Bramley (EA) 
a ional Mirror Task Force (nMTr1 
Foundation for Water Research 




for example, the Water Services Association, Institute of Hydrology 
More 
Figure 4: UK involvement in the Task Force process 
Less input 
113 
3.3.1. Purpose of the Task Force 
The Task Force Environment-Water was a joint initiative of Edith Cresson, Ritt 
Bjerregaard and Martin Bangemann, representing the Commission Directorates 
General in science and education, the environment and industrial affairs. The main 
orientations were agreed after what was described as, 
... 
broad inter-services consultation and first contact with some of the 
key European organisations concerned, at industry and research level. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1996c: 1. 
As previously indicated, the Task Force on water policy is a reflection of the 
Commission's growing policy initiative in this area. It presents its interests in water 
management from many angles - from consumer demands about pollution to issues 
of competitive market location. It assumes that a pan-European collaborative 
approach would allow the EU to better achieve these objectives. Forging a single 
agenda from potentially such diverse sets of interests, however, is not such an easy 
task and could be considered as a major obstacle to the development of the agenda. 
After some limited consultation the Commission provided four broad axes 
within which submissions to the Task Force should be made (see section 3.3 
above). Within those axes there were further, more targeted, issues which were the 
product of internal and limited external review. This may indicate that the 
consultation process which was about to begin through the initial Call for Ideas to 
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member states, was more restricted in terms of the agenda for policy strategy. The 
agenda was already set in terms of key objectives, so the purpose of the `Call' may 
be interpreted differently. One clear advantage to the Commission of establishing 
objectives and then calling for input into the means of achieving those objectives, is 
that it is an important means of identifying and then taking new research and 
strategic thinking from within the member states. 
The first meetings to get the Task Force project off the ground were held in 
October 1995, when discussion and consultation was closed from more general 
participation. External input on a more open basis was invited in March 1996 
where pan-European water industry organisations such as Eureau, EWWG 
(industry), EURAQUA and Techware (Research) could have an input. The broad 
consultation was then further expanded to the full range of potential participants, 
as the EU's Joint Research Centre (as manager of the process) approached 
enterprises and other stakeholders in the water supply and treatment sector (for 
example, specialist research centres on all aspects of water use, water and water 
research users, regional and national authorities and regional planning authorities). 
The framework which was established by the Task Force, effectively 
worked as a means of rationalising the potentially diverse inputs from the wide 
range of national and water industry policy actors in the member states. This seems 
to further indicate a less open framework. To achieve this rationalisation, `Mirror 
Task Forces' (MTFs) were set up to co-ordinate the responses of a discrete field. 
These fields were national (member state), regional (cross-national within EU 
regions) or professional (in this case they were also pan-European). 
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The Commission encouraged the operation of more national MTFs because 
`[T]hey provide a means of involving the maximum number of participants (relay 
function)' (Commission of the European Communities, 1996c: 8). This `relay 
function' would prove beneficial for the Commission in providing a summary of 
all interests in one discrete field. However, the down-side of such summaries is that 
the MTFs' desire to submit a coherent set of proposals provides less room for 
diverse or conflicting opinion, within any single submission document from a 
MTF, whether a national or a professional network. In other words, the creation of 
single MTFs for such large areas as `the Mediterranean' or even `the UK', rather 
than maximising input may in fact have limited both the range of actors to be 
consulted as well as the input of those involved, to those actors who share opinions 
on the direction of water management. This seems to be the only means of 
achieving a coherent MTF submission. In other words the very structure of the 
Task Force from the outset seemed to encourage coherence rather than diversity. 
Although this seems not unreasonable in attempting to achieve specific objectives, 
it does raise questions about the about the ability of actors who do not share the 
view of the dominant MTF network actors to effectively penetrate that network 
and have their views reflected in the submission. 
Already, a general convergence between the priorities of industry and of 
universities and research centres can be observed ... Despite the 
fact that 
water management is, in essence, a local activity, there are clearly several 
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topics of common interest for which a European approach is amply 
justified. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1996c: 8. 
It is clear that the Commission was actually very precise in the 
outline of the kind of areas on which they were seeking advice. The four 
broad axes were broken down further into much more detailed areas of 
investigation which had been established through initial, more closed 
consultation at the European level. In other words, in order to formulate 
the public document establishing the main consultation process, a 
significant consultation had to have already occurred. This first consultation 
produced the menu of needs and wants of the Commission in the water 
policy domain. In that sense the formation of the public consultation 
exercise was, in fact, a way of providing information and knowledge on a 
range of pre-determined issues, rather than sparking a new wave of 
initiative. 
This indicates that the Task Force process was more about 
harnessing new knowledge and expertise than creating an agenda for the 
future of water research. The Commission had identified the issues which 
(in light of subsidiarity) were both significant in terms of challenges facing 
the EU, and ones which required a renewed input from water professionals 
who are otherwise spread across the EU. The `hook' for the external 
consultees within the MTFs is likely to have been one of potential research 
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funding for ideas which had not been able to reach national agendas through 
a combination of limited national funding opportunities and public 
misconceptions of the priorities for water management. Overall, then, the 
real motivations for participation by all parties in the Task Force may have 
been hidden behind the claim in the public documentation that the exercise 
was one of consultation to form the future research agenda for water 
management in Europe. 
3.3.2 How the Task Force developed 
The framework which was originally designed by the Commission changed little 
throughout the process with two notable exceptions. The Commission had 
indicated that the purpose of the Task Force was to provide a framework for 
consultation and ultimately concertation in achieving a coherent research agenda 
for the water sector. Having one eye on citizens (in their role as consumers, 
primarily) and the other firmly on its research export market, the EU created a 
structure which should have produced a valuable circuit of knowledge and thus 
social capital. In fact, given the actual cycle of events, the internal (social capital) 
benefits seem not to have arisen and, in addition, the impact of MTF participants 
seems to have been limited. 
The first reason for this is due precisely to the fact that the agenda 
(objectives) had already been identified. A second reason lies in a change of 
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procedure some way into the Task Force process. In their initial publicity materials 
and information packs to the embryonic national MTFs, the Commission had 
indicated that after some external consultation they would issue a questionnaire to 
the MTF participants to elicit their ideas for the European research agenda. In 
actuality this became, what amounted to, a second `Call for Ideas' to 1500 
interested individuals and organisations, who had been identified by the 
Commission and who, in the case of some of those contacted in the UK, had not 
been invited to participate in either of the UK national or professional MTFs. The 
change on paper may seem subtle, but its significance lies in the impact the decision 
had on the role of the MTFs. Contact, by the Commission, to other interested 
parties effectively by-passed the existing MTF structure (Interview with Dr 
Packham, at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). This changed the role of the national 
Mirror Task Force significantly from one of `ideas man' (a dynamic consultation 
managed by the UK MTFs) to that of providing a `position paper' (writing up the 
range of inputs which were sent to the Commission from UK stakeholders, rather 
than ones who had been invited to participate by the UK officials). This change had 
the effect of further weakening the potential impact that the MTFs could have in 
terms of presenting their own ideas, as the EU now seemed to be choosing their 
consultees for them. 
To summarise, the Commission initiated the Task Force process and used it 
both as a mechanism for internal review as well as a platform for external 
consultation (between government, private and user interests) in order to achieve 
its aim of an improved market position. The Task Force can also be seen as a means 
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for the Commission to firm up its own ideas as well as providing a conduit for the 
input of new proposals. In addition, it encouraged horizontal consultation within 
member states as well as providing for themselves (the Commission) a better 
understanding of the problems facing the water sector. 
The main criticism of the role of the Commission, however, is that given 
the nature of the consultation process and the very precise elaboration of targets in 
the initial documentation, we may question how open the Task Force process was 
in reality, and how far this inflexibility was intended by the Commission at the 
outset. If inflexibility was intended, then this clearly changes the way we can 
characterise the Commission's role in the overall process. Rather than a facilitator 
of a valuable network for exchange and co-ordination of ideas with policy 
implications, the process conducted by the Commission can be seen as one of 
reaffirming existing proposals (emanating from a closed consultation), legitimising 
the future direction of EU regulation by appearing to have consulted widely on 
each aspect, and attempting to increase its authority within this policy domain 
through the incentive of future research contracts for business. 
The chapter will now give an overview of the UK actors who had an input 
into the process, firstly in the professional MTF and then in the national MTF. 
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3.3.3 The professional network. The example of Techware 
Techware (Technology for Water Resources)' was invited by the Commission to 
be a part of the Task Force process in the role of `professional Mirror Task Force', 
alongside other pan-European research and industry groupings. Its role was to be 
similar to that of the national MTF, in providing proposals for the Commission 
agenda. Techware's credentials for fulfilling such a role derive from both the nature 
of its organisation and its previous involvement in similar European Union 
initiatives. 
Techware describes its mission as being a facilitator for research exchange 
between relevant actors, as well as bridging the gap between the national and the 
European level. It seeks to achieve its mission objectives through a range of 
4 Techware was established in July 1990. It has a co-ordinating Techware Bureau (CTB) in Brussels 
which is responsible for the European and international dimension of Techware's work. There are 
also Regional Bureaux (RTBs) in Belgium, Italy and the UK, which provide a regional dimension to 
their objectives (Information Leaflet). Techware has three main functions. Firstly, its structure is 
one of a network for the exchange of information and technology between researchers and research 
users - in universities, public authorities and professional associations. Secondly, Techware is a 
University Enterprise Training Partnership (UETP) and is therefore recognised for funding by the 
Commission. In this role it participates in a student and academic training exchange programme for 
participating organisations and students wishing to gain training and experience within the 
profession. Thirdly, Techware through its contact with the Commission and other international 
organisations can match members to new projects and initiatives or provide a broader structure to 
allow individuals to respond to initiatives which they would not otherwise have the resources or 
range to meet (Techware 1997a: 1). 
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activities including training courses, academic exchanges and `Think Tanks' of 
Techware members to forge proposals in the hope of securing funding. (Techware, 
1997a: 1) 
The central purpose of Techware is to create a pan-European network of 
active researchers and professionals in the water sector. Through such a network 
greater opportunities for funding and other contract work can be realised. In this 
respect Techware has close contact with key actors across the European Union and 
has already considered potential `gaps in the market' and priorities or (at least) 
possibilities for pan-European research in the water management domain. 
(Interview with Alan Bruce, at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) It is clear then, that 
Techware would be a useful reservoir of information for Commission officials in 
the central Task Force. 
The role of the professional MTF was to provide a `position paper' relating 
to the perceived problems of water management in the future, and ways of 
resolving such problems. Given Techware's nature as a pan-European research 
organisation, the strategy they adopted was to highlight a pan-European issue 
which could then form the basis of their submission to the central Task Force. The 
choice of subject to reflect its multinational membership was, according to 
Techware, easily narrowed down: 
[T]here is one topic which is, indisputably, of fundamental importance to 
all regions of Europe and that is the availability of adequate water 
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resources in the future to meet both the social and economic needs of the 
community. Techware, 1996: 1. 
For the purposes of their submission to the Task Force, Techware created a 
specialist group `Environment-Water'. It submitted its position paper entitled, 
`European Research Priorities in `Environment-Water' under the Fourth and Fifth 
RTD Framework Programmes' in March 1997. 
3.3.4 Techware's role in the Task Force 
Techware were involved in the Task Force process as one of three organisations 
with pan-European contacts and experience. The Commission has an established 
relationship with organisations such as these. Both the pan-European make-up of 
such organisations and the potential input of expertise and innovation from the 
combination of water managers, engineers, researchers and so on, makes them an 
ideal source of information for the Commission. 
The description of two types of MTF by the Commission is telling. 
National MTFs could provide an insight into the needs of the national water sector 
and the direction of national research and development. They should also provide a 
valuable insight into the perceived national needs of the European Union level of 
policymaking. The professional MTF by contrast, should be able to provide 
something of an already integrated agenda of priorities for the water sector. 
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Organisations such as Techware should provide in their submission something like 
a more limited version of the main Task Force process as a whole. In this sense the 
professional MTFs are likely to have a narrower (and thus more coherent) focus 
than national MTFs which may have to take on potentially competing views from 
the public, industry, environmentalists and so on. Working as a forum for the 
exchange of information from young researchers, academics and professionals and 
matching teams to bids, they already have some idea of participating member 
states' priorities. They have also worked in a similar capacity for the Commission, 
and so have important knowledge of how to put together a submission for the EU 
and, in addition, the likely areas of Commission interest. (Interview with Alan 
Bruce, at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) So, the experience of being a major player in 
the research community in Europe and knowledge of the mechanics of 
Commission initiatives made them an obvious choice as a professional MTF. 
3.3.5. The national Mirror Task Force. The example of the UK 
The UK national MTF and its consultation process was to involve all relevant sets 
of interests in the water domain, ensuring input from representatives of all relevant 
policy actors, from the utilities and researchers to consumers and 
environmentalists. With such a broad range of actors to be consulted, the creation 
of national MTFs was a more effective means of harnessing their input and one 
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which could provide an overall picture of the problems, as perceived by users, of 
gaps in the technology supplied by industry. 
The structure provided by the Commission for the national submissions 
was two-fold, involving a National Contact Point (NCP) and a MTF. In the case of 
the UK, an individual government representative was nominated from the DTER 
to act as the bridging unit between the EU and the member state (in the role of 
NCP) for maintaining contact during the Task Force process. The national MTF 
was established alongside the NCP to manage and co-ordinate the national 
response. 
How the national MTF organised its network and screened the various 
inputs from the stakeholders was left to the secretariat of each national network. 
The Commission indicated that the MTF should be a means of maximising 
participation in the Task Force process, by all relevant stakeholders (in order to 
perform the relay function) which would both legitimise the process and would 
also mean gaining an all round perspective on the future of water policy. This was 
to be achieved by involving not only the industry/the utilities but those who one 
may expect to be more critical of the water company's strategy - consumers and 
environmentalists. 
For the UK, the DTER, (through the agency of the Drinking Water 
Inspectorate), provided the UK NCP but, rather than keep the MTF as a DTER 
structure, the Department decided to give that responsibility to the Foundation for 
Water Research (FWR) as an independent organisation. To head-up and co-ordinate 
the UK response, FWR appointed Dr Ron Packham to chair the UK MTF. Dr 
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Packham has a very strong reputation within the UK water sector, (having 
previously worked in FWR and other agencies for the DTER), and thus also has 
many contacts throughout the industry. 
Funding was provided by the DoE, the Environment Agency for 
England and Wales and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency. 
The only guidance from the Government was to remind the Task Force 
about the criteria for Community-funded research which distinguishes it 
from research at member state level. 
Bruce, 1997: 10. 
With the formal organisation of the UK MTF in place, Dr Packham's task 
was to initiate the consultation process. Broad categories of actors had been noted 
by the Commission in its initial communication and, through his already 
established contacts, Dr Packham was able to draw up a list of consultees. 
(Interview with Dr Packham, at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) The response to the 
established national MTF in the UK, was strong until the `second' Call for Ideas 
was initiated. The UK MTF responded to what it initially perceived as a rug-pulling 
exercise by the Commission, by obtaining a list of the UK respondents to this 
second `Call' (and copies of their proposals) from the Commission (Interview with 
Dr Packham, at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). The benefit to the UK MTF from 
this second call, however, was that it did highlight some groups which the national 
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MTF had not previously contacted (notably the university sector), and who could 
now be directly involved in the UK consultation exercise led by Dr Packham. 
Having drawn up a network of consultees (see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3), 
this was subdivided on a participatory basis. Individuals and organisations which 
were contacted or opted into the Task Force process, stated how much 
involvement they wished to have in the consultation and thus had more or less 
input into the final document. The most active participants sent representatives to 
meetings and focus groups, others were kept in touch with written updates, and the 
least involved could submit comments to a circulated draft of the final UK 
submission (Interview with Dr Packham, at Techware, Marlow, 15/5/97). 
Through this process of consultation and exchange the UK MTF reached a 
consensus on research priorities for water. 
Despite a shifting timetable and a much more drawn out process than was 
initially envisaged by Dr Packham, the UK MTF completed the task outlined by 
the Commission. It established a network of consultees, with a very clear 
hierarchy, who thus had varied inputs into the process. It submitted its proposals 
to the Commission and attended the closing meeting in Baveno, Italy to discuss the 
production of the final Commission document. 
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3.3.6 Characterising the role of the UK national Mirror Task Force 
Effectively the UK national MTF had a dual role vis-a-vis the central Task Force. 
Importantly it played a linking role between the Commission and the UK 
stakeholders in the water policy domain. Rather than all individual actors 
submitting individual responses to the Commission, the UK could provide a more 
structured response which relied on a broad range of inputs. Incorporating both 
water industry professionals and (latterly) academic researchers, it would be able to 
provide ideas for the resolution of water management problems as well as more 
long term strategies for new technologies. As a result of the consultation, the 
additional benefit to the Commission from the public consultation process, was 
that the position paper of the UK national MTF, distilled the better inputs and 
integrated the issues arising from different perspectives on the water management 
field. In this sense the position paper represents a `screened' and consensual 
viewpoint which can be considered as representing the UK industry perspective. 
Clearly there were some benefits for those who participated in a managerial 
capacity in UK MTFs. The Commission's `Call for Ideas' coupled with the 
potential for new funding to flow into the area as a result, meant that the response 
within the UK was very strong: `Some 50 ideas were submitted by the UK and 
most reinforced the more general research priorities identified through the main 
consultation process' (Bruce, 1997: 11). The consequent benefit for key researchers 
in the field was to establish contact with previously unknown (to the MTF 
secretariat) knots of researchers outside the industry itself. The significant `new' 
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groups in this regard were researchers in universities, who had not previously been 
known to the secretariat of the UK MTF. In other words, the Task Force had the 
effect of expanding the existing network of expertise within the UK. 
The key functions of the UK MTF in relation to the main Task Force were 
to structure an overall UK response through consultation and then to provide a 
filtering process, in order to present a coherent set of proposals in the submission. 
The key positive side-effect of the process was to expand the existing UK network 
and to raise the possibility of maintaining contact between participants for future 
UK ventures. 
3.3.7 The network of consultees : The UK respondents 
The UK consultation for the national MTF was organised by the Chair of the 
MTF, Dr Packham. As an expert in the field, Dr Packham was an obvious choice 
for the Foundation for Water Research, once that organisation had been appointed 
by the DTER to undertake the MTF responsibility. Having already worked 
alongside the industry, the Chair of the MTF had established a significant list of 
contacts. This is a very valuable commodity when trying to establish a network of 
experts. 
The personal and professional contacts which Dr Packham already had, 
formed the basis of the initial list of consultees for the national MTF. Organisations 
with which he had collaborated previously, personal contacts from previous 
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associations in major organisations and key industry organisations and quangos 
(Ofwat, Water Services Association, Environment Agency and so on) were 
included on the list. In other words, the initial contact list was somewhat a personal 
list of colleagues, associates and key water industry representatives who had had 
some prior contact with Dr Packham. This list was used to organise the first 
discussions, and to establish a network of participants for continuing the national 
MTF process (Interview with Dr Packham, at Techware, Marlow, 15/5/97)). 
As already noted, the next stage of the main Task Force process, according 
to the original Commission documentation, was to circulate a questionnaire 
(directly from the EU) to other identified socio-economic stakeholders. As it, in 
effect, became a second Call for Ideas, it seemed to cut across the objectives of the 
national MTF. As noted above, the second Call for Ideas resulted in some 
respondents who were new to the UK MTF secretariat. So, a second contact list, 
incorporating the new wave of respondents was drawn up by the end of 1996. 
Although this set of additional contacts allowed the national MTF to be, 
arguably, more `rounded' in that it now had a different dimension through the 
input of academic researchers, the list remained limited. Despite discovering a new 
group of relevant policy actors through the Commission's second Call for Ideas, 
this did not result in a further widening of the net for possible consultees, 
particularly in the public (non-industry) domain. To meet the stated Commission 
criteria of the broadest consultation of all relevant socio-economic stakeholders, 
very diverse groups including citizen representatives and environmental 
organisations could claim that they should have been consulted. The UK national 
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MTF was only partially successful in this regard. Consumer representation was 
expressed through the involvement of the Ofwat National Customer Council and 
the Scottish Water and Sewerage Customers Council. But, clearly, `consumers' is 
only a smaller subset of `citizens'. 
It seems that environmental concerns should also have been incorporated 
either as citizen concerns - which cannot only be considered to be ones involving 
pricing and service - or through access to environmental groups' research into 
some of the main issues of water management. In the case of the UK national MTF, 
`green' groups were not invited to be part of the consultation process. 
Environmental organisations were not approached at any stage in the consultation 
process and the national MTF conceded that this might have been a mistake 
(Interview with Dr Packham, at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). 
3.3.8 Characterising the consultation process 
The consultation process of the UK national MTF was limited, having been built 
on an established list of contacts. The introduction of new actors did not come 
through the actions of the UK national MTF but through those actors responding 
directly to the Commission's second `Call'. It seems at least a possibility that `new' 
actors would not have had any significant impact if the Commission had not 
initiated this second, direct call to interested individuals and organisations which it 
had identified. The UK national MTF, on that basis, was not actively seeking to 
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expand the range of network actors from those who were a comfortable ensemble, 
having worked together previously and which stemmed from prior personal 
contact in other contexts. Even after some new contacts were established 
(highlighting the fact that the policy field was more densely populated than had 
initially been envisaged), further attempts were not made to discover other 
potential actors. 
The particular concern that this raises, as noted in the preceding section, 
surrounds the lack of environmental-citizen concerns articulated by any 
campaigning organisations. Although the agenda presented by this sector may have 
different priorities from the key industry players, this is precisely why their views 
should perhaps have been courted. Further, the `green' dimension was specifically 
called for by the Commission in its initial communications with potential MTF 
actors. 
A fuller evaluation of the consultation process can be found in the following 
chapter after a consideration of the experience of those organisations which were 
involved in the UK Mirror Task Force, and the opinions of those who were 
omitted from the consultation. 
3.4 Conclusion: Impressions of the Task Force 
The structure and operation of the EU Task Force raise certain questions about the 
openness of the process, and the potential hierarchies of interests within the 
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consultation framework. There are five key points to make, at this stage, about the 
nature of the Task Force. 
Firstly, it seems clear that the agenda of priorities for action in this 
particular area were already set, in advance of the distribution of the public 
documentation. Despite the description provided by the Commission, that the 
purpose of the Task Force initiative was to create the future agenda for water 
research in Europe, four broad axes and more specific targets had already been 
identified. 
In order to formulate these axes, the Commission had initiated a 
consultation process within its own structures as well as with a limited number of 
pan-European organisations, who already had close relationships with the EU. The 
second point then, is that the Commission had relied upon its own established (and 
trusted) contacts to draft the documentation. 
The creation of the Mirror Task Forces can be understood as a means of 
rationalising the wide range of potential inputs to the consultation process, initiated 
by the Commission. Within the UK, both the professional and the national MTFs 
also relied upon established contacts in order to draw up their list of consultees. 
Consequently, the range of actors (interests) represented within the consultation 
was limited and, consequently, the diversity of opinion which could be expressed 
was also limited. 
The fourth point is that the Task Force process as a whole was biased 
towards the participation of industry experts. Precisely because, at both EU and the 
national levels, the managers of the process were taken from the industry itself and 
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relied on established contacts, there was a professional-industry bias within it. As a 
result, of course, very few non-experts or actors with different types of expertise 
(different interpretations of the problems for water management) actively 
participated - or were invited to do so. In this case then, the experts were not just 
the holders of policy-relevant knowledge, but were experts with particular water 
industry concerns. 
Finally, the second call for ideas from the Commission had the potential to 
counteract the professional-expertise bias, as it did have a positive impact on the 
UK national MTF through the expansion of the range of consultees. Other 
interests were alerted to the Task Force process and, therefore, had the potential to 
channel in non-industry opinions. Therefore we can begin to see that the Task 
Force process of formalised consultative networks produced hierarchies of policy 
actors and a limited impact for those not already `on the inside', in terms of being 
an existing contact of the network managers. The need for coherence in the 
submission from the MTFs further constrained the network from expanding its 
horizons to those groups who may have challenged the dominant ethos of the core 
network actors. This resulted not only in hierarchies of input but of a clear 
industry bias in the proposals, as the groups kept on the margins were those outside 
the pre-existing professional-industry network, those representing citizen concerns 
- consumer and environmental organisations. 
The following chapter will analyse the policy consultation using a network 
approach. It will show the value and limitations of this kind of analysis. Network 
analysis is able to show the limited nature of the consultation. Networks are not 
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necessarily open and competitive. They create hierarchies which are then difficult 
to penetrate by groups outside the existing network of actors. However, I shall 
argue that network analysis has to refer to constraints on policymaking which it 
cannot explain. 
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Chapter 4. The Operation of the Task Force 
4. j Introduction 
This chapter analyses the network involved in the EU Task Force water policy 
consultation. It discusses some of the main actors' experience of this process based 
on information gathered from interviews and questionnaires. In section 4.2 the 
experience of the professional MTF, Techware, is discussed. Section 4.3 deals with 
the national MTF, which required a much wider consultation. Some preliminary 
analysis is given of the MTFs' views of the central EU Task Force and its 
management in Section 4.4. Both MTFs felt that the consultation was in some 
respects badly managed. 
The national MTF consulted a wide range of relevant organisations in 
compiling its submission. Questionnaires were sent to all of the consultees who 
were contacted by Dr Ron Packham, the national MTF head. Section 4.5 discusses 
the views of those who responded to these questionnaires, and identifies some 
relevant organisations who were not contacted. Section 4.6 performs the same task 
with respect to the national MTF consultees as Section 4.4 performed with respect 
to the MTFs. It makes some observations about the way in which this particular 
network operated. Section 4.7 considers the implications of this particular case 
study for our understanding of networks in general, in two ways. Firstly some 
reasons for the static quality of a policy network are discussed. Secondly the 
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characteristics which tend to increase an actor's impact are identified. I argue that 
dominance is a function not only of policy relevant knowledge, but also of more 
practical knowledge of the policymaking process itself. 
The broader aim of this chapter, however, is to illustrate the value and 
limitations of network analysis. Previous chapters have already made some 
theoretical arguments in this direction. The purpose of the empirical material is not 
strictly to prove these theoretical arguments, however. As I have argued (Section 
1.9) the relationship between evidence and theory should not be seen in terms of 
the logical priority of the former. We should think of theory and evidence as 
ideally supporting each other, and this should alter our view of the purpose of 
empirical studies. The purpose of this particular empirical study is to see exactly 
what can and cannot be explained within the network approach. I shall argue in 
Section 4.8 that, while network analysis enables us to understand many features of 
the Task Force consultation, it does not enable us to explain why that process was 
subject to certain constraints. More generally, my argument is that network 
analysts can refer to constraining factors on policymaking, but must depart from 
the networks model in order to explain those constraints. The following chapters 
will explore some of the ways in which they may try to do that. 
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4.2 The professional Mirror Task Force: Techware 
Techware was founded by two Belgian academics in 1990. It was organised as a 
means of obtaining a share of the growing European pot of money which is 
available for transnational research initiatives. As with the COMETTI programme, 
which was already operational, its central focus is on transnational meetings and 
the exchange of personnel. 
Techware has a pan-European philosophy, which shapes its input into an 
integrated research agenda for water policy. It has a student exchange programme 
as part of its framework, to support on-going European research in the field. 
Along with workshops for members, it has programme development and learning 
delivery strategies, which makes Techware a strong forum for trans-national 
exchange, and thus an important reservoir of information for policy developers 
within the European Union. Asked to describe Techware's central aims, Alan 
Bruce (Director) said they were `co-ordination, co-operation and exchange; 
Techware works well as a network. ' (Interview with Alan Bruce at Techware, 
Marlow 15/5/97) 
' The COMETT and COMETT II programmes are EU exchange schemes for students, teachers 
and training specialists, particularly for those representing the 'new technologies' field. They are 
exchange networks linking universities and enterprises within the member states as well as with 
central European and EFTA countries. 
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Techware Membership (1997) 
Country Affiliation 
Austria Technical University of Vienna 
Belgium Vlaamse Milieumaatschappij 
(Vlaanderen) 
Belgium Ministere Wallon de 1'Equipment et des 
(Wallonie) Transports 
Finland Finnish Environment Institute 
France Office International de 1'Eau 
Germany Deutscher Verband fur 
Wasserwirtschaft und Kulturbau 
Italy Federgasacqua 
Netherlands Delft Hydraulics 
Portugal LNEC 
Romania Technical University of Bucharest 
Spain CEDEX 
UK Environment Agency for England 
and Wales 
UK Techware UK/Ireland 
Figure 5: Techware pMTF: Membership of Specialist Group `Environment Water'2 
2 Adapted from Techware Specialist Group, `European Research Priorities in `Environment-Water' 
under the 4`h & 5`h RTD Framework Programmes', March 1997. 
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The professional MTF structure was organised in response to the 
Commission's proposal that the overall Task Force should operate through the 
creation of MTFs, reflecting both national and professional interests. Despite being 
created by organisations already well known to the European Union (from 
previous research contract work), the professional MTFs had to re-establish their 
credentials with the central Task Force secretariat, prior to organising their 
consultative networks. The professional MTFs offered a different kind of input to 
nationally organised MTFs as, given their position in the field, it should have been 
clear that they already represented a reservoir of European (relevant across the 
European Union) and thus transferable expertise. Techware operates on a day-to- 
day basis as a network of practitioner interests and as an information bureau for up 
to date sources and information on policy in the field. It is membership based, 
where participants pay an annual fee in exchange for the services it provides. 
Although Techware has a Brussels office, the location of the key secretariat in the 
UK means that Marlow in Buckinghamshire is the focus for European wide 
meetings and consultations. 
Techware is a network of water sector experts which has established 
credentials with the Commission. According to its Director therefore, as a result of 
the good work it has conducted in the past, it is held in high regard by European 
Union officials. (Interview with Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) In this 
sense Techware was an obvious choice for the type of organisation which should 
have a role as a professional network. The Commission was, to a certain extent, 
relying on its established contacts to draw up a directional framework for future 
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water strategy. Further evidence that the Commission felt comfortable about the 
nature of Techware's input is found in the fact that there was no pro forma for 
how the professional network should organise itself, how it should consult its 
membership, nor how it should channel in ideas or put together its final report. As 
a result, the nature of Techware's role was assumed by both the organisation and 
the Commission. Techware understood their role as one of `expressing a view 
appropriate for the Commission (to take action) and which the Commission could 
interpret as it saw fit'. (Interview with Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
In other words, its role was understood as being to put forward a range of 
proposals which can be seen to be relevant in at least one national context but, as 
far as possible, are pan-European. The Commission could then sift those proposals 
for those which provided the best fit with their long-term objectives. 
With no given format for consultation, procedure or drafting, Techware 
could proceed on their own terms in trying to establish an overarching professional 
view. According to its structure and organisation, Techware has no vested interests, 
nor does it claim to reflect the perspective of any particular industry or operator in 
terms of what should be the long-run strategy for research (Interview with Alan 
Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). The membership does reflect a mix of 
affiliates across national boundaries (see Figure 5) which could potentially cause 
difficulties in reaching any single, agreed position. The four axes were given in the 
initial Commission Call for Ideas (see Chapter Three above), and these were used as 
a basis for `expressing to ourselves the reason for EC research'. (Interview with 
Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
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As a membership based organisation representing small and large operating 
concerns, Techware is an active network, which does not necessarily aim to be 
overtly commercial. The high turnover of membership (it loses and gains members 
on an annual basis through the membership's calculation of Techware's `value for 
money' and whether the forum offered by Techware is a particular need for the 
coming year), in addition to the wide mix of affiliates, is also likely to add to any 
difficulties in establishing a single perspective. In order to put together a report to 
the Task Force then, which could be said to truly reflect this particular professional 
network, the task of writing and producing a draft fell to the key personnel - in 
fact the Director had individual responsibility for authoring the report. (Interview 
with Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) Thus the substantial document 
was put together by the Director and then circulated to the membership for 
comments. Significant contributions from members were incorporated into the 
draft and then circulated a second time for comments/opinions, but these did not 
produce any significant amendments to the initial document. (Interview with Alan 
Bruce'at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
Given the nature of Techware, then, any articulation of core priorities is 
problematic. In fact the result for the Task Force document was to present a long 
list of priorities, only some of which can be seen as relevant to all member states. 
This is the difficulty of attempting to express a `European' perspective. On the one 
hand the substantial list of priority areas in the Techware Report are relevant to 
someone, but few can be said to be relevant to all. Arguably this diminishes the 
Techware input, as only those proposals seen as having directly pan-European 
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application can be taken on board. The strategy needs to be one in which research 
reports should concentrate on common ground, so as to be more directly 
transferable into European Union framework programmes. Techware, however, 
consider that this type of approach is not particularly helpful and re-emphasise that 
the full range of possibilities was presented and the job of interpreting the reports 
(and thus which areas to pursue further) should be left to Commission officials 
(Interview with Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). 
In the opinion of the Techware Director, the report submitted was 
balanced, Techware did its best to respond positively to the Commission's Call, 
and tried to provide an overview of priorities which reflected the concerns of all of 
the membership. Alan Bruce does admit however that the weakness of the report 
lies in the very long list of priorities which were presented. He also tried to link up 
those priorities directly to the key concerns which the Commission highlighted in 
the four axes. Techware provided a matrix for the justification of their research 
priorities in the terms that the Commission set out. In some instances it is a case of 
a broad interpretation of those justifications, for example, `everything or nothing 
can impact on employment'. (Interview with Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 
15/5/97) Again it was left to the Commission to sort out from this matrix which 
bits were the most appropriate for the research agenda. 
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4.2.1 Techware's perspective on Task Force consultation 
For those involved in the Task Force through Techware, the process was seen as a 
means of operating a wide consultation with a range of interested organisations, the 
outcomes of which should ultimately benefit citizens/consumers. For the 
Techware secretariat, it seemed that, within the broad sweep of the organisation of 
the Task Force, all ideologies were represented. The differing political concerns of 
Commission officials, it is suggested, can be detected in the terms and proposed 
`ends' of the Task Force programme. A crude interpretation of these ideological 
convictions, according to the Techware Director, is a political Left - Right - 
Environmental differentiation, reflected in the documentation's concern to 
represent three strands in the Task Force: People (bottom-up approach); Markets 
(competitive edge of EU market over external competitors); and Ecology 
(integrated water resource management). In other words, the Commission was 
trying to have `something for everyone' in the Task Force, which would allow it to 
justify the expenditure of time and money. (Interview with Alan Bruce at 
Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
In terms of the positive aspects of the Task Force for Techware, the main 
perceived benefit was its method - that it put in place a framework which brought 
relevant sectoral actors together, in some cases for the first time. Despite the 
existing networks which seek to give an effective base to information and research 
exchange, the EU Task Force brought in some actors who had not previously been 
a part of the pre-existing, established networks. (Interview with Alan Bruce at 
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Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) The variety of individuals and groups actively 
involved in research in the field was wider than had already been recognised. One 
reason for this could be the Commission's reliance on established networks of 
contacts. A problem which may be identified then is a reliance on the same 
individuals/organisations time and again to deliver, rather than picking up on new 
people entering the field. 
Networks of interests can tend to be more static than dynamic insofar as 
they rely on established connections rather than actively seeking out new talent 
and new ideas. The result is that familiarity of network actors can make the policy 
domain stale. Leaderships can emerge to the extent that few individuals have a 
significant input (let alone impact). If new actors can be propelled into the network 
through an external shock such as an EU Task Force initiative, there is still no 
guarantee that new actors will be able to break down the established leaderships 
nor, particularly if they do not fit into a pre-existing network location, be carried 
forward into any future consultations or network events. In other words networks 
will tend to be static unless there is some type of external shock to their 
organisation. Even in those cases where this does happen, the familiarity and 
established network leaderships which exist may prevent new actors from 
remaining in the network after the conclusion of the specific task which drew them 
in, in the first place. Techware were reasonably isolated in terms of their own 
submission (they did not consult outside the membership and did not therefore 
draw in new network actors) but the organisation did feel that the Task Force 
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process as a whole had the potential to expand networks of expertise in the water 
sector, and overcome those problems just stated. 
Some concern was noted by Techware in respect of the range of reports 
submitted, which varied in size, length and quality - raising questions about the 
weight of each individual network input. (Interview with Alan Bruce at Techware, 
Marlow 15/5/97) This however, may be something one would expect with the 
wide range of partners involved in submissions. More difficult for the professional 
networks though, were the moveable deadlines which operated throughout the 
process. They recognised that it is difficult, if not impossible, to cut off member 
states with a deadline, as all member countries' contributions have to be, or at least 
seen to be, of equal importance. If Techware had ignored the deadline then, they 
claim, their report may have been more coherent and more directly applicable to 
the Commission's objectives (Interview with Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 
15/5/97). 
In terms of quality also there was concern expressed about the extent to 
which the member state reports represented the same degree of input and shared 
priorities. The UK MTF Report is considered to be a reflection of all those 
consulted, in other words that most consultees were on board before delivery of 
the final document. This is arguably not the case with other member state reports, 
where significant actors or sectors were not in agreement on the content of the 
submission to the Commission. Perhaps all this indicates is the Techware 
Director's own perception of having done a good job on his report, unaware that 
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the limited authorship of the Techware submission could also invite criticism of its 
utility. 
4.3 The UK national Mirror Task Force 
From the perspective of the key personnel involved in the UK national MTF, 
research in the UK in the 1970s was very much goal driven: trying to provide 
solutions to specific and (politically) targeted problems. This was the result, it is 
claimed, of long-term research (as a strategy) coming to an end. In terms of 
resources it was no longer considered efficient to throw money into a general 
research pot and see what came out. (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, 
Marlow 15/5/97) 
In the opinion of Techware, this has been a negative development as this 
strategy means that people with innovative ideas are suppressed by senior 
management if their work falls outside the specific programme aims. (Interview 
with Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) However, the national MTF 
officials, particularly those used to working in tightly financed research 
organisations or government sponsored agencies, see such a system in less negative 
terms: arguing that research essentially needs to be applied and, as such, there needs 
to be some analysis of major problems - as opposed to relying on inspiration from 
bright individuals. (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
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For those perhaps more used to working in an environment which is more 
likely to work in concert with government officials, then giving money to people 
to work in isolation is inefficient, and may miss the mark. In areas such as 
toxicology, for example, a solution may not be found if the research is not target 
driven. It is possible that this difference of opinion may be a difference of private 
sector versus public sector thinking on the best strategy for research. On the one 
hand the professional network (those who have, for a long time, worked outside 
agreed frameworks through having established their own agencies) expresses a 
greater need for strategic thinking in the water industry, claiming that there is a 
lack of inspiration within it. On the other hand, those who still work more closely 
with government have a perspective which emphasises efficiency and budgets, 
without the luxury of inspirational, long-term thinking. 
This should not imply that those who work more with national agencies 
have less of a free hand in determining any agenda whose priorities they work to - 
after all, policy-relevant knowledge is potentially a very effective resource when in 
negotiation with, or lobbying, government departments for funds and contracts. 
However, it is possible to detect a difference of approach as between these two 
groups of professionals, and the difference is further observable in the approaches 
of the professional MTF and national MTF to the EU Task Force process. 
It is acknowledged by the directors of both MTFs that everything is budget 
driven and thus research organisations within the UK respond vigorously to 
European Union proposals which may have a resourcing reward. Clearly 
budgetary issues can significantly impact on the selection of priorities for research 
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innovation, `how you order priorities depends on how much money there is. 
Research that costs fifty thousand pounds won't happen' - as it is simply too 
expensive, according to officials within the DTER (Telephone interview with Tony 
Lloyd at DTER 19/5/97). A clear consequence is that new ideas arising from UK 
research try to find room to develop at the European rather than the national level, 
where budgets are a little less tight. Given that there is European Union money 
available, then good ideas/proposals may see a return in terms of European money 
filtering back to the national level to aid future research contracts in new areas. 
This may be an admission that the national level is now too limiting in its 
resourcing of research which is not policy- or means-ends specific. As argued in 
Chapter Three, key researchers in the field are increasingly looking for new sources 
of financial support to prop up longer term research proposals. One very serious 
question that this raises is whether strategic thinking has therefore moved to the 
supranational EU level, not only undermining national research bases but also 
increasing the legitimacy of the European Union to take on this mantle. 
In terms of existing funds which are available for research, organisations like 
the Water Research Centre (WRc), derive a certain amount of income from 
membership contributions from water authorities and associations. Any other 
resources come through contract income from central DTER funds (approximately 
X1.5 million/year) (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). 
From the point of view of the research organisations, bureaucrats do not 
have time to set the agenda so, essentially, the most active and most familiar (and 
trusted from previous contract work) organisations in the policy domain highlight 
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prioroites for the agenda. In other words networks of key policy actors are able to 
have an input into the agenda for the sector and reliable delivery means that it is 
likely to be the same organisations involved in this process each time. Again this 
may indicate that although access and agenda setting is possible for networks and 
key policy actors in a given domain, these are likely to remain static rather than 
dynamic, particularly through familiarity with government officials they can 
achieve something like Grant's `insider group' status. The DTER acknowledges 
however that what research organisations see as important areas for study are not 
always the same as the sponsoring department. In that sense they further 
acknowledge that it is actually often a case of who shouts loudest. (Telephone 
interview with Tony Lloyd at DTER 19/5/97) There is also a need for a supportive 
role for research to play in terms of government policy, as it is public money being 
spent. Thus, research on areas in the public domain is subject to the further 
constraints of public opinion and electability. These are a constraint for experts 
insofar as those `experts' or actors with strong policy-relevant knowledge are 
limited in their ability to set the agenda by people who, they consider, have no real 
understanding of the policy domain or its problems. 
As the bureaucrats haven't the time to set the agenda, they tend to favour 
organisations which have already given them a reasonable return. Research 
organisations which have delivered the goods in the past are trusted to do so again. 
In this case there can be often as little as one big planning meeting at the outset, and 
then the researchers are left alone to carry out the work. (Telephone interview 
with Tony Lloyd at DTER 19/5/97) However, the relationship between 
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established research organisations and the government has been strained by the 
shift to competitive tendering. It has been the case that established researchers have 
fed ideas into the DTER, who have then taken those ideas and offered them out to 
tender. When the government has appointed the successful bidder, that outside 
agency has had to go back to the original researchers for consultation on how to 
move forward. This is a further de-motivating force for researchers in the national 
context. (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
With regard to the EU Task Force, a similarly suspicious note was taken by 
the key UK research organisation (Foundation for Water Research): they did not 
want to hand over all their ideas to the Commission for fear they would hand them 
on to their own agencies. This concern had to be balanced by the fact that 
`everyone was interested because everyone was short of money and here was a 
possible funding opportunity for research. If you could demonstrate evidence of 
expertise, you could hope that some [money] would come back'. (Interview with 
Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
There were other pitfalls to guard against in addition to the possibility of 
losing ideas. Maybe, in the final stages, a decision would be taken for only partial 
funding of a project. These type of difficulties have been the actual experience of 
many people doing contract work for the Commission (Interview with Dr 
Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). A further dimension to the problems of 
the competitive nature of `good ideas' lies with Ispra, the EU's own research arm. 
As Ispra has evolved it has become more competitive. It is also in the position of 
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having to justify its existence and is thus further considered to be a potential 
burglar of ideas. 
4.3.1 The formation of the UK consultation 
Aware of the shortcomings of the EU Task Force, key actors in the UK went 
about the task of putting the UK national MTF together. The National Contact 
Point was Tony Lloyd at the DTER. The DTER and the Environment Agency 
initiated the original UK response to the Commission's call. The DTER, using 
their tried and tested method of using trusted organisations, saw the Foundation 
for Water Research (FWR) as the ideal place from which to run the UK MTF, and 
set aside funds for the contract as well as for the co-ordination of the MTF. FWR 
asked Dr Ron Packham (who had worked for FWR - and still does in a semi- 
retired way, as well as having worked for WRc and DoE in the past), as an 
established contact, to be involved and to head up the UK response. Initially Dr 
Packham took on the role of co-ordinator in May 1996 with an end point some 
time in July that year. 
The first significant change to the development of the consultation, which 
caused difficulty for the national MTFs, was that the organisation of the Task 
Force changed. Initially the Commission had approached governments and 
requested a response to the Task Force. The positive response from the national 
governments led them to set up the national MTFs. Then, as already noted in 
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Chapter Three, in June - July 1996 the Commission sent out a second and more 
general `Call for Ideas', of which the existing MTFs were not made aware. The UK 
national MTF had thought that the main effort, for proposals to be forwarded to 
the Commission for inclusion in the Fifth Framework Programme, would be 
through the national MTF, and yet the Commission was approaching other actors 
with questionnaires (which effectively formed a second Call for Ideas) to generate a 
more general response. 
The first fundamental question that this new development demanded, was 
how the UK national MTF would fit with the new Call for Ideas. The FWR had 
already begun approaching senior figures in key contact areas for their input into 
the national MTF, and there was a major concern that this would somehow 
undermine their authority in the process. (Interview with Dr Packham at 
Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) However, in successfully securing copies of all the 
responses from within the UK to this second call, the UK national MTF was in a 
better position than it had been at the outset of its consultation, in terms of having 
access to a greater number of potential participants than it had managed to muster 
on its own initiative. This point will be returned to below. 
4.3.2 The operation of the UK national Mirror Task Force network 
Dr Packham consulted the following groups: (i Scotland, Northern Ireland, 
England and Wales; (ii) the government departments and the Environment Agency; 
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(iii) the operators - representatives of water undertakings in all parts of the UK; (iv) 
major research organisations - for example, WRc, the Institute of Hydrology, and 
the Institute of Freshwater Ecology. (A complete list of the UK national MTF's 
consultees can be found in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. ) 
The method of consultation varied, and ranged from holding group 
meetings with some participants where meetings were held at the Water Services 
Association; to corresponding on a letter-only basis with others; and to providing 
only a circular for a wider range of groups, who remained on the margins. Some 
organisations took less of a direct interest in the consultation than others and just 
wanted to be kept informed of outcomes rather than to play a particularly active 
role in the drafting of any documentation. So again, as with the professional MTF, 
the active core took most decisions and consisted, essentially, of the secretariat of 
the national MTF. (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
Thus, there was a clear hierarchy of consultation within the national MTF 
but, according to the secretariat this was a voluntary arrangement on the part of 
those who participated. (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 
15/5/97) However, it is also the case that those at the core, who were already well 
known to one another, were satisfied with this arrangement and they did not seek 
to persuade others to have a more significant input. 
The Commission's `second' call for ideas had received a huge response. 
They had been bombarded with replies from a wide range of actors and 
organisations wishing to participate in the Task Force. The UK MTF personnel 
were keen to look at the responses to see if there was a `fit' with the ideas which 
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had emerged from their initial consultation with senior figures in the existing 
established network of the national MTF. From the UK national MTF's point of 
view, an analysis of the responses to the EU call showed that the ideas from other 
agencies tied up well with existing proposals. What the MTF hadn't previously 
realised, however, was the volume of responses from the university sector. Several 
universities had knots of researchers engaged in work in the field, and this could 
potentially provide a new dimension to those already established in the network 
who can be characterised more as professional or industry-based researchers. 
The positive outcome from the EU's second call, therefore, was a new 
dialogue between the university-based research community and the established 
network. Contact was established with the interested academic community and was 
built in to the existing national MTF. This could be considered as the entry of a 
new set of actors into a network of interests, as the original consultation process by 
the UK national MTF had relied upon existing contacts. This reliance on 
established contacts, in itself, is not necessarily negative. Through a long career in 
the field, working within the major research organisations, Dr Packham knew who 
many of the key researchers in the sector were. In that sense, choosing who to 
consult was simply a matter of referring to an existing list. (Interview with Dr 
Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) However, the problem with this method 
of consultation lies with who it misses out, which may be due to a lack of 
knowledge (in the case of the university sector), or perhaps is done in a more 
conscious way - which was arguably the case with the key environmental 
organisations, as these are highly visible. 
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As will be seen in section 4.7 below, the lack of consultation with (what 
might be judged as) key sets of interests may allow for the smoother running of the 
process. This is particularly the case if the lack of consultation can be understood as 
a means of avoiding complications and conflict arising from competing sciences or 
competing expertise between industry based researchers and campaigning 
organisations. However, it is interesting to consider why some groups can accede to 
an established network, whilst others are not invited to do the same. One 
interesting point in this regard is that in the analysis of responses by the UK MTF 
to the second call, the national MTF found that submissions `tied up well' with the 
existing thinking. If they did not `tie up well', then being brought inside the 
national MTF was much less likely, given that the consultation and the drafting of 
the submission had already begun. This necessarily raises questions about full 
representation of all relevant interests in the domain in the Task Force process. 
The second point to consider alongside that, is not only the fact that 
environmental organisations were not on the `list' but, in addition, that it did not 
occur to anyone in the national MTF to consult them. It was clear from the 
Commission's Call for Ideas that it was important to have all interests represented 
in the process (all relevant socio-economic actors). This was detailed in the 
Commission documentation as necessarily including consumers and environmental 
organisations as well as operators, regulators and managers. 
UK consumers were indirectly represented in the national MTF through 
Ofwat's National Customer Council primarily, and also the Scottish Water and 
Sewerage Customers Council (SWSCC), who were particularly proactive in terms 
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of ensuring consumer input into the consultation (Questionnaire response, Archie 
Minto Head of Charges SWSCC, 10/9/98). The chair of the UK national MTF 
considered that the interests of the consumer were strongly supported throughout 
the process as a core set of interests. (Interview with Dr Packharn at Techware, 
Marlow 15/5/97) Interestingly, however, this dialogue with consumer 
representation was more in terms of the perceived need to change consumer 
interests as they currently stand. The UK national MTF Report reflects this 
strongly in its claim that customer perception of the problems of water pollution 
needs to be improved as they are seen by the industry as being wrong impressions 
of the key issues for resolution. Their particular concern of course is that, given the 
nature of research and problem resolution (with the constraint of public opinion 
and electability), such misunderstandings of water management issues results in 
money being spent in the wrong areas because of the potential impact of consumer 
(voter) pressure on MPs (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow, 
15/5/97). This demonstrates a constraint on network autonomy very clearly, and 
indicates that policy is not made in an expertise driven political vacuum. Rightly or 
wrongly, the agenda is, at least in part, set by political concerns of both 
affordability and electability. 
The further delimiting of expertise in the policy process can arguably be 
said to derive from the lack of consultation with different kinds of experts in the 
field, who may also have a different agenda - the environmentalists. As already 
noted, the lack of consultation with these organisations arises in the first instance 
from their lack of presence on `the list'. The fact that they were not considered to 
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be a necessary point of consultation despite the explicit instruction of the 
Commission documentation to reflect environmental interests, may also be 
significant. 
The final delivery date for the UK MTF Report was set for January 1997, 
and then pushed back into February. For the completion of the final document a 
small drafting group of the main actors was formed which had, at most, twenty 
representatives from the range of consultees (Interview with Dr Packharn at 
Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). The draft document was circulated to all those 
involved in the consultation and the final report was sent at the end of February 
1997, to go forward to a European meeting of all national and professional MTFs, 
at Baveno, Italy. This closing conference was charged with producing a working 
document based on all the national and professional MTF submissions. The raison 
d'etre of the whole process, which was distilled at this meeting, was to produce a 
document to help formulate the priorities and strategy in the Fifth Framework 
Programme. At Baveno, the delegates formed working groups to discuss any 
amendments to the Muscow document. The delegates had hoped that the 
conference would produce a final document representing all national inputs which, 
in turn, would change the shape of the Fifth Framework Programme. However, 
there were indications at that final discussion meeting that the consultation process 
from the Task Force process would, in fact, have a limited impact on the 
forthcoming Research and Technological Development (RTD) programme. It 
transpired that priorities had already been set and a strategy had been determined, 
even before the consultation process had begun, (Interview with Dr Packharn at 
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Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) raising questions of the consultation process being 
merely an exercise in surface legitimation for achieving pre-determined European 
Union targets. 
There was some anger and bitterness within the UK at the final outcome 
from the Task Force experience. The opinion was that the Commission should 
take on board what was said both in the range of documentation as well as in the 
final discussion session at Baveno - not least because of the amount of time and 
money that was poured in to the process by all those connected with it. (Interview 
with Dr Packharn at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) The final report from the 
Commission was due out in September 1997, but only appeared in early 1999. 
There was no written or verbal communication from the Commission explaining 
the delay in publication of the Commission document, increasing suspicions that 
the entire Task Force consultation had initially been shelved. 
The role of the Commission in the Task Force was understood by the UK 
national MTF to be one of initiation, co-ordination and policy impact. In other 
words its role was to establish the various national and professional MTFs; to hold 
internal meetings to elaborate and co-ordinate the range of priorities in this 
particular sector; and to consult with other individual bodies and associations about 
target areas. They also used Ispra and DG XII in manager roles, but no impact from 
these organisations or from the Inter Service Group (which was established to co- 
ordinate the overall Directorate General input), can be detected (Interview with Dr 
Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97). The dominant opinion across the board 
in the UK is that the lack of a final document, when expected, was a result of 
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internal politics in DG XII. It is considered that the central reason for the 
disaffection within DG XII with the Task Force process, lies in the fact that such 
approaches are seen as undermining the role of DG XII officials in their key 
function of formulating policy in this field. The Task Force could be considered as 
effectively putting policymaking out to tender and thus undercutting the role of in- 
house policy makers in the Commission. Through both wanting to maintain a key 
role, and also in wanting to retain control over policy direction, DG XII perceived 
the Task Force process as more of a threat than as an additional dimension to 
effective policymaking. Hence the very limited impact of any of the Task Forces 
which have been set up to date. 
This seems to indicate that irrespective of some of the difficulties of and 
limits to consultation within the MTFs, the impact of the consultation exercise was 
limited by the structure and organisation of the Commission itself. It is already 
clear that there was a differential impact of network actors within both the 
professional and the national MTFs. In addition, the impact of the submissions 
from all MTFs was limited by the Commission in terms of both pre-determined 
targets and internal politics. This vastly reduces the autonomy and policy impact of 
network actors. 
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4.4 Mirror Task Force Experience Indicators 
From the experiences of the two MTFs which had UK involvement, it is possible 
to draw out some central points about the constraints placed on the consultative 
framework which had been established. In other words, there are some elements of 
the design and practice of the overall Task Force, which seem to indicate that the 
process wasn't as open as may have been indicated at the outset by the 
Commission. This first set of `experience indicators' arise from the formal 
construction of the Task Force process, initiated by the Commission. The second 
set of `experience indicators' are based on the problems in the organisation of 
MTFs in response to the EU's framework. Together the two sets of `experience 
indicators' provide significant limitations on the effective operation of the overall 
Task Force, relative to what we might have assumed would take place. 
Firstly it was noted by the professional MTF that the framework provided 
in the EU documentation was actually quite rigid. The targets which had been set 
were prescriptive, rather than open and flexible. The detailed framework outlined 
the areas which had been highlighted as key sectors for EU action, to improve its 
position in some key dimensions: research and development, business 
opportunities, leading regulatory body and so on. So the agenda, at the most 
fundamental level, had already been set. This implies that the Task Force process 
was more a means of discovering the best means of achieving the ends as set, as well 
as a way of identifying the best individuals and organisations to support it in 
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operationalising those means. The first constraint on the Task force then was the 
prescriptive framework from the Commission. 
Alongside this initial constraint is the limited weight of the MTF inputs. 
Clearly one consequence of a pre-determined agenda is that the impact which 
MTFs can have is limited, and is likely to be effective only if their submission is 
directed to the areas outlined in the documentation rather than those which fall 
outside the objectives set out by the Commission. Proposals which do not directly 
match the imperatives presented in the EU documentation are less likely to be 
taken up, precisely because the agenda is not really open. By the end of the Task 
Force process (submission of final documents to the Commission) both MTFs in 
the UK recognised that the level of their investment in terms of time and financial 
resources, was out of balance with the return they had from the Commission. It 
wasn't until they reached the end of the process, however, that they realised that 
the potential impact of their input was probably very narrow. (Interviews with Dr 
Packham and Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
This feeling of impotence at the national level was exacerbated by the 
structure of the Task Force, the dual MTF arrangement (professional and national) 
as well as by the shifting deadlines for completion of the process. It is difficult to 
detect any overt preference on the part of the Commission for the proposals from 
the different types of MTF. However, the UK national MTF did feel that they may 
be perceived differently on the ground, as the `professional' tag was given to only 
one particular type of network. They felt that, as a result, the implication could be 
that they were not professionals in the same way as organisations such as 
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Techware, and this might be an important difference for potential participants in 
either network. (Interview with Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) In 
terms of the ever-changing deadlines, those that completed their report by the 
original deadline felt that they may have lost out to submissions which were 
presented later, and which could thus reflect a more lengthy consultation process. 
So, this further constraint can be characterised as differences between MTF 
submissions. 
A final and significant constraining element of the overall design of the Task 
Force is the relationship between EU-level expertise and policymakers and the 
experts assembled in the MTFs. It was felt by the UK participants (in this case, the 
secretariat-of the MTFs), that some of the delays and difficulties in the operation of 
the Task Force process could be attributed to a possible rivalry between the 
national and the European level - inter-institutional rivalry particularly in respect 
of bureaucrats working in DG XII being undermined by the Task Force 
initiative. (Interview with Dr Packham and Alan Bruce at Techware, Marlow 
15/5/97) 
Taken together, these constraining factors found in the organisation of the 
Task Force at the EU level point to a less open, less flexible, less accessible structure 
than might otherwise be assumed from the initial documentation. 
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4.5 UK Mirror Task Force consultees 
The UK consultees can be classified according to the following groups: 
environmental concerns; water management concerns; consumer representation; 
academic interests; technical consultants; dominant insider organisation; regional 
interests; and interests not consulted. In this section I will discuss the experience of 
groups in each of these categories in turn. 
(i) Environmental concerns 1: Institute of Freshwater Ecology 
(part of Natural Environment Research Council) 
The main concern for the Institute of Freshwater Ecology (IFE) was that 
environmentalists were not very well represented in the consultation process and 
also, therefore, in the final document submitted to the Commission. In fact IFE felt 
that if their organisation had not been a part of the consultation process then 
environmental concerns may well have not been represented at all. (Questionnaire 
response, Professor Pickering Director, Institute of Freshwater Ecology, 24/8/98) 
This highlights the dearth of environmental representation within the national 
MTF. This can further weaken the input of those who did participate (such as IFE), 
because there were no links to be made with organisations which may share their 
concerns, which would have allowed them to lobby more effectively within the 
network. 
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Also, potential participants were not given a precise outline of the structures 
which were in place for their involvement, nor information about there being 
more than one arena in which UK organisations could have an input: the 
professional MTF as well as the national one. Particularly with the high profile of 
the Environment Agency (EA) who were directly involved with the professional 
MTF this seemed, in the opinion of the IFE, to improve the weight of input of the 
professional MTF, relative to the national one. (Questionnaire response, Professor 
Pickering Director, Institute of Freshwater Ecology, 24/8/98) In other words, not 
only were they not initially aware that other Task Forces existed, but that the 
professional MTF may, in fact, have been the more important forum to be 
involved with - particularly for environmental concerns, because of the presence of 
senior EA officials. 
(ii) Environmental concerns 2: The Environment Agency 
Interestingly, despite the UK government's association (through the DTER) with 
the national MTF, Mervyn Bramley of the Environment Agency (EA) acted as 
chair of the Techware professional MTF. This, as indicated above, had the 
consequence of giving increased significance and weight to the Techware 
submission. 
Mr Bramley's saw his role as Chair as one which was catalytic and as a 
source of inspiration in the discussions which were had around the structure of the 
submission. Importantly the EA, in the Chair's opinion, could also have an 
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important role as a quality checker in terms of the substance or content of the 
document and, significantly, as bringing a more pro-European perspective to the 
process. (Questionnaire response, Mervyn Bramley Head of Research and 
Development, Environment Agency, 16/4/97) It seems that the implication was 
that a Europhile perspective may have been needed to counteract a more inward- 
looking approach from others represented in this particular network. 
An obvious quality which one would assume could be brought to the 
process through this chairmanship of the professional MTF is a significant 
environmental angle, although Mr Bramley notes that the approach of EA is also 
pro-industrial. (Questionnaire response, Mervyn Bramley Head of Research and 
Development, Environment Agency, 16/4/97) Given that the professional MTF 
represented a network of professional and research interests, it seems that the 
industrial sector may have been over-represented relative to other interests within 
the professional network. Consequently, within this particular MTF, the 
environmental angle was not as strongly represented as it might have been. This 
factor becomes even more relevant when we consider the importance of the 
chairmanship of the professional MTF. Already it has been noted that the Chair 
saw his role as being both `catalytic' and `inspirational' which indicates a strongly 
active role in the consultation process. Further, Mr Bramley claims that the 
consensus within the professional MTF was reached through `institutional 
leadership and an independent secretariat'. (Questionnaire response, Mervyn 
Bramley Head of Research and Development, Environment Agency, 16/4/97) 
Given that EA is a respected institution and occupied the Chair of this particular 
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professional MTF, it seems likely that this leadership-consensus-building was 
carried out from the front, increasing the relative weight or power in negotiations 
of the MTF chair. 
In terms of a wider consultation from within the professional MTF, to 
account for the diverse interests associated with water management, it seems that 
this particular MTF struggled to be as broad a church as it could have been. In 
terms of citizen or `needs of society' interests highlighted by the Commission for 
inclusion in the consultation, their precise role in the professional MTF is a little 
unclear. For consumers, these interests were incorporated by `notionally allocating 
more weight to the more informed and involved' (Questionnaire response, Mervyn 
Bramley Head of Research and Development, Environment Agency, 16/4/97) and 
for environmentalists there wasn't an agreed means of ensuring that they were 
represented at all. This raises two points. 
Firstly, the distribution of weights of consumer views implies that 
organisations already known about and well organised (resourced) would have 
more chance of being represented than others (although there is no clear indication 
that any consumer organisations were directly contacted by the professional MTF). 
Secondly, one can ensure the inclusion of environmental concerns through inviting 
representatives to participate. One possible reason why environmental 
organisations were not approached, is the perception that they do not have the 
same claims to expertise or scientific knowledge as the EA and the other non- 
environmental organisations within the network. (lnterview with Dr Packham at 
Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) However, whilst it may be true that campaigning 
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environmental organisations (for example, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) 
are not rigorous in the same way in terms of scientific knowledge, they certainly 
have policy-relevant knowledge and consequently should have something to 
contribute to the process. 
The significant benefit from the consultation process for an organisation 
like the EA is that it `should reinforce links' between those actors involved in the 
consultation (Questionnaire response, Mervyn Bramley Head of Research and 
Development, Environment Agency, 16/4/97). The choice of language here is 
interesting in that it does not mention creating new links but of reinforcing existing 
ones. This not only implies that `new' organisations (ones not previously known to 
the secretariat of the professional MTF) were not approached to participate, but 
that this exercise reinforced the network of organisations who were involved, 
making it more likely that the same groups will come together in the future. This is 
here referred to as the reinforcement function. 
(iii) Water management concerns 1: Water Research Centre 
The main concerns of the Water Research Centre (WRc) were elaborated as five 
outline proposals on the following issues: Contaminants in the environment; 
irrigation; water re-use; wastewater treatment and river catchment management. 
(Questionnaire response, John Davis, Senior Consultant at WRc, 20/1/98) 
WRc were an obvious choice to be consulted in this process, as they are the 
lead organisation for the European Environmental Agency's Topic Centre on 
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Inland Waters. In this sense they adopted very much a pan-European perspective. 
Given their established links with the EU, the WRc made submissions to the Task 
Force through both the UK national MTF as well as to Brussels directly. As a 
commercial organisation with experience of the EU water domain, WRc have 
expertise in EU research and development and so could lend that to the process, 
but felt that the benefits which would flow directly to them would be 
limited. (Questionnaire response, John Davis Senior Consultant at WRc, 20/1/98) 
(iv) Water management concerns 2: Water Services Association 
The Water Services Association (WSA) was involved in the UK national MTF 
alongside individual water company chiefs. In an individual capacity Ted Thairs 
(Head of WSA) is involved with both the UK water industry and European trade 
associations, and so participated in these two capacities. The key areas of concern 
highlighted by the WSA were: water supply, availability, collection and treatment 
of waste waters, re-use of sewage sludge. (Questionnaire response, Ted Thairs Head 
of WSA, 14/4/97) 
From the perspective of the WSA also, achieving a consensus was 
considered to be an easy task. The objectives which WSA saw as common for all 
those involved in the national MTF were: reliable supply of high quality drinking 
water, good sanitation, high level of environmental protection and optimising 
technical/commercial opportunities for European business. (Questionnaire 
response, Ted Thairs Head of WSA, 14/4/97) One can probably agree that in the 
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broadest terms there was some consensus around core issues of water quality and 
water management. However, what is more difficult to agree about is the detail, the 
hierarchy of aims and, crucially, the means of achieving such objectives. This may, 
in fact, cause more conflict than consensus. 
Perhaps the most interesting element of the WSA contribution was the way 
they perceive the incorporation of consumer and environmental interests. In both 
cases, the water companies felt that such concerns were expressed through, and are 
an integral part of, the water companies' input (Questionnaire response, Ted Thairs 
Head of WSA, 14/4/97). Again environmental concerns are seen as part of the 
water companies' remit and, as such, are considered as already integrated into their 
priorities for water management. Certainly in the era of post-privatisation water 
supply and management, it is possible to take issue with the water companies in 
terms of their claim to fully integrate consumer and environmental concerns 
within their overall strategy. The prioritisation of concerns within water 
companies again may raise some questions about the effective integration of 
concerns which will directly impact on levels of profit and the pass-through costs 
to customers of increased environmental management. 
(v) Consumer representation: Ofwat National Customer Council and Scottish Water 
and Sewerage Customers Council 
The main concern for consumer representatives was articulated as the consultative 
arrangements for consumers. So they were not concerned with price and supply 
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directly, as indicated by the water companies, but with a means of better voicing 
concerns about price and supply which are not heard at present (Questionnaire 
response, Archie Minto, Head of Charges at SWSCC, 10/9/98). The central issue 
for these groups, then, was the need to increase their ability to articulate their 
concerns about the issues of improvement versus costs. They noted that there are 
both institutional and organisational barriers to having full discussions about their 
concerns. This is something which does not only affect relations within member 
states between consumers, regulatory authorities and water companies, but, 
significantly in this context, also affects their ability to lobby the EU. The 
significant barrier here arises from the lack of similar consumer representative 
organisations in other member states. (Questionnaire response, Archie Minto Head 
of Charges at SWSCC, 10/9/98) This significantly undermines their ability to 
influence the agenda in a number of ways. 
Firstly, water companies are happy to claim that they effectively represent 
consumer interests - yet each company now is a commercial venture and so 
information is commercially sensitive. As a result even if consumers are represented 
through the water companies they cannot be represented uniformly but regionally, 
which weakens their position. Secondly, the fact that consumer organisations 
recognise that there are obstacles to proper discussion whereas the companies do 
not, indicates that the water companies are content to claim legitimacy of 
consumer representation even though the consumer organisations themselves 
would not agree. Thirdly, in addition to being under-represented within the 
member states, they are unable to be effective within the EU context as, generally, 
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there is a lack of similar consumer organisations across the EU. However water 
companies and water management officials are not similarly encumbered. So, in 
presenting water management issues from the industry perspective business can 
benefit from concertation and European level fora, increasing their ability to lobby 
the EU. 
The Scottish Consumer Council noted directly that they would like to be 
able to have more influence on the EU's agenda (Questionnaire response, Archie 
Minto Head of Charges SWSCC, 10/9/98). In terms of the final national MTF 
document, they would have liked more direct reference to the interests of water 
payers. They also noted that they had developed no new links as a result of being a 
part of the consultation process. (Questionnaire response, Archie Minto Head of 
Charges SWSCC, 10/9/98) This seems to add weight to the impression that 
organisations who were already known to each other in the professional- 
management-industry sectors reinforced their relationships, but did not build any 
new linkages with non-industry interests. 
Further, given the limited range of organisations involved who represented 
non-industry interests, there were no other organisations for the consumer councils 
to attempt concerted action with, and thus be more powerful in the process. As 
with the environmental interests then, there is some evidence of a fragmentation of 
the representation of consumers within their own spheres and also a fragmentation 
between them and environmentalists, who may be able to act together under the 
`interests of society' banner. Together they were not able to create an anti-industry 
alliance - which only increased the imbalance of weights, as the industry 
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representatives exhibited a capacity to work together for their long-run interests 
resulting, perhaps, from a better clustering of common objectives (competitiveness 
of business; application of research findings; improvement of technology etc. ) 
(vi) Academic interest: The university sector 
The main concern here was with conservation and sustainable management of 
species and habitats. (Questionnaire response, Paul Bradley Principal Ecologist, 
University of Sheffield, 28/8/98) Again, this sector submitted directly to the 
Brussels Task Force in the second Call for Ideas and, as a result, their proposals 
were passed on to the UK national MTF secretariat. Some academic respondents 
felt that there was an imbalance in the consultation between industry-led 
environmental issues and areas such as species protection. This may be further 
evidence of a fragmentation within the environmental domain resulting from the 
wide diversity of areas which are covered by the `environmental concerns' banner. 
This has the further consequence that it is more possible for industry to claim to 
have taken on board environmental management concerns, without meaning they 
have integrated the full remit of conservation issues, as would be identified by the 
range of actors who consider themselves to be working in this field. The main 
university respondents were brought inside the UK national MTF, but the final 
report wasn't circulated to them, adding to their perception that they were not 
centrally involved in the process of consultation. (Questionnaire response, Paul 
Bradley Principal Ecologist, University of Sheffield, 28/8/98) 
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(vii) Technical consultants: Kaiak (UK based artificial island enterprise) 
Kaiak were invited into the process directly by DG XII. Given their previous 
involvement with the European Union in terms of enterprise initiatives for the 
creation of artificial islands, they were asked to be involved specifically to raise 
awareness about inshore/coastal waters use. Kaiak were concerned about cost 
efficiency, coastal land use and clear added value at the European level. 
(Questionnaire response, Gerald Clark Chairman of Kaiak, 22/8/98) 
Kaiak were not a part of the UK national MTF, although they were listed as 
having been consulted in the final national MTF document. This is likely to have 
arisen from the response of the national MTF to the second Commission Call, 
whereby Dr Packham sent a covering letter (from UK national MTF) with the EU 
second call to all the UK respondents. In this way the actual consultation looked 
much wider than was in fact the case. Kaiak responded directly to the joint 
Research Centre and, unsurprisingly as they were invited to participate, they feel 
their input was reflected in the final EU document. (Questionnaire response, 
Gerald Clark Chairman of Kaiak, 22/8/98) 
However, no new links were created for Kaiak, as they were involved in a 
very specific capacity and thus were isolated from other participants. They further 
indicate that they were unclear about the precise procedures which were put in 
place to operate the Task Force. 
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(viii) Dominant insider organisation: The Institute of Hydrology 
The Institute of Hydrology (IH) have very strong links with both FWR and the 
DTER, which resulted in their inclusion in the Task Force process. Interestingly, 
because of the complex of links IH has with a range of organisations, IH were 
involved with many MTFs (including ones outside the UK) and tried to influence 
all those they participated in. (Questionnaire response, Neil Runnalls Marketing 
and Business Development, IH, 22/1/98) In contrast to the lack of knowledge on 
the part of more marginal organisations, IH had a clear advantage from their prior 
experience of the process and structures of European Task Forces and it was 
possible, therefore, for IH to maximise their impact and policy reach within the 
central Task Force. After a re-drafting of the final document IH saw a clear return 
for their investment, as so much of their input was directly represented in the UK 
national MTF document. (Questionnaire response, Neil Runnalls Marketing and 
Business Development, IH, 22/1/98) 
Despite this, IH had a very cynical opinion of the overall process, in terms 
of how much genuine impact the national consultation process would have on the 
final EU RTD programme. They were also in a position, as they understood the 
Task Force architecture better than others, to fit their submissions to the precise 
areas outlined by the Commission. IH were aware that the agenda was more fixed 
than open and so were able to apply any influence they had in the right places. In 
other words, IH worked on the assumption that there was no point putting 
forward ideas which did not provide an easy fit with the quite rigid framework 
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outlined by the EU in their initial documentation because, in fact, there was no real 
flexibility in that agenda. So, it is clear that who an organisation knew (in order to 
access more than one MTF) and how well that organisation understood the process 
in advance (making better judgements about what the Commission needed from 
the consultation) would allow such groups to maximise their input and thus see a 
much better return for their investment. 
Overall, IH believed that the consultation would come to nothing, but that 
still it was important to participate. Other smaller, more marginal organisations did 
not realise the same benefits of merely participating in the consultation, as that in 
itself brought no reward. In contrast it was important and beneficial for IH to 
participate because of their links with so many relevant organisations in the 
domain - which meant IH could both lend legitimacy and could also have a certain 
influence on the outcomes. (Questionnaire response, Neil Runnalls Marketing and 
Business Development, IH, 22/1/98) 
(ix) Regional interests: The Scottish and Welsh Offices 
Both offices were contacted as part of the consultation for the report of the UK 
national MTF. Both departments were invited to participate because of their policy 
responsibilities for water regulation in Scotland and Wales. As a result the role they 
defined for themselves was the identification of specifically Scottish and Welsh 
water issues which should be included in the report. The outcome of the 
consultation, however, found that the issues identified by other actors in the 
176 
network were thought to be relevant to most parts of the UK, so additional 
regional emphasis was not required. (Questionnaire response, Philip Wright Head 
of European Environment and Engineering Unit, Scottish Office, 6/5/97) 
(x) Organisations not consulted 
As already noted, environmental organisations were not directly part of the 
consultation process of the UK national MTF. The reason for the lack of 
consultation, in particular with campaigning organisations, can be understood from 
the explanation from the UK national MTF as to why they were not on the list of 
original network contacts. According to the UK national MTF, `green' groups are 
not necessarily motivated to research, as they are campaigning organisations. The 
UK national MTF `was dealing in specific research proposals, and the Greens are 
not in that business'. (Interview with Dr Packharn at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) 
Although the UK national MTF accept that the omission of green groups is 
a possible criticism as they have a clear interest in the policy field and have policy 
relevant knowledge, their omission had clear benefits to the UK MTF. Some of the 
coherence of the final submission would have been lost with a wider consultation, 
due to the differing emphases of management professionals and environmentalists. 
Further, the UK national MTF indicated that environmental organisation did not 
share the same concerns in terms of their institutional focus (and therefore research 
commitments) as other participants, and so were not approached. (Interview with 
Dr Packham at Techware, Marlow 15/5/97) A conflict of styles and purpose (in 
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terms of the end goal of research) would have created difficulties in the consultation 
process and also in being able to producing a coherent set of proposals. 
4.6 UK MTF Consultees Experience Indicators 
Again, as with the MTF secretariats' experience outlined in 4.4, it is possible to 
discuss some key elements of the Task Force consultation, as understood from the 
perspective of the participants. The overall experience of the consultation process 
from the point of view of the groups and individuals drawn into the process can be 
outlined across four axes. 
(a) Lack of environmental input. It seems clear that one overwhelming 
element of the consultation process was the weak environmental input into the 
process. This can be seen not only in terms of the lack of groups brought into the 
consultation - particularly the key campaigning organisations in the UK - but also 
the limited impact of the input from those who did participate. One reason for the 
weakness of the input may be due to the very wide range of concerns which can 
come under the `environment' banner. This leads to a certain fragmentation of any 
potential environmental lobby within such networks. 
(b) Pro-European versus national interests. The purpose of the central Task 
Force was clearly to define EU research strategies in the water policy domain. 
However the EA which often works in European fora, still felt it was necessary to 
counter-balance potential anti-European feeling within the policy consultation. The 
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negative approach of some actors stems from two main sources in the case of this 
particular Task Force: a suspicion of the motives for consultation (creaming off 
strategic thinking) and a dislike of the rigid interventionism of the EU in standard 
setting, which is felt to be more cautious (for example in setting water toxicology 
targets) than is necessary. This results in a need, from the perspective of 
professionals and researchers in the UK, for balancing the perceived EU 
interference and rigidities with the possibility of financial reward for participation 
in EU programmes. 
(c) Consumers' interests marginal. Consumer input into the consultation was 
weaker than may have been expected. Although consumer organisations had better 
representation than environmental interests, there was clearly a difference of 
opinion in the identification of consumer interests between water company 
managers and consumer representative organisations. It is also possible to detect a 
difference of opinion in terms of how well those interests were represented in the 
consultation, particularly through the representation of the water companies. 
Given that the water companies expressed a different picture of consumer interests 
than consumer representatives themselves, the claim by the water companies that 
they had effectively integrated consumer concerns into their contribution to the 
consultation is difficult to sustain. This may indicate that consumer input was 
actually more marginal than claimed by the secretariat of the national MTF, as 
consumer organisations had a very limited direct exchange within the MTF. 
(d) Dominant insider organisation. The weight of inputs of those 
organisations which did participate was further unbalanced by the ability of key 
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organisations to exploit their knowledge of the structures, Commission preferences 
and existing relationships with other participants. Organisations which could rely 
on prior knowledge had more influence on the process itself (through targeting 
Commission preferences) and therefore also had a much better return on their 
investment. 
4.7 Network outcomes 
The Task Force process had limits, from the outset, in two key dimensions: the 
organisation of the central Task Force by the Commission and the organisation of 
the consultation at the national level by the MTFs. As well as the problems of 
limited flexibility and accessibility of the agenda as already discussed, such 
constraints have more tangible outcomes in terms of the role and capacities of the 
network actors within the MTFs, as well as in terms of the organisation and 
distribution of policy expertise at the national and EU levels. Taking national 
network actors first, the reliance on existing, established networks of contacts had 
three key effects on the MTF. 
(a) Reinforcement function: this refers to the links or relationships which 
exist between the network actors. It is clear that the ability to create new links 
within the network was very limited. Despite some new actors being brought to 
the attention of the core network actors, the experience of the new actors 
(universities) was of being very marginal and, as a result, they withdrew from the 
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network at the close of the consultation. However, those network actors who 
formed a part of the original list of contacts found the participation experience 
useful insofar as it brought those contacts into a common forum. In other words, it 
provided an arena in which those actors who were already known to each other in 
either a direct capacity, or by reputation, could have those relationships reinforced. 
The familiarity of the line-up will have re-assured those involved about who the 
key actors are in their policy domain, and who is recognised by external actors (for 
example the government, the Commission) as an expert in the field. Consequently 
the formation of future networks in the policy domain is likely to reflect the same 
composition of policy actors, pointing again to the tendency for networks to be 
rather more static than dynamic. 
(b) Established leaderships further limit dynamism: this refers to network 
leaderships in established fora. This is a factor which arises from the fact that 
existing network relationships have been further reinforced. A consequence of a 
reliance on established links is that decisions about the direction of the network are 
likely to emerge from established, dominant groups or individuals. Being an 
established member of the network may deliver greater authority to the individual 
who manages and directs the work of the network. Another possibility, however, 
is that the dominant or core principles around which the core actors cluster, are 
unlikely to be challenged. By delimiting the scope of membership and deriving 
leadership from within the core, the dynamic or the potential for change within 
the network is limited. 
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(c) Fit with pre-existing network locations: A third factor arises from the 
obstacles to potential new actors becoming involved in the network. Even if the 
obstacles to membership can be overcome, for example resulting from an external 
shock such as the second call for Ideas from the Commission which effectively by- 
passed the UK national MTF framework, and which expanded the range of 
consultees in that domain, there are more difficulties in retaining (the desire for) 
meaningful membership. The central difficulty seems to lie in the ability of any 
new entrants to match (or `tie up well' with) the ideas, proposals or direction of the 
established network. In other words, if the areas they represent seem to be marginal 
or too diverse to be integrated fully, those individuals or groups representing those 
interests remain marginal or withdraw from the network. So, even where new 
actors have the ability to gain entry to the network, if they cannot provide an easy 
fit with what's already there they are unlikely to remain a part of that particular 
network. In addition, if there are no other groups with which they can combine in 
order to increase their weight then the dominant network remains unchallenged. 
Other outcomes: 
In addition to the impact on the network of experience indicators such as 
those we have found in this particular case study, there are two further significant 
outcomes from this type of consultation. 
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(a) The possibility that strategic thinking (policy expertise) has moved to the 
supranational level. This may change the significance of certain types of 
knowledge, where an understanding of EU structures, processes and objectives is as 
important as policy relevant knowledge. 
(b) This has the further consequence of the more limited resources at the domestic 
level being directed to areas with high public salience. This may undermine the 
impact of professional-industry networks within the UK as their analysis of what is 
required in future water quality and water management does not always match the 
public identification of water issues. 
Taken together these additional factors may point to the changing terrain of 
network activity, as it shifts further away from the national level to European 
arenas. In addition it may indicate that, at least in the initial stages of this network 
shift, that different types of knowledge become as important as those already 
associated with networks. Not only does resourcing, professional cohesiveness, 
policy-relevant knowledge (or expertise) deliver influence within a network but it 
also increases understanding and familiarity with the `rules of the game'. In 
addition, insider status is something which is being reproduced at the EU level, as 
the example of the Institute of Hydrology demonstrates. 
The UK national MTF seems to have been of limited utility for the UK 
participants. Those who already had contacts with others in the network kept 
them, but the MTF consultations didn't provide the function of building any new 
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links for those outside the existing network. Also, much of the consumer and 
environmental concerns' input was limited in the UK submission. As well as the 
absence of key campaigning organisations, it was felt by organisations with an 
environmental dimension who did participate that without their involvement the 
environmental element of the submission would have been even weaker. In that 
sense environmental concerns did not form a part of the basic make-up of the 
network participants. 
Despite the fact that the core network actors in this case (water industry 
professionals) can and do claim to have integrated consumer and environmental 
concerns into their own strategy, this Task Force demonstrated that recognition of 
what is important to different interests is limited. Not only do water industry 
professionals claim that the public misidentifies the most important issues for long- 
run water management, but consumers claim that water companies misrepresent 
their real concerns. This clearly creates difficulties in producing a coherent 
submission which represents the full remit of socio-economic stakeholders in the 
water policy sector. In the particular case of the national MTFs, the disadvantage to 
non-industry concerns is increased as a result. This arises from the fact that the 
consultation was dominated by water industry professionals with marginal input 
from consumer and environmental interests. The imbalance is then exacerbated by 
the misrepresentation of consumer and environmental interests by the industry. 
It has also become clear that how much prior knowledge an individual or 
organisation had of the structures and objectives of the Task Force was also very 
important. One certain consequence of a high degree of prior knowledge of the 
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workings of the Task Force, was an increase in the leverage a particular 
organisation could have within the network and thus the ability to have a 
significant impact. This ability to have more of an impact manifested itself in a 
number of different dimensions. Prior knowledge could direct an organisation to: 
(a) stick to the framework as given (because know it isn't really open, so some 
suggestions will not make the final document); 
(b) operate in many fora, rather than be limited to one MTF. This spreads the 
impact any single organisation could have and makes it possible to find the most 
suitable MTF for voicing opinions; 
(c) be able to use prior knowledge as an indicator of the importance of that 
organisation. The fact that they appear to already be on the inside track provides 
a lofty perch from which to pass down their suggestions to the MTFs, for 
maximum impact on the central Task Force; 
(d) take note of spread of participants rather than be limited to their own 
individual interest (a proposal which is multidimensional is more likely to be 
represented in a pan-European forum than ideas which only directly impact on 
limited end users or in very particular contexts which cannot have more general 
applicability). 
Again it seems clear that established network actors who have long experience of 
similar approaches, and have the appearance of `insider' status, are set to benefit 
more directly from this kind of consultation than newer or more marginal groups 
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who can only represent a single or limited area of interest. So bigger organisations 
also stand to gain more from such an exercise than smaller, more targeted groups. 
The exception would be where they have a particular (even unique) product 
or service to provide, such as Kaiak. Smaller, less coherently organised groups or 
individuals with ideas of unidimensional application are unlikely to reap the same 
reward from the consultation process. The consequence, of course, is that new or 
marginal interests do not remain in the network at the end of the consultation. 
Having only a limited impact and not gaining any tangible benefits from the 
experience encourages new or marginal interests to withdraw from the network, 
thus allowing the existing network to remain unchallenged. In addition there are 
disincentives to attempting to maintain contact, which do not apply to established 
network actors. That is, there are costs involved in investing the time in order to 
become a more established member of the network, costs which, on the experience 
of previously limited rewards for participation may not be considered a worthwhile 
outlay. 
So one characteristic of this type of network is the reinforcement function 
for established network actors. In other words, because of the problems for new or 
marginal groups, the dominance of established network actors and pre-existing 
interrelationships are not challenged, but reinforced. The consequence is that the 
network will be further reinforced in the future as they call on each other again as 
the lack of challenge strengthens a belief in their coherence and ability to work 
together. 
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A second characteristic which develops in established networks is that, 
precisely because the networks are made up of clusters of like-minded water 
professionals, the leadership of the network is predictable. The leadership is not 
from an individual or organisation from outside the network, but from a dominant 
group inside that network. Particularly if we consider the role of leaders of the 
network as also of being the power brokers within that nexus, then this is likely to 
be proactive leadership on the basis of established ideas and practice. So we could 
characterise networks such as these as having established leaderships which, thus, limit 
dynamism. 
A further characteristic, on the basis of the experience of the newer or more 
marginal groups to the network is that if they cannot easily fit with the overall 
direction of the network, they are less likely to be adequately represented in the 
outcome. In other words, it seems to have been the case with this particular 
network that new approaches needed to fit with pre-existing network locations - 
otherwise their views could not be adequately communicated. 
In terms of internal network dynamics, there was very clearly a 
fragmentation of the groups or organisations representing the `needs of society' 
versus a uniformity of those representing the `needs of the market'. This was 
manifested on four levels. Firstly, it was manifested in fragmentation within the 
environmental sector - as there are a multitude of issues for environmental groups 
to concentrate on and neither of the two umbrella organisations (Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth) were involved. Secondly, there was a lack of coherence across 
the green-consumer divide - despite both sets of interests fitting broadly into the 
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`needs for society' axis, identified by the European Commission. Thirdly, there was 
a fracture between the national and the EU level in both the environmental and 
consumer fields - particularly in the consumer domain as a result of the 
underdeveloped nature of European consumer rights organisations. Finally, the 
outcome of these three factors, was a certain fragmentation of the organisations 
representing `society' versus the alliance building capacities of business enterprise 
and pan-European industry groups. This had a double effect: `society' groups had 
weak representation in their own right and were also weak relative to the 
representation and coherence of organisations representing the industry. 
4.8 Conclusion 
It is clear that network analysis provides very useful insights into the behaviour of 
important policy actors in a given sector. It is possible, through this type of 
approach, to identify core and marginal actors and to look at the relationships 
between them in order to make judgements about the reasons for their core or 
marginal status. In this particular case study, the core groups can be identified as 
representing something of a professional network. The professional-industry bias 
was visible through the formation of both the professional and the national MTFs. 
The managers of the MTFs had a central role in organising the consultation and the 
submission of proposals to the central Task Force. These managers were derived 
from professional researchers embedded in the policy domain. 
188 
One limitation of network analysis, however, is that the significance and 
the operational details of networks vary from one policy sphere to another and 
over time within a single sphere. Certainly they may take on different forms than 
the professional-industry emphasis found here. In looking for policy networks in 
each and every policy domain and examining the differences between, say, a 
network of water professionals and a network of road transport lobbyists, the 
conclusion will always tend towards an emphasis on variability. 
However, there is a more serious limitation. Network analysis provides 
only a limited kind of explanation of policymaking. In effect it treats some facts as 
simply given, and so not in need of explanation. It enables us to explain the 
particular course that policymaking takes within a given set of constraints, but it 
does not provide an explanation of those constraints themselves. This general 
feature of network analysis showed up in three features of our case study: the 
importance of the EU's existing agenda in prescribing a framework for the 
consultation; the almost complete neglect of environmental interests; and the less 
marked but still significant neglect of consumer interests. 
These three facts had a very important effect on the outcome of the 
consultation, and yet network analysis can offer at best only a partial explanation 
of them. It can explain the omission of environmentalists, for example, as a slip on 
the part of Dr Packham; but this seems very superficial. It is difficult to believe that 
the policy outcome would have been significantly different had Friends of the 
Earth been consulted. To the extent that it would not have been different there was 
an unseen constraint on the process which network analysis simply cannot explain. 
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Similar comments can be made about the representation of consumer interests in 
the process. 
The general point is quite simple. Network analysis takes many features of 
the modern political world for granted, relying on them in its explanations, and so 
it is unable to provide any explanation of them itself. Assumptions about general 
constraints on policymaking form part of the background theory which is used to 
apply network analysis. Whether this reflects tacit endorsement of these features, 
or instead modest explanatory aims, if we want to explain the general constraints 
we must look elsewhere. Moreover, as I have argued throughout, we ought to try 
to explain these general constraints. Without some appreciation of them there is a 
danger of over-estimating the power of individual actors. Chapters Five and Six will 
examine how we might explain them. Chapter Five will look at theories of the 
state as a distinct social actor, whilst Chapter Six will examine Marxist views of the 
state as an aspect of capitalist social relations. The Marxist view allows us to 
understand the role of the state as well as structural limits to individual agency. 
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Chapter 5. Statism 
5.1 Introduction 
The following chapter will consider the different contributions of pluralism and, in 
particular, statism to understanding the nature of political outcomes. These are two 
major strands of non-Marxist political science and they have polarised views of the 
state: pluralism does not engage directly with the state as a social actor with 
autonomous interests. By contrast, strong state-centred approaches focus on the 
state as a key actor with both its own preferences and the ability to implement 
these. In part these statist approaches provide something of a corrective to the 
society-centred approach of pluralism. Given the arguments made in the discussion 
of the case study, that the information about network actor interaction may be 
secondary given the possibility of macro constraints on the autonomy of actors at 
the meso-level, it is important to consider alternative interpretations. One 
significant criticism which has been made of network approaches then is their 
possible overestimation of the power of individuals and groups in society. This 
results from a lack of a theorisation of potential constraints on network autonomy. 
It is possible that that the state, in particular, could provide a constraint on the 
network: either in terms of it being a distinct social actor or as an aspect of 
structural constraint. The first of these propositions is considered in this chapter, in 
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providing a discussion of those theories which emphasise the central importance of 
the state as a social actor. 
It is worth re-stating that the pluralism with which we are particularly 
concerned (policy networks) was a response to the strong state theories which 
preceded it. In other words, in contrast to the image of a strong state and 
formalised government-industry relations, the new pluralism concentrates on less 
formal connections within the political economy - in particular within the 
policymaking process. This produces a firmly society-centred approach. 
Consequently, inquiries into the state have never been a prominent feature of this 
type of approach. Rather, given that it is engaged in the task of elucidating the role 
of non-state actors and explaining political outcomes in terms of the interplay and 
interrelationships of networks of social actors outside of the formal organisation of 
the state, the state itself has been marginalised as a distinct actor. Therefore the 
state, in pluralism, is not conceived of as a constraining, shaping or dominant actor 
with autonomous preferences and power. 
One can thus begin to understand the location of the state and other social 
actors within pluralist frameworks. The emphasis was consciously shifted away 
from the state in order to highlight the significance of non-formalised networks 
which seemingly had a powerful impact on the shape of political outcomes. Whilst 
this strand of neo-pluralism in particular has allowed a significant investigation into 
the power and impact of individual agency in creating and achieving political goals, 
a focus on the meso-level need not entail the omission of either the macro-level nor 
of formalised political relationships. This position has been discussed by non- 
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Marxist state-centred theorists as an important corrective to the dominant society- 
centred approaches within political science - which, for these theorists, includes 
both Marxist and pluralist accounts. 
As Skocpol notes (1990), the response to the prevalence of society-centred 
accounts has been the further sophistication of alternative models, ones which 
highlight the continued importance of the state as a social actor. There are different 
types of non-Marxist statist approaches which vary according to their assessment of 
the extent of state autonomy. The core of all such approaches is a definition of the 
state in terms of the public officials who comprise the institutional organisation of 
the state. There is also basic agreement over `the state' (state officials) having an 
agenda (preferences) which they seek to convert into political reality. In other 
words the state (state elites/state officials/ state managers) is a strong, autonomous 
actor with its own sets of interests. The variation then, lies in the extent to which 
the state can be understood as autonomous from the dominant economic and social 
groups in society, where that autonomy (state capacity) is understood as the state 
being able to override any countervailing preferences, or as being powerful enough 
to change the preferences of oppositional groups in society. 
As these are non-Marxist accounts, any relationship found between the state 
and powerful economic and social groups or classes is not one in which the state 
reflects (or acts on behalf of) the needs or interests of sectional groups or classes. As 
noted above, the core of these approaches is that the state has its own interests 
which it pursues in a changing context of support or opposition from dominant 
non-state actors. In other words state preferences are not reducible to the interests 
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of any single social group or elite. It is far more likely within a statist approach to 
view the state as fragmented, with different sets of state officials' interests being 
represented in different branches of the state. But, how far you need to consider 
state capacity in relation to socio-economically powerful groups in society is a point 
of useful comparison between statist approaches. Thus in both definition of the 
state (as the sum total of public officials) and in the relationship between state and 
civil society, these approaches are essentially non-Marxist. 
State-centred approaches may be considered as attempting to plough a 
middle way through the perceived difficulties of both pluralist and overly- 
structuralist accounts, particularly Marxism. There has been significant 
development of theory on state autonomy and this is considered not only to be a 
more accurate account of state activity, but is seen by some to avoid the pitfalls of 
both pluralism and Marxism. That is, it takes the state seriously as a powerful actor 
in the political process (unlike pluralism) but is encumbered neither by economic 
determinism nor instrumentalism (as is Marxism). 
The aim of this chapter is to form the first part of a discussion on the 
relevance of the state to the policymaking process. It has been suggested in the 
opening chapters that a significant omission in the networks approaches to 
policymaking is a direct engagement with the state as a potential constraint. The 
solution to this weakness can be provided from one of two sources, a statist 
approach or a Marxist approach. Given the potential difficulties in integrating a 
Marxist theory of the state with a more general pluralist perspective on the meso- 
level, this chapter will concern itself with non-Marxist statist positions. Although 
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an easier fit can be found in using statism with pluralism, the critique provided of 
the statist approaches demonstrates that there remains a strong argument for 
adopting a Marxist approach to the state and policymaking. Consequently, Chapter 
Six will detail the evolution of Marxist contributions on the state. 
This chapter will thus begin with a short overview of the pluralist treatment 
of the state as a basis for exploring the arguments developed to support the claim 
that, in fact, the state is a significant and autonomous actor. It will then consider 
the key contributions of statist theorists: Nordlinger, Krasner, Skocpol and Mann. 
It argues that state-centric approaches such as these can be integrated into neo- 
pluralist account of policymaking. Thus this type of state analysis can provide a 
solution to one central problem identified in the networks model. However, 
despite providing a strong theory of the state as a social actor, these approaches do 
not develop a theory of structure (capitalism) and, therefore do not locate the state 
and state capacity within any structural analysis. This, it can be argued, is a 
significant omission as, despite the advantages of a strong state approach for neo- 
pluralism, the formulation of the state and state capacity is such that it can provide 
useful information about the nature and activity of individual states within 
capitalism, but tells us nothing about capitalist states in general. Again this stems, in 
part, from the method of analysis. Strong state-emphasising theory interprets the 
variability of states in capitalism as evidence that there cannot be a universal, 
structural account of states and state capacity. Thus the method used tends to be 
comparative analysis of state capacity in particular policy domains, a method which 
highlight diversity rather than similarity. 
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A second area of weakness is that despite the concentration on state 
autonomy, much of the analysis is actually concerned with the relationship 
between the state and dominant social groups. As noted above, one variation in 
these type of state interpretations is the extent to which the state can be understood 
as autonomous from society. In fact then, this seems to indicate that the focus of 
political inquiry should be on the relationship between state and society, in order to 
understand the social dynamic, rather than concentrating either on the state or 
society to the exclusion of the other. 
Before considering each statist contribution in turn, let us consider the 
arguments for statism. 
5.2 Pluralism and the case for a Statist approach 
If the notion of the state is to be at all meaningful, and not merely a 
ragbag synonym of government, it must be divorced from and even 
opposed to personal power - not in the legal but in the political sense. 
Nettl, 1994: 11. 
The state is most often described as a set of institutions which are distinct as a result 
of two main features, which are taken to be general comments about all states: 
firstly, they have a monopoly of legitimate force (violence and coercion); and 
secondly, they exhibit continuity of personnel (which distinguishes the state from 
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the government and implies that the government is not a part of the state). Other 
features of a specific state would be that it has clear geographical boundaries and, 
within that territory, it is the sole rule-making body (Hall, 1994: General 
Commentary). 
There are variations within classic pluralism about the precise nature of the 
state, but most formulations see the state as the sum of public officials who 
comprise the central institutional arrangements and, where the state is discussed 
directly, conceive of it as being separated from civil society. The state in these type 
of formulations is subordinated to society and is thus seen as the backdrop of 
politics which, if it does intervene, does so in non-confrontational ways: not to 
represent a specific interest, either of its own or of a particular social group. The 
three standard interpretations of the state within pluralism represent something of 
an evolution within the perspective. The idea of the state as a weathervane 
responding to society has the concept of pressure group competition at its core, and 
this remains at the heart of pluralist analysis. In this particular formulation the state 
mirrors interest competition and so reflects the fact that the state is passive, yet 
responsive to the strongest pressure groups (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1989: 43). 
A second formulation asserts the idea of the `neutral state', where in a 
proper polyarchy the state can (and should) maintain its neutrality. This has raised 
questions about the means (and thus the implications) of state intervention within 
this model, as clearly the nature of state intervention indicates more or less 
neutrality. The third model casts the state as a `broker' or `an interest group state', 
where `public policy is the aggregation of pressure group activities going on inside 
197 
the state' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1989: 47). This is perhaps a more sophisticated 
view, in the sense that it accepts that the state does more than just respond to civil 
society and, through its intervention, can demonstrate preference. 
Implicit in all these formulations however is the notion that the state is not 
an actor which can exercise a particular type of power for its own ends. Rather it 
somehow stands back from the main political arena and merely guards the 
framework of society. However, state-centric theorists have addressed the problems 
of the classic formulation of the state in pluralism. Here such theorists consider the 
state as a strong actor which is able to successfully pursue its own goals, even if 
opposed by dominant social groups. This is clearly a very strong interpretation of 
the capacity of the state vis-a-vis dominant social groups or classes, and indicates the 
importance of considering the state as an actor in its own right. Of significance also 
is that explicit in these type of contributions is the separation of the state from civil 
society. In other words the state is neither seen as a reflection of society as in 
pluralism, nor as a reflection of the needs of the capitalist class as found in 
Marxism. 
The differences statist contributions exhibit can be considered as their 
strengths relative to classic pluralist and structuralist-functionalist approaches. In 
other words, the state-centred approaches considered here overcome the difficulties 
of networks approaches in being able to identify some of the potential constraints 
on individual agency which were discussed in Chapter Two. In addition, they avoid 
the criticisms which have been levelled at structural approaches, particularly 
Marxism. In considering the state as autonomous from civil society, the 
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relationship between the state and social groups (even if one accepts the idea of an 
economically dominant class) is neither a given nor a constant. The actions of the 
state then are not seen as being determined by, nor in the long-run interests of, the 
dominant social group. 
Given the dominance of pluralism and Marxism as explanations of political 
outcomes, it is clear that there is critical space for a non society-centred approach to 
challenge these assumptions. Both pluralism and Marxism, according to state 
theorists, deny the state its place in shaping and directing political outcomes. By 
concentrating on either the interplay of competitive interests or the class struggle 
between bourgeois and proletarian, the state is marginalised and understood as a 
site of activity, rather than as a powerful social actor in its own right. Particularly 
through the development of international relations theory, which focuses on 
sovereign states and the interdependency of states, rather than sub-state groupings, 
then there has been something of a trend towards emphasising the state as a key 
actor. 
Skocpol (1990) discusses this change within social science from society- 
centred to state-centred approaches, which she refers to as a paradigm shift. She 
notes that a common element of pluralist and structure-functionalist accounts is the 
perceived insignificance of the institutions of the state relative to the power and 
preferences of society: `Government itself was not taken very seriously as an 
independent actor, and in comparative research, variations in governmental 
organizations were deemed less significant than the general "functions" shared by 
political systems of all societies' (Skocpol, 1990: 4). Further, Skocpol notes that the 
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research findings of pluralists cannot be easily accommodated within their own 
analytical frameworks. Consequently, an approach which can adequately account 
for autonomous preferences of public officials is, arguably, more compelling. 
When pluralists focused on the determinants of particular public policy 
decisions, they often found that governmental leaders took initiatives 
well beyond the demands of social groups or electorates; or they found 
that government agencies were the most prominent participants in the 
making of particular policy decisions. Within pluralist theoretical 
premises, there were but limited ways to accommodate such findings 
Skocpol, 1990: 4. 
For state-emphasising theorists the problems of analysis are not only found within 
pluralism but also within structural accounts, in particular Marxism. The difficulty 
within these type of approaches again arises from it being an account which is 
essentially society-centred and thus similarly considers the state as being either 
controlled by or the `guarantor' of society - specifically, class - interests. 
... at the theoretical level, virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state 
have retained deeply embedded society-centred assumptions, not allowing 
themselves to doubt that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or 
class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production. 
Skocpol, 1990: 5. 
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State-emphasising theory, such as that presented by Skocpol, Krasner 
Nordlinger and Mann, then, is about the autonomy of state action - autonomy 
from dominant classes or other politically weighty social/political forces. Further, 
this type of theory seeks to avoid abstract generalisation about all states in 
capitalism: the view that they share common functions relevant to the mode of 
production. According to Skocpol, to work at this level of generalisation 
undermines the force of the theory. Such generalisation does not allow any 
discussion or analysis of the relative impact of differences in state structures and 
activities. Not only does this render useful empirical information but, for the 
purposes of state theory, the multitude of differences in state style and approach, 
and differences in political choices and outcomes which are evidenced through such 
an exercise, also serves to illustrate the impossibility of such generalisation. 
Consequently the preferred method is the comparative politics approach, precisely 
to highlight the differences between modern states. 
State-centred approaches thus occupy the middle ground between pluralists 
on the one hand who do not discuss the state directly, and neo-Marxists (and other 
functionalist type accounts) on the other, who do not grant true autonomy to state 
activity. Statist approaches favour an interpretation of the state as a strong and 
autonomous social actor. However the main areas of weakness with statist 
approaches, which we can identify already, are two. Firstly, in shifting the 
emphasis away from society and onto the state, statist approaches do not truly 
illuminate the state-society relation, which seems to be most relevant. Secondly, the 
state is considered as a social actor which is unencumbered by structural constraints 
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on its autonomy, in a way similar to the networks of interest found in neo- 
pluralism. Without a direct engagement with structural analysis it is impossible to 
truly determine the `reach' of the structural organisation of society, for example in 
terms of capitalism as a specific mode of production placing constraints on the 
autonomy of social actors, at the level of society or the level of the state. 
5.3 Nordlinger on autonomy, democracy and the state 
To be state-centred rather than agency-centred is not to claim the irrelevance of 
individual actors or agents, but is to attribute powers to the state (state officials in 
Nordlinger's case) which can be of greater significance than those of other societal 
actors. In other words the preferences of the state can be enacted irrespective of the 
range of opposing forces. The claim is slightly more restricted than that may imply, 
as Nordlinger (1981) notes that the state and state preferences must be understood 
as at least as important as those of social actors. He is concerned to refute society- 
centred analysis which sees the state as merely responding to or being colonised by 
societal preferences. Rather, Nordlinger claims, the state has its own preferences 
some of which will be compatible with, and some of which will diverge from, 
societal preferences. When those state-society preferences diverge, the state will 
tend to translate its own preferences into action. Additionally, the state will 
attempt to `reinforce societal convergence' or realign societal preferences to prevent 
the emergence of preference divergence (Norlinger, 1981: 7). 
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Nordlinger is part of the range of statist contributors who consider the state 
to be of central importance in understanding policymaking. Within Nordlinger's 
approach, the state is defined as `... public officials taken all together ... ' 
(Nordlinger, 1981: 3) and focuses on the autonomy of public officials from the 
important social-political groupings in society. This has some points of reference 
with some Marxist contributions, notably those of Miliband and Block (see 
Chapter Six) who also focus on the relative autonomy of state personnel or state 
managers from the dominant class. The focus on officials is significant for statists as 
it is a means of avoiding reification of structure, a criticism which has been made 
about more structural-functionalist contributions on the state. Nordlinger writes: 
... the 
definition of the state must refer to individuals rather than to 
some other kinds of phenomena, such as "institutional arrangements" or 
the legal-normative order. Since we are primarily concerned with the 
making of public policy, a conception of the state that does not have 
individuals at its core could lead directly into the anthropomorphic and 
reification fallacies. 
Nordlinger, 1981: 9. 
This highlights an important element of a theory of the state, which is that the 
definition of the state is key to understanding how it behaves. 
In order to achieve as widely acceptable a definition of the state as possible, 
Nordlinger argues for the exclusion of both variable characteristics and invariable 
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functions and purposes. In other words, only those elements that `encompass all 
states and all of their components at all times should be included' (Nordlinger, 
1981: 10) and, in order to maintain theoretical neutrality, any definition should 
avoid statements about `the preservation of political stability or the reproduction of 
capitalism' (Nordlinger, 1981: 10). Again, under the guise of theoretical neutrality, 
Nordlinger is making claims for his method which are open to direct challenge. It 
is not possible to be theoretically neutral and simultaneously imply that the 
context of capitalism is merely a given with no explanatory capacity of its own. In 
other words, as Marx argued, neutrality and the acceptance of capitalism are 
mistakenly conflated. This means that existing economic laws are considered to be 
natural laws and therefore require no independent analysis. This, according to 
Marx, conforms to bourgeois political economy insofar as capitalist rules of the 
game remain unchallenged, hidden by the guise of natural conditions. (see 
Grundisse in McLellan 1990: 348). 
What Nordlinger leaves us with then is a definition of the state which is 
close to that of Weber, in his assertion that, `Quite simply the state is made up of 
and limited to those individuals who are endowed with society-wide 
decisionmaking authority' (Nordlinger, 1981: 11). That is, those public officials 
who can take decisions which are binding on private individuals. State preferences 
then are those decisions which have the support of a majority of public officials, 
particularly of those in the most influential offices of state and those with better 
personal and strategic resources relevant to the issue under consideration. The way 
in which public officials preferences are shaped is, according to Nordlinger, vastly 
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diverse - he cites: career interests, loyalties and professional 
knowledge 
(Nordlinger, 1981: 15) as just some of the shaping factors. This serves to highlight 
that there is unlikely to be a unity of purpose on the part of public officials, and 
rather a fragmentation of interests within the state. 
It is clear that this is a strongly state-centred analysis insofar as the state is 
conceived of as being able to implement its own preferences (or the sum of public 
officials' preferences) despite countervailing social and political forces. In this way 
it is clear why Nordlinger refers to the state as both autonomous and democratic. 
After all, the assumption might well be that, if the state is always able to convert its 
own preferences, that the state is somehow acting against democracy and 
legitimacy. However, the fact that the configuration of preferences is neither 
guaranteed nor unified in purpose indicates that the full range of possibilities in 
policy are open. This, for Nordlinger, seems to satisfy a claim for the democratic 
and legitimate nature of state action. 
This type of state formulation would not be difficult to reconcile with 
much of the networks approach, as this indicates only that there is a strong reason 
for considering the role of public officials and their relationship with different 
policy areas. This is state-centred but does not engage with structuralism, as the 
state is defined as the sum total of public officials. Consequently this effectively 
remains an issue of competing preferences, only at the level of the state - not a site 
for societal preference competition but a battle between state preferences and 
divergent societal interests. Again, in order to make the claim of theoretical 
neutrality and to avoid reification, Nordlinger argues that it is not possible to see 
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the state as having a specific role to play or, in Nordlinger's terminology, as having 
an invariable function. To consider the state in those terms would be to enter the 
difficult terrain of determinism and instrumentalism, and certainly not to consider 
the state as either autonomous or democratic. 
Conceiving of the contemporary state as essentially legitimate and 
democratic (or, at the very least, the best available attempt at achieving these 
ideals), is a pluralist preoccupation. This effectively undermines any attempt to 
understand policymaking as anything other than the outcome of preference 
competition, either at the level of society or at the level of the state. Although the 
`shaping factors' of public officials' preferences may admit hierarchies and vested 
interests, the divergence of these as between officials at different times and in 
different policy areas, is seen to be evidence of pluralism. Further, the definition of 
the state, state preferences and shaping factors in Nordlinger's work points to a 
fundamental of pluralist analysis: that these areas can be clearly investigated 
through the chain of decision making, through examinations of the hierarchies of 
public office, personal and strategic resources of individual officials and direct 
questioning their knowledge, loyalties and interests. This is not too dissimilar to 
Richardson's policy communities model which highlights the strategic significance 
of public officials in networks with other interested communities. 
Nordlinger notes in the preface to `On the Autonomy of the Democratic 
State', 
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It struck me as most implausible that the democratic state - the elected 
and appointed officials who populate this large, weighty, resource-laden, 
highly prized ensemble of offices - is consistently unwilling or unable to 
translate its preferences into public policy when they diverge from those 
held by the politically weightiest societal groups 
Nordlinger, 1981: vii-viii. 
Equally, it seems unlikely that the state's preferences will emerge solely from a 
battle of career interests, loyalty, official and personal resources. Further, it seems 
unlikely that the state's vested interests stretch no further than the ambitions of the 
officials and the offices they occupy. Indeed Nordlinger notes that state preferences 
are probably also shaped by societal factors such as socialisation, education and so 
on. However, he adds, `But in all probability they do not overshadow the state's 
internally generated preferences. The democratic state is significantly autonomous 
in this subjective sense' (Nordlinger, 1981: 38). This separates the state almost 
entirely from its social context, in granting it such autonomy from the 
configuration of social forces and other powerful interests within society. The 
contributions from Skocpol and, in particular, Krasner are more certain about the 
relationship between the state and dominant socio-economic groups. These type of 
strong state approaches discuss state autonomy, but do so more in the sense of the 
relative autonomy of the state from dominant interests. In other words, the 
capacity of the state is assessed in terms of the context within which it acts, directly 
linking the analysis of the state to its relations with civil society. 
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5.4 Krasner's relational approach 
In his work on foreign policy, Krasner develops a theory of the state which has a 
strong state configuration yet demonstrates a considerable overlap with key 
elements of structural Marxism. 
A significant starting assumption which Krasner shares with other state- 
emphasising theorists is the distinction between state and society. This is elaborated 
in order to distinguish state interests from those of dominant social and economic 
groups. So the state is autonomous, with aims which are separate from the range of 
competing social interests. Krasner claims that these separate preferences can be 
material or ideological and, in combination, comprise the `national interest'. So the 
state, in the form of public officials or `statesmen', pursues the national interest 
which may be understood as economic expansion or stability or may be 
understood ideologically. The distinction between `material' and `ideological' is 
significant, as without the ideological dimension there may be little to separate 
Krasner's account from that of structural Marxists. Krasner provides the example of 
the Vietnam War as a policy choice which had no identifiable economic rationale. 
This was purely an ideological conflict with Communism and this can, for Krasner, 
explain the misguided decision to pursue this particular foreign policy. 
Krasner maintains that the state acts democratically in pursuing the national 
interest as the decisions taken are related to the needs of society. It is clear however 
that the state will meet with varying degrees of internal and external opposition to 
its policy decisions, and its ability to overcome these will be a function of the 
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structure of the political system and thus the capacity of the state to achieve its 
objectives in the face of domestic or international opposition. Two things are most 
significant here. Firstly, Krasner claims that a policy domain such as foreign policy 
will exhibit more state autonomy than areas of domestic politics, as foreign policy 
is better insulated from societal pressures and interests. This indicates again that the 
state is not a unitary actor, but is fragmented with different parts having greater 
capacity (autonomy) than others. Secondly, the mechanics of the political 
institutions are relevant in most statist theory. In the same way that Archer 
discusses the capacity of pre-existing structure to shape the context of future 
agency, the political institutions of the state which may have been forged in a 
previous era, have a potentially constraining effect on the autonomy of the state. 
This point will be returned to in the critiques of statism, in section 5.8 below. 
The important elements of Krasner's approach are that state aims are those 
pursued by state officials (managers), autonomous from the needs and preferences 
of wider society, yet will also reflect the broad concerns of civil society. These are 
formulated on the basis of material or ideological gain and thus represent, broadly, 
the national interest. There will be some conflict in the pursuit of certain policy 
aims which may arise from internal or external opposition to their 
implementation. The internal strength of the state, and therefore its ability to 
transcend opposition or to even change the aims and behaviour of oppositional 
forces, will depend partly upon the structure of the political system. In other words 
the nature and extent of state capacity differs as between states - hence the need for 
comparative political analysis. It is important for Krasner to distinguish between 
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the material and the ideological pursuit of the national interest in order to clarify 
the difference between his approach and that of structural Marxism. In other 
words, if one could explain state policy aims on the basis of material expansion, 
stability and so on, that is not so far removed from the state pursuing interests 
which serve the long-run interests of capital. As Krasner states, 
Although it is much more difficult to distinguish structural Marxist 
arguments from a statist paradigm, the importance that American central 
decision makers have at times attributed to ideological as opposed to 
economic or strategic aims is more compatible with the theoretical image 
that guides this study than with any materialist interpretation. 
Krasner, 1978: 34. 
According to Skocpol, Krasner uses a `Relational Approach' in his work on the 
state. That is, state capacities are seen as relative `to dominant or transnational non- 
state actors and structures, especially economically dominant ones' (Skocpol, 1990: 
19). On this view, the state is able to either change the preferences of non-state 
actors who may confront the state or it can successfully oppose such demands. In 
addition, Krasner claims that states have different capacities within their own 
institutional arrangements. In other words, they will be more able to translate their 
preferences into policy in some areas - notably foreign policy - than in others. 
This further extends to states in a general sense, that states of any given type will 
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demonstrate different capacities in different sectors: for example, not all states in 
capitalism will have more capacity in defence than in agriculture. 
Krasner's approach seems to be preferable to that of Nordlinger as, in 
Krasner's work, taking the state seriously as an autonomous actor still requires a 
consideration of the state in relation to its social context. If we can take anything 
from the discussion of networks models it is that there are likely to be (informal) 
power relationships between public officials and dominant social groups and/or 
interest communities which need to be investigated. 
5.5 Skocpol on state autonomy 
Like Krasner, Skocpol sees states as sovereign holders of power both in terms of 
their own territories as well as their geopolitical relationships. The development of 
international relations theory has led much statist theory to be rooted in ideas of 
states interacting with other states in various power networks. In particular, the 
different economic development of states after world war two and the differences 
in development between NICs and the period of British dominance followed by 
the Pax Americana, seemed to demonstrate that states were actors in their own 
right, capable of shaping society, rather than the other way around. In addition, the 
notion of the state managing a territory `leads us away from basic features common 
to all polities and toward consideration of the various ways in which state 
structures and actions are conditioned by historically changing transnational 
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contexts' (from work of Hintze, Skocpol, 1990: 8) In other words, for Skocpol, the 
state is shaped from without by its relationships of interdependency with other 
states in the international system as well as internally through national historical 
development. 
Skocpol further notes that her definition follows from Weber and Hintze. 
She quotes Alfred Stepan, `The state must be considered as more than the 
"government". It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive 
systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and 
public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within 
civil society as well' (Skocpol, 1990: 7) This indicates that within the domestic 
context the state is a shaping force in society, it has a role to play in regulating 
relationships - again a view which is similar to Marxism. So, for Skocpol, the state 
is shaped from without through its international location; individual states shape 
their respective societies rather than vice versa (which contradicts pluralist notions 
of state responsiveness to preference competition) and state capacity will be partly 
determined by the historical development of the particular state under discussion. 
This implies both a strong state and one which can develop autonomous 
preferences: 
States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and 
people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of 
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the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. This is what 
is usually meant by "state autonomy" 
Skocpol, 1990: 9. 
For Skocpol, state autonomy can develop from different sources. In some instances 
non-state elites who are unconnected to the existing dominant order can take the 
state over (for example in a coup). Having taken on the reins of the state it is then 
possible for that elite to redirect state power and destroy the existing social order. 
This indicates that power rests with the state itself rather than with the changing 
elites, and that the state is separate from the dominant classes or social order insofar 
as the state (or state policy) can be re-directed to achieve the ends of new elites. 
This has some similarities with some class-based analyses, in particular the debates 
around relative autonomy and Leninist notions of transforming the bourgeois state 
into a workers state (see Chapter Six. ) 
As noted, for Skocpol, the important dimension of states is their autonomy 
from dominant social groups or classes. But in addition she stresses the differing 
capacities of states, arguing that there is no uniformity of state capacity even within 
broad bands of state categorisation, for example, capitalist or western market 
economies. Allied with her point about the necessity of considering the state as a 
separate social actor, in order to discover the impact of the state on political 
outcomes, this points very clearly to her preferred method of comparative politics. 
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... such overall assessments are perhaps 
best built up from sectorally 
specific investigations, for one of the most important facts about the 
power of a state may be its uneveness across policy areas. And the most 
telling result, even of a far-reaching revolution or reform from above, 
may be the disparate transformations produced across sociopolitical 
sectors 
Skocpol, 1990: 17. 
Skocpol maintains a state-centred analysis and engages with notion of classes 
but, as a non-Marxist, she does not consider classes to be the product of the social 
relations of capital. Because Skocpol sees the state as an autonomous actor within a 
context which happens to be capitalist - in other words, she considers the state as 
the primary focus for analysis rather than the capitalist system - consequently, she 
sees the state as giving form to the organisation and consciousness of classes rather 
than vice versa. So the state is the shaping force, rather than society. In this way we 
can see how statists continue to turn society-centred approaches on their head, 
whether they be broadly pluralist or more structural-functionalist: 
It is never enough simply to posit that dominant groups have a "class 
interest" in maintaining sociopolitical order in continuing a course of 
economic development in ways congruent with the patterns of property 
ownership. Exactly how - even whether - order may be maintained and 
economic accumulation continued depends in significant part on existing 
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state structures and the dominant-class political capacities that these 
structures help to shape. 
Skocpol, 1990: 26. 
In the end Skocpol indicates the two ways in which non-Marxist state- 
centred approaches conceive of the activity of the state: either it is a means by 
which officials achieve their goals relative to the social context; or it is a set of 
institutional arrangements which shapes political wants as well as the means of 
achieving them. On the face of it this is not a particularly contentious statement for 
inquiry which wants to consider the state as a significant social actor. 
Underpinning this view however are several assumptions which may be open to 
challenge: that the state is autonomous (relatively) from the social context, that 
states in capitalism differ as between one another in terms of their capacities 
(power), that the state is the agent for social and political change, that the state is 
able to shape political engagement and the stratification of society. In other words 
it is possible that in the pursuit of a theory which consciously de-emphasises society 
and focuses solely on the state, we can end up attributing too many functions to 
the state - that it provides the major explanatory power for domestic and 
geopolitical outcomes. 
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5.6 Mann on multiple crystallizations 
Mann develops an approach to the state which is somewhat different from the 
theories already discussed. He is particularly concerned that the state is understood 
as having more dimensions than either apparently reductionist explanations such as 
Marxism (the state is only capitalist) or the pluralist vision of state penetration by 
competing groups, allow. In other words, Mann is clear that the modern state is 
multifunctional and has `crystallized' into different forms. Each crystallization 
responds to one of three sources of social power which Mann identifies as: 
`capitalist, as moral-ideological, and as militarist' (Mann, 1993: 44) Further, as a 
result of political struggle, states have crystallized as either `representative' or 
`national' and as `patriarchal'. His aim is to identify relationships between these 
different crystallizations and to assess whether one `may ultimately determine the 
overall character of the state' (Mann, 1993: 44). 
In this way Mann's account differs from the more obviously society-centred 
approaches as well as the state as autonomous actor explanations provided by 
Skocpol, Nordlinger and Krasner. In fact, Mann's approach to the state openly 
borrows from the full spectrum of different contributions, to arrive at a perspective 
which has the complex label of a polymorphous theory of higher level state 
crystallizations. Polymorphous conveys the multiple power networks, tasks and 
mobilizing constituencies at the centre of the state (Mann, 1993: 75) and `higher 
level' represents the most fundamental crystallization(s) of a state. Mann's 
crystallizations therefore represent different `pulls' on the direction of a polity, 
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representing as they do different power constituencies and capacities and so on. 
The question becomes one of whether the modern state is dominated by one 
crystallization one (for example, the aims of capitalism) or whether it in fact 
responds to all possible crystallizations. In other words, for Mann, the nature of the 
state cannot be understood as only one type of crystallization. 
To explain his intertwining of parts of existing theories we can start by 
outlining Mann's four major (or higher) crystallizations in the state: capitalist, 
militarist (domestic and geopolitical), representation (citizenship as contestation 
and participation) and national (the `where' of citizenship, for example, 
centralisation or confederalism). Importantly, as noted above, these are non- 
contradictory (a state can manifest a combination of these crystallizations 
simultaneously) and each can effect a change in the other. 
Clearly, the first higher crystallization - capitalism - is a reference to class 
theories, in particular Marxism. The problems which Mann finds in purely Marxist 
interpretations are the lack of state autonomy and the denial of the possibility that 
classes could have alternative (power) accumulation projects which do not have a 
capitalist logic. Together these place constraints on an understanding of the state, as 
they limit states to their relation to the mode of production. Thus states are only 
defined in this single dimension: `... the vice of class theory is to regard this as 
their only fundamental property' (Mann, 1993: 45). Mann doesn't disagree that 
modern states are capitalist, but he argues that they are much more mullti- 
dimensional than the Marxist conception of capitalist states allows. Class theories 
produce a wrong picture of a unified state which manages the class struggle to 
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maintain capital accumulation. That explains the state, society, the social dynamic 
and geopolitical interaction. For Mann, despite accepting that there are limits 
placed on states by the demands of capitalist accumulation and that the modern 
state is capitalist, the state has more functions than this alone and involves a wider 
diversity of non-class actors. 
The example he gives of a further functional dimension which lies outside 
the singularity of the capitalist crystallization, is foreign policy. This he develops as 
his militarist crystallization which involves a variety of key actors: classes, 
particularistic pressure groups, statesmen, the military, nationalist parties (Mann, 
1993: 70 -74); who intervene in the business of foreign policy to a greater or lesser 
extent, at different historical conjunctures and to differing extents as between 
states. Thus statesmen will behave according to context but states interact with 
other states (rather than other social actors) and thus are important in their own 
right. This borrows from elitism - the notion of an autonomous state elite - and, as 
Mann notes, is reinforced by realist international relations theorists. Autonomy is 
seen as more developed in this sphere as foreign policy is better `insulated' from 
class and other societal interests which can permeate domestic politics. This is 
similar to Krasner's argument which also notes differences of state capacity. He also 
picks up on the differences for foreign policy (relative to other policy domains), as 
he sees this area as being more easily detached from the pressures of dominant 
social groups who can have a much more significant input into domestic policy 
concerns. 
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The idea that domestic politics can be penetrated by societal groups is at 
least a partial reflection of the pluralist picture of democratic politics. Mann argues 
that modern states comprise both `authoritarian and democratic-parliamentary 
states' (Mann, 1993: 61) where the former represents the `domination of every day 
life in the territory' by the political institutions of the state (in particular the 
expanded and centralised bureaucracy which allows much greater control over a 
given territory); and the latter is the area in which civil society can gain control. In 
other words, for Mann there is an interpenetration of state and society. The state 
has multiple institutions which provide potential for access to these `state spaces' 
by civil society. This re-emphasises his key point that states cannot be understood 
as either singular or necessarily cohesive: 
The "power" of the modern state principally concerns not "state elites" 
exercising power over society but a tightening state-society relation, 
caging social relations over the national rather than the local-regional or 
transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far more of 
social life than had earlier states 
Mann, 1993: 61 
According to Mann then, modern states can have multiple crystallizations 
and therefore cannot be understood or defined in relation to a single characteristic. 
The state is an actor as well as a site of action (for example, for classes), yet it is not 
a unitary actor as the state comprises multiple political institutions and diverse state 
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elites. The state can be seen as fragmented, with different parts occupied by 
different elites, each with different interests. The autonomy of state elites can be 
constrained in two ways: by the participation of civil society or by the political 
institutions which having' ... arisen in the course of previous power struggles, 
then institutionalized and constrain present struggles' (Mann, 1993: 52). 
Mann's work is based in empirical studies of social power and state 
development over the whole period of history 1760-1914. On this basis it seems 
likely that any definite conclusions he might arrive at about states and society 
would be heavily contingent on time and place. This would immediately rule out 
the possibility of a singular vision of the state or a cohesive elite. In other words 
Mann is arguing that states have developed in different ways at different times at 
different speeds in different countries. Having discovered this, existing theories of 
the state which are consciously much more limited in their application, are likely 
to be inadequate. Consequently Mann finds it necessary to combine parts of all 
major theoretical contributions on the state to arrive at his polymorphous theory 
of higher level state crystallizations. What this seems to refer to in practice is that 
modern states do not represent a single interest and are not controlled by a single 
elite. The state can act autonomously but may be constrained by both the 
contestation and participation of civil society and/or the political institutions of 
the state. Mann layers this with fundamentally sociological inquiries about the 
nature of something like US welfare policy: he discusses that it is mostly framed 
with classes or economic sectors in mind, but it has also been patriarchal and racist. 
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The question for Mann then is of how these multiple crystallizations relate to one 
another (Mann, 1993: 78). 
As with much state theory Mann's conclusion is essentially that states, along 
with society and social divisions, are important in shaping policy outcomes. The 
relative weight of each of these inputs is contingent on time and place. Theories 
which consciously undertake to improve the image of the state by making claims 
about its autonomy from society (whether as an actor or as both an actor and a site 
of action) all reach a point of conceding that the autonomy of the state is in fact 
contingent on the balance of socio-economically dominant groups or classes in 
society. The eventual distinction between the state and civil society is thus not 
quite as sharp as the intention. Does this make them equally society-centred? It 
seems relevant to take the state seriously, and to this end pluralism seems to omit 
such an analysis to its detriment. To resolve this through a focus on the state, 
however, does not seem to provide any real solution either, as all state theorists 
conclude that it is impossible to generalise about states at all, even modern states. In 
fact the clearest outcome from a reading of these different contributions is that is 
absolutely imperative to understand state-society relations. So statists commit the 
opposite mistake of pluralists, in thinking that the state is the primary explanatory 
variable. In the end both must concede that neither the state nor society is primary. 
Instead, as Marxists claim, historical categories are primary. 
Thus it seems clearly advantageous to take Marxism as a framework for 
understanding capitalism (although it may be more plausible to subdivide this into 
phases of capitalist development) given that this should provide the best insight 
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into the relevant socio-economic groupings and their relationships with one 
another and with the state. In spite of the critiques ranged against Marxism by 
other theorists - reductionism, functionalism, determinism, defining according to a 
single crystallization and so on -a Marxist view need not have these features, as 
will be argued in Chapters Six and Seven. 
5.7 Hay on levels of stateness 
A final example of a theorist who claims that it is impossible to generalise about 
states is Colin Hay (1996). A dominant theme of non-Marxist accounts of the state, 
is that the differences between states and within states over time, necessitate a 
particularised elaboration of the state within its specific context. Further, the fact 
that there can be significant differences in state form and behaviour is an indication 
that generalising is without any real value. Hay has attempted to rationalise, as far 
as possible, the demands of particularisation and has thus elaborated a model of 
`levels of stateness'. 
In starting with assumptions about the difficulties of generalisation, Hay 
feels that it is necessary to pull out three identities (Hay, 1996: 9) and four `levels of 
stateness' (Hay, 1996: 12) in order to operationalise the concept of the state - that 
is, to rescue it from its wide-ranging, culturally-grounded meanings. Although 
characterising it as dynamic, and as a set of changing power relations, he quotes 
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Jessop on `strategic selectivity', again (as with other statists) indicating that the 
realm of the state's institutional reach is not a level playing field. 
Thus Hay elaborates three identities - state as nation, as territory and as 
institutions - and, although all three are bound together in different ways in 
different contexts, each denotes a key charactersistic of the state: providing 
citizenship (which the state has the power to dictate the membership of); having 
administrative authority within the territory; and the apparatus of the state which 
impacts in both the private and public spheres. The extent of this `institutional 
reach' (how the state intervenes, how centralised it is, for example) is one of the 
key examples of difference between states, states over time and so on. 
Hay distinguishes four levels of stateness, which move from the general to 
the more specific. This allows him to make only one general point about all states, 
which is that they exhibit the three identities noted above, before moving on to 
make more particular points about the specific state under consideration. His levels 
of stateness are as follows: State as category (as already noted, this indicates that the 
state has the three identities); the state form (less general, a variable, but perhaps 
still quite a broad band particularly if we consider the importance which Hay 
attaches to the amount and variety of differences between capitalist states); the state 
regime (much more particular to the specific state under discussion - as it is a sub- 
category of state form - highlighting its `particular stage in evolution', for example 
the Keynesian welfare state); and the state structure (the most specific level of 
stateness, at which we set out to describe the institutions of a particular state at a 
particular time). 
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This type of distinction may well be necessary if the task before one is to describe 
and discuss a particular state and is also useful in comparative analysis. However, as 
with all the contributions which have already been discussed, such an exercise does 
not provide any means by which we can attempt to understand or analyse more 
general aspects of state activity, even in a particular phase of political-economic 
development. It could be argued, for instance, as alluded to above, that there is an 
important dimension of the state about which we can make general points, 
irrespective of the dynamic and culturally specific differences in the outward layers 
of the state and in its principal functions (even taking those outlined by Hay). It 
could be argued that the on-going constraint on state activity and state autonomy is 
the logic of capital accumulation for all capitalist states. Mann, as we have 
discussed, argues that this is possible but that it should not be recognised as the 
only relevant characteristic of modern states. Perhaps not, but it may be the most 
relevant, particularly in recognising the state's role in society, specifically in 
relation to Hay's state identities, even more so his levels of stateness. Issues about 
the state as nation, territory and apparatus - that is: citizenship, administrative 
priorities, and state intervention - may well be explicable through the defining 
characteristics of the capitalist mode of production. Again, if we accept the state as 
a dynamic ever-changing network of power relations which, according to Hay's 
levels of stateness, evolve from one type of regime to another within a broader state 
form (for example, from a Keynesian welfare state to a post-Keynesian market led 
welfare system, both within the capitalist framework), then we need to know how 
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and why this change occurs. So, precisely because the state is dynamic not static, we 
require an explanation of this change. 
5.8 Problems with statism 
The discussion has identified some of the weaknesses of statist theory which, taken 
together, leave critical space for the introduction of alternative views of the state. 
The main benefit of statism lies in the importance it attaches to the state as a key 
social actor. In this respect it solves one problem identified within pluralism of 
having no direct engagement with the state as a shaping force in society. 
Statism also seeks to avoid the determinism which has tended to follow 
class-based society-centred approaches such as Marxsim. It does this through 
attributing autonomous interests and power to the state as well as conceiving of the 
state as a more fragmented than unitary actor. It holds that it is not possible either 
to define the state in terms of one key characteristic (it is capitalist, it is Catholic) 
nor to see state interests as a reflection of the interests of the dominant socio- 
economic grouping or class. Rather the state comprises a multitude of branches 
populated by a diversity of interests. 
In avoiding the mainstays of society-based accounts, statism tries to focus 
exclusively on the powerful, autonomous state but ends up having to qualify its 
interpretation of state action as being only relatively autonomous. In other words it 
recognises the need to understand the relationship between state and society, yet 
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fails to do so explicitly through its claim that the state shapes society rather than it 
being a dynamic, two-way relationship. Further, statism, despite being an approach 
which seeks to make claims about state capacity cannot produce any significant 
general statements about modern states. The emphasis on both the comparative 
method and the variability within and between states makes it impossible to 
characterise all states in capitalism. In terms of providing an heuristic framework 
then, statism is a busted flush. 
The key areas of weakness can be considered as the following: 
(1) particularisation: the wide variety of actually existing states is taken as evidence 
that generalisation about states is not possible; 
(2) variable functions: states cannot be considered as having invariable functions as 
this would produce conclusions which would be rooted in either determinism or 
reification; 
(3) agency-centred: the emphasis in statism is on individuals as state personnel, 
officials, managers and so on, again as a means of avoiding any possibility of 
reifying structure, but with the result that statists do not engage with structure; 
(4) preference competition at the level of the state: the idea of a strong state simply 
indicates that preference competition occurs at the level of the state rather than 
only at the level of society - but the emphasis is still on contestation of diverse 
interests which can be uncovered through comparative analysis and methodological 
individualism; 
(5) directly observable power: state preferences are able to be investigated -a single 
dimension to power again; 
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(6) multitude of elites: the range and diversity of elites who occupy different 
branches of the state is claimed as evidence of a lack of singularity of the state 
which in turn is claimed as an indication that democracy is being served - no one 
set of interests dominates; 
(7) contingency: concentrating on the state doesn't provide all the information we 
require as it is also contingent on time, place and socio-economically dominant 
groups and the existing political institutions of the state. All these have a 
constraining effect on state capacity. In fact, therefore the state is only relatively 
autonomous. 
The state is not as powerful and autonomous as initially implied by statists. 
It is constrained by both its own political institutions which may have been forged 
in previous struggles, it is potentially limited from within its own territory by the 
constellation of dominant groups or classes and can be limited from without by the 
both the logic of capital accumulation and geopolitical considerations. This does 
not seem to be as strong a vision of a state as might have been expected. The 
outcome of the discussion of these contributions seems to be that what is needed is 
a theory which can explain more precisely the relations between state and society, 
rather than one which emphasises only one part of the relationship. Pluralists 
started out wanting to explain policymaking without reference to the state, but 
increasingly brought it back in; statists started out wanting to explain outcomes 
largely in terms of the state, but ultimately hedge their explanations with caveats 
about the contingency of state power. One way of reading this is to see each type 
of political analysis (pluralism and statism) as a welcome corrective to the other. 
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But it could equally suggest that neither civil society nor the state is explanatorily 
primary. This is the view which will be developed in the next chapter. 
In addition, if we are to treat the state as another social actor - no matter 
how central - then it too could be subject to the same type of macro constraints 
which were discussed in Chapters One and Two. That is, statism helps with one 
particular difficulty of pluralism (that of a lack of analysis of the state) but does not 
provide a solution to the other weakness noted, the lack of a framework for 
understanding potential macro constraints on actor autonomy - whether that actor 
is a policy network or the state. This is where the benefits of a deductive approach 
become clear. Prior theorisation about the nature of the polity is a means of 
making sense of the way in which the macro functioning of the system (mode of 
production, in particular the logic of accumulation) might have an impact on the 
autonomy of social actors at the level of the state or of society. This is not 
necessarily to define state and society as being only capitalist and not, say, 
simultaneously patriarchal and racist. But it would claim that being capitalist is the 
most relevant characteristic for understanding the regulation of social relationships 




Statists have a purely inductive view of state theory, as of other kinds of theory. 
That is, statists develop state theory from a set of generalisations from direct 
observation of states. One result of this is that they tend to emphasise differences 
between states. A further result is that this kind of state theory cannot provide the 
insights into structural constraints on political actors which, it is argued, is 
desirable and also necessary. 
The claims of pluralism, including the state-centred pluralism (statism) 
discussed within this chapter, do not contradict the central tenets of Marxism - or 
at least they do not have to. Pluralists, it is clear, make some different assumptions 
about social and political phenomena than Marxists. In particular much of pluralist 
discussion focuses on the different development of actually existing political 
phenomena. This produces different assumptions and conclusions about the nature 
of power and its distribution and thus the explanation of political outcomes. 
Fundamentally, this difference in approach (and thus conclusions about the nature 
and functioning of the political economy) stems from a difference of subject matter: 
Marxists have at base an historical analysis, a theory of capitalism and the trajectory 
of social-political development. This, inevitably, produces claims about the 
constraints that capitalism produces as an economic framework - and thus 
structures both the political-economy and the actions which can take place within 
it. 
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Pluralism, by contrast, has no significant historical context and thus does 
not conceive of capitalism as a stage in economic evolution. Further, as pluralism is 
not an opposing theory of capitalism, it does not produce a means of understanding 
the capitalist project in any universal terms. In other words, pluralism is not bound 
by the complications of a class analysis nor any singular explanations of the 
transformation of the system. Rather it accepts the capitalist context, and seeks to 
demonstrate that differences in state formation, political outcomes and social 
transformation within nation states indicate the complex and variable nature of 
capitalist arrangements. 
Significantly, although pluralism tends to set itself in opposition to Marxism 
through its method and initial assumptions, the emphasis on variation does not 
contradict a Marxist approach. The usual characterisation is of Marxism producing 
monolithic analyses (instrumentalist/determinist) full of intangibles (false 
consciousness, structural power) which indicate that it is unnecessary to engage in 
analysis of `surface phenomena' such as policymaking. But, in fact, the diversity of 
capitalist manifestation should lead Marxists to investigate both the durability and 
flexibility of the system. 
In the particular case of the state, it should be clear from the foregoing that 
the heart of non-Marxist analyses is the notion of the state in capitalism rather than 
the capitalist state and, in addition, that it stands apart from dominant socio- 
economic groups, or classes. The state is considered as a social actor in its own right 
but is defined in terms of its personnel. Focusing on public officials indicates, from 
the outset, two important elements. Firstly that within policy areas over time, 
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across policy sectors, and across territorial boundaries, outcomes will differ. 
Consequently, state strategy will differ depending upon the make up of the public 
officials comprising the state. Secondly, and a linked point, given the autonomy of 
the state from dominant social groups, its actions and preferences are for its own 
maintenance. The capacity of the state to translate its preferences into policy 
despite countervailing social forces, or with the coincidence of support of dominant 
groups, will differ as between states and can, therefore, only be discovered through 
comparative analysis. 
This perspective resonates with some neo-Marxist contributions on the 
state, although a significant difference which remains is that non-Marxist 
approaches do not suppose that the state will act in any particular way. Differences 
within Marxism tend to revolve around the way in which one conceives of the 
state's role in relation to the long-run interests of capital. The following chapter 
will consider the contributions of Marxism and neo-Marxism and will examine the 
potential benefits in utilising an approach which provides not just a theory of the 
state, but a theory of social structure - in fact, a theory of capitalism. 
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Chapter 6. Marxist theories of the State 
6.1 Introduction 
It has been established that there are two key problems with network approaches 
to policymaking analysis, which stem from a lack of investigation of the state as a 
potential constraint (either as a distinct social actor or a part of a structural 
constraint). Both the state and social structure could place significant limits on the 
actions of individuals at the meso level and, as such, both should be examined in 
political analysis. Without such investigations, approaches such as the networks 
models, are engaged in a different enterprise: a limited examination of policy fields. 
Such a limited focus in such approaches indicates that these frameworks cannot, in 
fact, explain the nature of the policy process generally, but simply provide 
information about specific cases. 
The previous chapter discussed the enduring significance of the state in 
political analysis and pointed to the need to consider the state as an important actor 
with discrete preferences, and the power to convert those preferences into actions. 
As outlined in Chapter Five, the integration of a theory of the state into networks 
approaches, does not have to conflict with a neo-pluralist framework. There are 
two reasons why this is the case. Firstly, the definition of the state used by strong 
state centric analysts is one which retains individual agency at its core. The state is 
defined as the sum total of public officials, the personnel of the state. So, state 
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preferences are the sum total of personnel preferences, and they have the power to 
convert them into state actions through a combination of personal and professional 
resources. The nature of the definition of the state is important insofar as it 
explains not only the composition of the state but how its organisation may affect 
its capacity to act. However precisely because these approaches concentrate on re- 
emphasising the state as a (relatively) autonomous actor, they do not make 
confident statements about the relationship that state managers may have with 
dominant socio-economic groupings in society. 
Secondly, as with pluralism, state-centred frameworks do not engage 
directly with structural issues. The importance of this lies in the fact that the 
conception of structure informs both the method of inquiry and conclusions about 
the nature of the state, state activity and state intervention. Both networks models 
and strong state-centric approaches use a comparative, empiricist method assuming 
that the social organisation of the system (as capitalist) is not a relevant variable. 
This indicates that within both types of framework capitalism, as the existing mode 
of production and thus the structural context of society, is not an explanation of 
political outcomes. This allows both approaches to fundamentally agree that the 
state is (perhaps relatively) autonomous from other social or economic 
configurations, consequently pluralism and statism maintain a similar world view. 
Each takes variability in state form and political outcomes as evidence that 
capitalism, as a particular mode of production, is not itself an explanation of 
political phenomena. 
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For these reasons there is no fundamental conflict between the neo- 
pluralism of networks approaches and a strong state-centred framework. It is 
possible, in other words, to integrate the two and thus improve one problematic 
area of network analysis. The second area of concern however, that of engaging 
with a structural approach, is not possible to reconcile within neo-pluralism and is 
not resolved with the integration of a non-Marxist theory of the state. If the 
criticism remains that, in addition to a theory of the state we need a theory of 
capitalism, then Marxism is the only theoretical framework which seeks to do so. 
Further, the way in which Marxism seeks to explain the nature of capitalism and its 
transformation, requires a different understanding of the state and state capacity. 
This reiterates the centrality of the type of state definition used and whether such a 
definition is drawn in a structural vacuum, or whether a definition of the state 
flows from prior theorisation of structural context. To discriminate in this way is 
the key to understanding the fundamental distinction between Marxist and non- 
Marxist approaches. To do so highlights why a choice between the two is 
necessary, and clarifies that attempts to integrate the two (or to talk of a 
convergence of pluralism and Marxism) actually results in pluralist Marxism which, 
in effect, undermines the stated benefits of a uniquely Marxist approach. This has 
significant implications for the way in which we might attempt to construct a `dual 
approach', which can successfully reconcile the benefits of network investigations 
of specific policy domains with a theory of the constraints on the range of political 
outcomes which result from the logic of capital accumulation. This point will be 
returned to. 
234 
The following chapter considers the development of Marxist state theory, as 
it continues to attempt to find a formulation which avoids the charges of 
determinism and instrumentalism without simply recasting an essentially pluralist 
account. The chapter begins with an overview of the contributions from Marx and 
Engels and the strongly instrumentalist position of Lenin. It then moves on to 
discussions of relative state autonomy. This remains an area which provides the 
most difficulty for Marxist theory and still informs much contemporary analysis. 
Finally the chapter considers the more recent contributions by Block and Jessop. 
Jessop is considered by many to provide the most sophisticated contemporary 
Marxist state analysis. However, it is argued that although the Marxism of Jessop 
has the advantage of being able to be integrated into more pluralist frameworks, the 
way in which he achieves this may indicate precisely the type of pluralist Marxism 
which, it was noted above, we may also wish to avoid. 
6.2 A non-pluralist framework 
... we shall try to clarify the at least apparent inconsistency that the 
state, although not itself a capitalist, nevertheless must be understood as a 
capitalist state - and not, for example, merely as a "state in capitalist 
society". 
Offe, 1994: 104. 
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The very fact that Marxism is a theory of capitalism (as a mode of production with 
a unique set of social relations) seems to provide a distinct advantage when trying 
to make sense of political change. Marxism has an historically rooted perspective of 
the social dynamic. In other words it has an in-built capacity to explain change 
with reference to the dominant mode of production. It does not seem unreasonable 
to accept that the way in which the political economy is organised (which we can 
all agree is capitalist) has a significant bearing on how relationships function within 
it and also therefore the distribution of power within it. Marxism has an effective 
critical capacity about the consequences of the organisation of society for the 
attainment of the `goals' of a capitalist system of production (the logic of capital 
accumulation), which makes sense within its overarching economic theory. 
On the specific issue of a Marxist formulation of the state, because the 
state is considered as an integral part of the social relation of capital, it too has a 
class character. In this way it is impossible to conceive of the state as standing 
back from the political process or occupying a neutral position vis-a-vis other 
interests. As Offe notes, 
... the state 
fulfils its function of helping to formulate a positive class 
interest [and] ... it acts negatively, i. e. as an organ of repression against 
the articulation of opposing interests. It is the two together, the positive 
formulation and the implementation of a class interest by the exercise of 
power, which constitute the class character of the state. 
Offe, 1994: 110. 
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The significant difference of approach between Marxism and neo-pluralist or 
state-centric theorists arises from the different analyses of the economic and 
political system. With a class-based perspective, it is impossible to conceive of 
political relationships between social actors and state-society relations in the way 
described in non-Marxist frameworks. This also arises from some fundamental 
differences of methodology which are informed by the use of an inductive rather 
than a deductive approach. 
The prior theorisation of social structure by Marxists which recognises a 
set of social relations unique to capitalism is a significantly different point of 
departure from non-Marxist approaches. Marxist theory absolutely requires an 
investigation of the way in which capitalism can constrain individual autonomy 
at any level of the polity. Again, precisely because of the way in which Marxism 
conceives of capitalist social relations, the configuration of power relations 
between social actors, and between social actors and the state, is fundamentally 
at odds with non-Marxist approaches. In the particular case of the state, its 
definition and thus the identification of it as part of the social relation of capital 
produces a vision which conflicts with the perspective of both neo-pluralism and 
state-centred approaches. The type of Relational Approach outlined by Krasner 
makes some crucial associations between economically dominant groups and the 
state; but due to the way in which the state is conceived, this remains essentially 
a relationship between competing groups of social actors. 
A distinctly problematic area of Marxist analysis however, is the way in 
which the state is defined and thus the extent of and, significantly, the nature of 
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state intervention in political outcomes. There have been two types of Marxist 
formulations of the state which have encountered much criticism for the way in 
which they conceive of state activity. These are, crudely, the determinist and 
instrumentalist positions. There has been general acceptance of the problems of 
both super-determinism and ruling class instrumentalism, and this has provoked 
new thinking within the Marxist tradition. Thus, there are a variety of 
contemporary Marxist approaches to the state which seek to avoid these charges 
but, arguably, do so to the extent that they arrive at positions not dissimilar to 
more pluralist approaches. 
So, the distinct advantage of a Marxist approach is that it provides a 
theory of capitalism, one which provides an analysis of the social relations of 
capital. This type of framework allows us to identify points of potential 
constraint on meso-level (and micro-level) autonomy. However, it is claimed 
that traditional Marxist approaches encounter their own difficulties in terms of 
determinism and instrumentalism. If we accept the need to avoid such pitfalls 
within traditional Marxist accounts of the state however, we still need to pursue 
a solution to the question of the state within a Marxist framework, in order that 
we can retain a theory of capitalism as part of our analysis. 
The proposal is then that only a Marxist analysis can provide a real 
solution to the two key problems of network models, that of lacking state and 
structural explanation in their accounts. It is possible to integrate a non-Marxist 
theory of the state into network models, but that does not eradicate the problem 
of theorising structure. The question of structural analysis cannot be reconciled 
238 
without stepping outside the dominant pluralist type frameworks, and 
effectively adopting a Marxist approach. In so doing, Marxism also provides a 
theory of the state, and so can offer a solution to both problems as identified. 
The challenge in the following chapter is to discover whether it is possible to 
adopt a Marxist framework and yet avoid the determinism and instrumentalism 
which have recently hindered the application of Marxism in political analysis, 
and in this way try to maintain a duality of structure and agency. 
A fundamental element of a Marxist theory of the state would be the 
centrality of class struggle which is underpinned by an analysis of the social 
relations of production within capitalism. The drive towards the reproduction of 
those social relations is therefore also key. One can assume that the state is part 
of that system of relations and has an important role in the maintenance and 
regulation of the social relations. The actions and capacity of the state in this 
regard will differ because of the prior means by which states acted and 
interacted. Therefore it would be a mistake to expect all states either to look the 
same or to behave the same in actually existing capitalist economies. 
`Present-day society' is capitalist society, which exists in all civilized 
countries, more or less free from medieval admixture, more or less 
modified by the particular historical development of each country, more 
or less developed. On the other hand, the `present-day state' changes with 
a country's frontier. It is different in the Prusso-German Empire from 
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what it is Switzerland, and different in England from what it is in the 
United States. The `present-day state' is, therefore, a fiction. 
Critique of the Gotha Programme in McLellan, 1990: 564. 
This does not fundamentally alter the place all capitalist states occupy in the 
social relations of production. As already noted this means we must seek a 
definition of the capitalist state, rather than a state in capitalism. To engage in 
the latter is to concentrate on the variability and particularisation of states which 
thus dislocates them from their structural context. Such a disengagement allows 
two things. Firstly the disassociation of the state from the mode of production. 
Secondly, as a consequence of this disengagement, such a formulation permits 
statements about the nature of production as though it were a `natural' process. 
6.3 Marx and Engels on the state 
It is often claimed that the difficulties for contemporary Marxists in formulating an 
unproblematic account of the state emanate from Marx's own writings. Such claims 
are based on the different ways in which Marx discusses the state in the course of 
the development of his own ideas. The evolution of his ideas saw the conception of 
the state change from a strongly intrumentalist vision to a much more determinist 
position through the application of his materialist conception of history. Later still, 
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however, it is possible to detect a yet further approach to the state which conforms, 
in a more sophisticated way, to his theory of the social relations of production. 
Marx's original ideas on the configuration of the state were ones in which 
the state played no central role in the economic production processes of capital 
reproduction. It was thus treated, in his earliest writings, as a `parasitic institution' 
separated from civil society (jessop, 1990: 26). However, it is clear in the 
development of his own post-Hegelian thought, that the state had a much more 
explicitly class character which helped to produce Marx's very instrumentalist 
theory of the state: 
The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie 
Communist Manifesto, in McLellan, 1990: 224. 
The main critical point of this position is one which one can see as having 
altered in his subsequent writings. That is, the state is a bourgeois shell. This 
indicates that the state is somehow separated from the social relations of 
production. In other words, the executive works on behalf of the ruling class but, if 
the state is an instrument of class rule, then presumably it can be used for the ends 
of other classes, notably the proletariat. In the development towards his most 
determinist position in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (1859), Marx's thought on the State can be seen in transition in the 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). In his discussions of the state at this 
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point, Marx seems to provide a basis for two currents of thought on the nature of 
class rule, which continue to colour contemporary Marxist state theory. The first is 
the idea that the representatives of the ruling class, at the level of the state, act in 
the long run interests of that class. This has provided the core of contemporary 
Marxist theory such as Block's notion of state managers (see Block, 1987). 
Secondly, this seems to indicate a certain (relative) autonomy of the state such that 
the ruling class rules but does not govern. This admits an interpretation of state 
actions such that ruling class representatives are able to take political decisions 
outside of the class relationship but which are likely, in the long-run, to resonate 
with the interests of the bourgeoisie. 
But under the absolute monarchy, during the first Revolution, under 
Napoleon, bureaucracy was only the means of preparing the class rule of 
the bourgeoisie. Under the Restoration, under Louis Phillipe, under the 
parliamentary republic, it was the instrument of the ruling class, however 
much it strove for power of its own. Only under the second Bonaparte 
does the state seem to have made itself completely independent. 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in McLellan, 1990: 316-317. 
It seems that Marx's ideas about the state were, at this point, still continuing to 
develop as his materialist conception of history was completed. Although Marx's 
exposition of the relationship of base-superstructure has become a rather crude 
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characterisation of the core of Marxism, one cannot simply ignore a construct 
which formed the basis of his future economics. 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations 
that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their 
material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on 
which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond 
definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of 
material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life processes 
in general. 
Preface to Critique of Political Economy, in McLellan, 1990: 389. 
This very determinist position has created one of the most difficult obstacles 
for contemporary Marxists to overcome. Both the instrumentalism of the 
Communist Manifesto and the determinism of the passage above, have provided 
critics of Marxism with great cause for resolutely developing non-Marxist accounts 
of structure and political outcomes. A perspective on the state and state power 
which characterises the relationship between the state and its economic context as 
one of a base-superstructure reflection encourages the kind of economic 
determinism which has encumbered Marxist theories and, in part, explains the 
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weakening of Marxism in the face of new pluralist challenges within political 
science. 
The apparent crudeness of both positions which, in addition, seem to 
provide very limited explanatory capacity vis-a-vis late capitalism and variability of 
form and outcome, nevertheless retain the essential force of an economic theory. 
Despite the difficulties of application in each case, both positions have at their core 
the essential and distinctive elements of Marxist analysis: the centrality of class 
struggle which is underpinned by the social relations unique to the capitalist mode 
of production. In other words, in spite of the vagaries of contemporary Marxist 
accounts of the state, to retain their essential Marxism they must surely have their 
basis here rather than in the more vague allusions to an approach rooted in an 
understanding of a society divided by class. 
In fact it is possible to retrieve Marx and Engels from the determinist 
entanglement and still apply these fundamental criteria. As previously indicated, 
the most sophisticated alignment of (political) phenomena with the social relations 
of production can be found in Marx's late writings. In his response to the 
unification of the German socialists into a single party, Marx criticised their 
proposed programme through an elucidation of the nature (and therefore the 
means of achieving) future communist society. In the opening paragraphs, Marx (in 
light of the failed revolutions) notes the existence of different forms of capitalist 
states and, significantly, the impossibility of creating a distinction between the state 
and society. 
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The German workers' party - at least if it adopts the programme - shows 
that its socialist ideas are not even skin-deep; in that, instead of treating 
existing society (and this holds good for any future one) as the basis of 
the existing state (or of the future state in the case of future society), it 
treats the state rather as an independent entity that possesses its own 
intellectual, ethical, and libertarian bases. 
Critique of the Gotha Programme, in McLellan, 1990: 564. 
So, the state should not be understood as autonomous from capitalist 
society and, in addition, the state must be seen as constituted from capitalist 
society, that is, indistinguishable from the social relations of production. This 
construct indicates that this is the essential basis for understanding the role of the 
state, but does not necessarily imply that state actions are determined by the 
economic base: rather that our understanding of the state must be one which is 
founded on an analysis of capitalism. Consequently, any Marxist analysis of the 
state must have class struggle at its core and this need not imply that state activity 
or other social action can be simply read from the economy in a crude way. 
The post-Marx contributions to a theory of the state will be assessed on this 
basis. Firstly, instrumentalist and determinist positions are understood as being 
limited as they necessarily divorce the state from its location as an aspect of the 
capital relation. Secondly, the question of the relative autonomy of the state is 
considered something of a red herring insofar as it is based on methodological 
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individualism. Finally, more recent contributions are discussed in terms of their 
`fit' with the stated criteria of a Marxist account. 
6.4 Repressive state apparatus: Leninism 
... 
democratic representation is the best political shell for capitalism and 
... once this 
form of state is established, no change of persons, 
institutions or parties can shake the political rule of capital. 
Jessop, 1990: 28. 
Invocations of the Leninist model, which were not infrequent, may have 
been particularly unfortunate. Lenin, as we have already seen regarded 
the state instrumentally and strategically, as a `machine for the 
oppression of one class by another'. 
Thomas, 1994: 142. 
It has already been noted that this particular interpretation of the role of the state 
(translated into actually existing Communism) significantly constrained the 
evolution of a coherent theory. Importantly, its distinct functionalism is the focus 
of criticism of its lack of sophistication and lack of relevance in advanced 
capitalism. Building on the idea that the state is no more than the executive 
committee of the bourgeoisie, Leninism addresses the means by which the state 
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maintains the system of class domination, thus developing a framework for the 
method of state transformation from capitalism to communism. Essentially this is 
an argument which revolves around the notion of the repressive arm of the state as 
the maintenance of bourgeois rule. 
An interesting dimension of this framework is that the state, given that it is 
an instrument for control (in capitalism by the bourgeoisie) has to be destroyed by 
the proletariat, it won't just wither away. In this sense, there is no point in reform. 
The route to communism is through smashing the capitalist state, as real radicalism 
would be suppressed by the repressive state apparatus. This development of theory 
reflects a split between the anarchists and the communists in the Socialist 
International over what kind of state should be aimed for. For Lenin, there was a 
need to build an organised workers state - the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
There are perhaps two points which need to be made in relation to this 
theoretical development. Firstly, it does not locate the state in the context of the 
social relation, insofar as it is still seen as something which can be taken over - 
using the existing apparatus for different ends. Secondly, this kind of formulation 
inevitably ends up in the area of formulation based on the state as epiphenomenon, 
and thus the consequent economic determinist arguments which have been so 
criticised. 
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6.5 Relative autonomy of the state: Miliband and Poulantzas 
If we are to understand the unique development of capitalism, then, we 
must understand how property and class relations, as well as the 
functions of surplus-appropriation and distribution, so to speak liberate 
themselves from - and yet are served by - the coercive institutions that 
constitute the state, and develop `autonomously'. 
Meiksins Wood, 1981: 84. 
Structuralist Marxism, particularly as expressed by Nicos Poulantzas, 
sought to update the work of Marx himself so as to allow attention to be 
given to the capacity of modern states to help capitalism survive by the 
provision of key functional needs, from education to welfare. Insofar as 
this approach went beyond merely instrumental views of the state, that 
is, beyond views insisting that capitalists controlled the state at all times, 
it suggested that the state had `relative' autonomy. This notion was 
inherently unstable: either capitalists did control the state or - as many 
care to argue - the autonomy of the state was at times real or absolute. 
Hall, 1994: 3. 
The debate between Miliband and Poulantzas on the nature of the state tends to be 
presented in terms of two polarised positions within the Marxist tradition. The 
exchange between the two has been described as representing structuralist 
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(Poulantzas) and instrumentalist (Miliband) points on the spectrum. Although 
contemporary writers have since claimed that the debate generated more heat than 
light, it is still necessary to briefly consider their arguments to gauge the impact 
they have had. 
Miliband in The State in Capitalist Society (1969) attacks both democratic 
pluralism and traditional Marxism. His central claim is that the dominant class 
rules but does not govern. He continues: capitalist class rule is ensured by its 
proximity to and manipulation of the state apparatus. This allows a conception of 
the state as a separate construct from its wider political-economic context, as well as 
providing a gap for individual agency within the state itself. Thus, Miliband argues 
that we can discover the nature of the state through empirical investigation at the 
individual, behavioural level. 
Poulantzas's initial response to Miliband's assertions was an attack on his 
method and its tendency to the descriptive rather than the theoretical (Poulantzas, 
1969: 69). For Poulantzas, as a structural-determinist, statements about power must 
be about the effect of a structural formation at a particular moment -a snapshot of 
the class struggle - as for Poulantzas, power relations equal class relations: they are 
not an expression of individual motivations. Thus, Poulantzas attacks Miliband for 
using abstracted empiricism (Miliband, 1970: 54). 
... Poulantzas criticises Miliband 
for analysing the state in terms of the 
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individual human subjects who control it, rather than in relation to its 
structurally determined role in capitalist society. 
Jessop, 1990: 30. 
It is perhaps an exaggeration to charge Miliband with ignoring structure 
altogether. Miliband does acknowledge a structural context - he views the socio- 
economic structure as a framework for action and sees individual acts within the 
context of a society divided by class. In response therefore, Miliband counters 
Poulantzas's argument by claiming that he takes his anti-empirical stance too far, 
losing sight of the necessity of empiricism and thereby reducing state officials to 
`the merest functionaries and executants of policies imposed upon them by "the 
system"' (Miliband, 1970: 57). In addition, Miliband claims that the level of 
structure at which Poulantzas works has few points of contact with historical 
reality and, without supporting empirical evidence, there is no possibility of testing 
his claims against `reality'. Thus, two criticisms are levelled at Poulantzas's analysis 
and method: that it is both structural super-determinism (Miliband, 1970) and 
structural abstractionism (Miliband, 1973). 
Essentially the debate was articulated on a methodological level, as it is clear 
that both Miliband and Poulantzas were concerned with the `relative autonomy' of 
the state and essentially disagreed over the means of promoting the most 
appropriate Marxist analysis. The difference between the two positions on the 
question of relative autonomy is one which turns on the different conception each 
has of power in terms of structure and individual agency. As already noted, 
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whereas for Poulantzas the structure of all power is class power, Miliband retains a 
concept of power which allows for individual agency. This latter power construct 
means that Miliband is arguing, in stark contrast to Poulantzas, that individuals can 
act in relative autonomy from the structure of class power. Thus, the state as a 
power holding agent, much as an individual, can sometimes be relatively 
autonomous from the class nexus. Miliband is therefore divorcing state power from 
the notion of class relations. In this way he is not too far removed from the strong 
state, non-Marxist perspectives discussed in the previous chapter. As Jessop notes, 
Miliband does not advance the Marxist analysis of the state. Indeed he 
actually reproduces the liberal tendency to discuss politics in isolation 
from its complex articulation with economic forces. 
Jessop, 1990: 30. 
Poulantzas does not make the same distinction between state power and class 
power, instead he claims that the relative autonomy of the state is inherent in the 
structure itself with class struggle expressed within the state itself. 
... the state according to Poulantzas is not an outcome or a resultant of 
class struggle but a cause of class struggle or a site where this can take 
place. 
Thomas, 1994: 145. 
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Thus, this debate is essentially one which revolves around the notion of relative 
autonomy of the state from the class relations which underpin political economy. 
In rejecting the instrumentalism of Miliband, Poulantzas ends up in a 
curious position, with references to class fractions and the relative autonomy of the 
state from the dominant class fraction, despite its role as a `factor of cohesion'. For 
Poulantzas, the class structure is reproduced within the state (Poulantzas, 1973, 
1976). The function of the state is to regulate the class struggle (without 
undermining the position of the dominant class fraction) through adapting public 
policy (concession) as well as through the repression of other class fractions. In 
addition to Jessop's criticisms of this position (in terms of a failure to elaborate the 
means by which this important function is realised as well as the problem that such 
an analysis produces a picture of the state which includes all institutions which aids 
social cohesion, Jessop, 1990: 27), the ensuing problems of state autonomy and 
complex class divisions further weakens his position. 
Poulantzas argues that in order for the dominant class fraction to maintain 
its position, it needs to get the support of other fractions of capital and other sub- 
divisions of class. In order to do this, the state requires some autonomy from the 
dominant class fraction and also needs to appear as an independent arbiter. The 
autonomy of the state is only relative, as the long-run needs of capitalism will 
always win out against contradictory state policy (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 
243-245). In other words, Poulantzas's position not only divorces the state from 
classes (separating the economic and the political), but also relies on a complicated 
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division of classes (within-class conflicts, Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 227). 1 Such 
a fragmentation of classes leads Poulantzas to be charged with admitting a pluralist 
analysis with Marxist language where his class fractions, strata and sub-categories 
could otherwise be described as interest groups (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987: 227). 
Given Miliband's instrumentalism and Poulantzas's charge of Marxist 
pluralism, it has subsequently been argued that both Miliband and Poulantzas were 
incorrect in their formulations as both contributions are guilty of failing to root 
the concept of the state in terms of materialist, historical analysis. It is clear that 
within Marxist theory, the state plays an essential role in the maintenance and 
reproduction of capital as a class relation. Further, the capital relation is an 
historically specific form of class relation (domination) in the capitalist mode of 
production. Given this as the starting point then, the separation of the state from 
the class struggle in the work of both Miliband and Poulantzas is essentially flawed, 
as the state should be seen as an integral part of the relation. What really needs to 
be explained then, is how the state within a capitalist mode of production gives the 
appearance of universalism and of somehow standing back from the antagonisms of 
a class-based society. 
1 'Poulantzas asserts that all social classes can be internally sub-divided in three ways. Fractions are 
the deepest internal division of a class, where incompatible material interests show up in separate 
political organisation ... 
Strata are weaker but important lines of division, based on more temporary 
conflicts of economic interests which do not produce separate political organisation ... 
Lastly, there 
are a number of isolated sub-categories of social classes with distinct corporate interests which can be 
critical in particular circumstances' Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 227. 
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The survival of the political institutions and hence of capital depends on 
the success of the struggle in maintaining this separation, by channelling 
the conflicts arising from the real nature of capitalist society into the 
fetishised forms of the bourgeois political processes. Thus the very 
separation of economics and politics, the very autonomisation of the state 
form is part of the struggle of the ruling class to maintain its domination. 
Holloway and Picciotto, 1977: 80. 
The criticism, which is levelled at both Miliband and Poulantzas then, is 
that their work falls into the bourgeois political-economy trap of seeing the state as 
something political and autonomous which can thus be studied in isolation from 
the economic sphere; in particular, as something separate from the contradictions 
inherent in the capitalist relation. As Ian Gough notes: 
For both Poulantzas and Miliband the capitalist state is a relatively 
autonomous entity representing the political interests of the dominant 
classes and situated within the field of class struggle. 
Holloway and Picciotto, 1977: 83 (emphasis added. ) 
One benefit for so-called `bourgeois political economy' of artificially creating this 
kind of separation between the two spheres, is that it allows such theorists to argue 
that the economic sphere is governed by `natural' laws and is thus not subject to 
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the social relations which underpin it. This is arguably a problem inherent in the 
work of both these protagonists. In other words, 
Marx's object is to criticise the mystification of political economy which 
are achieved precisely by beginning with `material production in general' 
and then proceeding to treat the process of producing capital abstractly as 
if it were the process of production as such. 
Meiksins Wood, 1981: 71, emphasis in the original. 
This points exactly to the claims developed here about the problems of non-Marxist 
approaches within political science generally, and in policy analysis in particular. 
Currently dominant analytical frameworks in political science accept the structure 
of capitalism as a given, rather than considering it as a particular mode of 
production which thus has consequences for the organisation and activity of society 
which are specific to this system of production. This will be returned to later in the 
discussion. Having reached this point however, what is still difficult to explain 
adequately is what is particular to the social relation in the capitalist mode of 
production which allows the state to appear to be disengaged from the 
economically dominant group, and thus appear to be universal, as opposed to class 
based. 
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6.6 Cultural hegemony: Gramsci 
For it should be remarked that the general notion of state includes elements 
which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense 
that one might say that state = political society + civil society, in other 
words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion). 
Gramsci, 1988: 235. 
... [this] [I]mplies that the unity, coherence and capacities of the state 
depend on movements and projects with its other - civil society. This 
reinforces the arguments against the central assumption of the state- 
centred approach that one can draw a clear boundary between state and 
society... Thus, as Gramsci long ago emphasised, both the state 
apparatus and state power must be analysed in relational terms. 
Jessop, 1990: 351. 
It is here that Gramsci's concept of hegemony is instructive in its linking of state 
and society. Of particular use is the notion that through the dominance of a class 
based ideology (capitalist class hegemony) in society, the state does not need to 
resort to coercion or even legal/punitive measures to promote the long-run 
interests of capital. What underpins the state is cultural values. This inevitably leads 
to criticism of an overestimation of the autonomy of politics and ideology, and to 
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similar points about the dislocation of the state from an integral part of the social 
relation of production. 
This point is further illustrated by Jessop, who discusses the question of the 
unity of classes. As Jessop argues, a significant difference between traditional 
Marxist theory and Gramscian and neo-Gramscian analyses is that the latter 
suppose that the state has a fundamental role in unifying the purpose of the 
bourgeois class through political and ideological domination, as such unity of 
purpose is not a given (Jessop, 1990: 42). This is a quite important contrast from 
standard Marxist theory in that it goes some way towards disassociating economic 
purpose and motivation as the class dynamic. Again the point can be made that this 
kind of disestablishment, or separation of, politics and ideology from economics 
may admit arguments of discretionary state action. 
This can be further clarified when one draws a direct comparison between 
Gramscian constructs and those of an arch-structuralist such as Poulantzas. For 
Poulantzas, the bottom line is that class struggle is on-going: 
Gramsci, by contrast, made and could afford to make no such easy 
assumption. The absence of class struggle is precisely one of the things his 
concept of hegemony is designed to explain, and might still explain. 
Thomas, 1994: 146. 
Wherever one stands on the contribution of Gramsci in terms of the relative 
importance of economics and politics, his work may have at least given a different 
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and potentially consequential explanation of how the state effects its (illusory) 
distinction from the class relation. However, it remains a central difficulty within 
any state-centred analysis of contemporary economy to account fully for precisely 
what is specific to modern capitalist relations of production, which is sufficiently 
sophisticated that it recognises the need to, and can provide a mechanism for, the 
state to appear to act as a neutral set of institutions. 
6.7 Block: Revising State Theory 
Block has contributed to discussions of a Marxist theory of the state through 
following the idea of `representatives' of the ruling class found in Marx's Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). In brief, Block's argument (1987) is that there is 
a distinction to be made between the bourgeoisie and state managers. State 
managers have their own vested interests in the long-run survival of capitalism and 
this, coupled with the logic of capitalist accumulation, will condition state activity 
such that it serves the long-run interests of the ruling-class. 
Block's argument stems from a reaction against the kind of instrumentalism 
and determinism which has hampered Marxist accounts in the past. In particular he 
wants to emphasise that structures do not act, only individuals do and that state 
actors are more autonomous than traditional Marxism has often implied. 
Consequently he sees state actions as the outcome of `three-sided conflicts among 
capitalists, state managers and the working class' (Block, 1987: 16). This corporatist 
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style decision making arises as a result of a combination of factors. Firstly, the 
ruling class does not have class consciousness and thus requires state managers as 
their representatives. State managers are, therefore, not necessarily of the ruling 
class but are part of the guarantee of the general interests of capitalism. State 
managers will serve the long-run interests of the ruling class through limiting the 
opportunity for anti-capitalist policymaking as well as actively promoting the 
general interest of capitalism, since they are in a relationship of dependency with 
the stability and effectiveness of the economy. In other words, they maintain their 
own position through ensuring the longevity of the capitalist system. 
So, the first relationship he identifies is between the ruling class and state 
managers. The second key dimension to his three-sided conflict is based in the class 
struggle inherent in capitalism. Class struggle provides the dynamic for on-going 
capitalist development (capitalist advance resulting from any victories by the 
working class over wages, working time and so on). With advancing capitalist 
development comes an expansion of the role of the state, an association which 
draws the relevance of the working class into a relationship with both the ruling 
class (through class struggle) and with state managers, (as the dynamic of capitalist 
development increases the power of state managers). 
According to Hay, Block manages to avoid the problems of instrumentalism 
and determinism. The reason for this seems to lie in the fact that Block's 
preoccupation is with state managers as utility-maximising rational subjects (Block, 
1987: 16-17). It is therefore a personnel- or agency-centred account (Hay 1999: 169). 
Additionally, Block has further revised his model in light of new work in the field. 
259 
He claims that his own model is too limited in two dimensions, it is restricted to 
class actors (outside of the state) and cannot easily account for variability. 
... my articles tend to suggest that the only 
important actors - other 
than state managers - are class actors - either subordinated classes or the 
capitalist class. I would now revise that to include many other collective 
actors organised around race, gender, age, sexual orientation, religion or, 
shared views about the environment or the arms race ... secondly ... 
this model will be of only limited use in making sense of any particular 
political outcome because it does not capture variations in political 
structures, political resources, and political ideas. 
Block, 1987: 18. 
The criticism of this position is clear: to allow other social struggles to be the focus 
of attention is to undermine the framework formulated by Marx and which is 
based on the social relations of production. That is, class struggle. Secondly, it has 
already been noted that Marx saw variability in state form but maintained that the 
essence, the significance of capitalist states, was the fact that they are rooted in 
bourgeois rule. Consequently, to be overly concerned with the variability of states 
such that the level of engagement is reduced to outlining the differences in actually 
existing states in capitalism is to move onto the terrain of general state theory and 
to distance it from Marxism. 
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Block recognises these difficulties and has thus chosen to label himself as a 
post-Marxist, 
The idea of Post-Marxism is that the questions that Marx posed remain 
central for understanding and transforming our social world. However, 
the answers that Marx offered no longer suffice, and just as Marx sought 
to transcend Hegel, so too, those who pursue the Post-Marxist project 
seek to transcend Marx 
Block, 1987: 35. 
The problem for Marxist state theory thus far has been two-fold: an 
apparently confused picture from the original writings of Marx and Engels which 
has allowed different theorists to choose different parts of Marx's writings to 
validate their interpretation, and ignore those that do not provide such an easy fit. 
Secondly, there has been a continued response to the charges of determinism and 
instrumentalism, formulations which are considered to be crude and outmoded. It 
seems then that within Marxism, we are faced with one of two positions, a 
structuralist approach (Lenin, Poulantzas), which is fervently interpreted as 
determinist and thus invalid; or something much closer to pluralist formulations 
which centre on agency based accounts of the personnel of the state (Miliband, 
Block). 
In the discussion in Chapter Two on structure and agency it was claimed 
that the best conceptual interpretation is one which sees the two (structure and 
261 
agency) conjoined in an on-going reciprocal relationship. It could be similarly 
asserted then that the enduring problem of the foregoing Marxist accounts of the 
state is that they also artificially disengage structure and agency. Thus, Marxist 
interpretations of the state and state power are similarly limited either by their 
reductionism to the individuals who comprise the state; or by their assumption that 
the state is an instrument of the dominant class; or by their more crude reification 
of the state: none of which have proved satisfactory. It has been argued that 
Jessop's work on the state has successfully addressed this issue - Hay writes: 
More convincingly than any other Marxist theorist past or present, he 
succeeds in transcending the artificial dualsim of structure and agency by 
moving towards a truly dialectical undertsanding of their interrelationship. 
(Hay 1999: 170). 
It is to Jessop's contribution that we now turn. 
6.8 Limits to state action and the circuit of capital: Jessop 
Although Jessop accepts that the state is inextricably a part of the capitalist social 
relation, and thus essentially working in the long-term interests of the capitalist 
class (through its central role in the maintenance and reproduction of the dominant 
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mode of production), Jessop argues that the state is similarly constrained by the 
mechanism of the circuit of capital: 
Its purse strings will be tightened and slackened from without. Since it 
does not directly produce its own sources of revenue, it is limited by the 
private accumulation process, and depends for its tax revenues on the 
circulation of commodities and the accumulation and reinvestment of 
capital. In Claus Offe and Volke Ronge's words, `... the state depends 
on a process of accumulation which is beyond its power to organise ... 
the state is denied the power to control the flow of those resources which 
are indispensable for the use of state power'. 
Thomas, 1994: 152. 
This implies then that state power is limited, that state intervention can be political 
(as opposed to simply economic) and not overtly capitalist and, significantly, that 
the state is not always capable of meeting or realising the demands of capitalism. 
... [T]he state is just one institutional ensemble among others within a 
social formation; but it is peculiarly charged with overall responsibility 
for maintaining the cohesion and the social formation of which it is a 
part. For the latter is charged with responsibility for securing the 
conditions for accumulation when market forces fail and with securing 
social cohesion in a class-divided society. But, in pursuing these 
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responsibilities, state managers can only employ the strategic capacities 
available to the state and these are always limited relative to the tasks 
facing them ... The state is 
both a part and whole of society. 
Jessop, 1990: 360. 
The important aspect of this stream of the argument is similar to Gramsci's thesis: 
this may be an explanation of the apparent lack of class struggle in not only the 
broader context, but also at the level of the state. In accepting that the single most 
important motivating force underpinning action is the contradictory nature of 
capitalism (therefore the state can only act within this framework) which has its 
boundaries drawn by the operation of capitalist forces of production, then it would 
appear that the state would at times take `neutral' decisions, apparently unfettered 
by its class location. This would arise because, 
... [C]apitalism is a highly 
dynamic institutional order and is continually 
undergoing major changes in organisation and operation ... the 
continued reproduction of capital in general requires the destruction of 
economic, political and ideological structures sustaining the current 
pattern of capitalist relations and the introduction of new, untried 
structures that might sustain future patterns. 
Jessop, 1990: 154. 
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Of course given this formulation of state action, one could expect that the 
markets, or capital generators, would have `more equal' access and input into the 
decision making process, via the organisation of the state. Indeed, Jessop clearly 
indicates that the interests of capital are favoured through the organisation of the 
state. Without stating that this is a class-state relationship, it is very close to the 
more pluralist idea: 
... [of] what Charles Lindblom 
has termed the "privileged position of 
business", a special relation between business and the state, which is a 
structural constraint upon the latter. Successful capital accumulation is 
bound to be an essential policy consideration, thanks to the state's 
dependence on capital for revenue and stability alike. What is of 
particular interest here is the state's ability, under these circumstances, to 
present itself as the guardian of society's general interest, the interest of 
all classes. 
Thomas, 1994: 152-3. 
Although Jessop is engaged in a very helpful exercise, the outcome of his discussion 
may leave us with a formulation which undermines the distinctiveness of a purely 
Marxist approach on which the argument against pluralism rests. The means by 
which Jessop arrives at his own conclusions about the nature of the state in 
capitalism, provide very useful insights into the problems of over-structuralism and 
over-determinism which can be manifested within Marxist approaches. His 
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concerns about these two issues seem to stem from excessive concern on his part 
about the `... wide variety in actual existing capitalist economies' (Jessop 1990: 
151). In this respect, his concern about particularisation of states is similar to that of 
Hay. It is arguable, however, that the existence of outward differences between 
capitalist states is evidence in itself that capitalism, as a distinct mode of production, 
forms no part of a general explanation of the nature of political outcomes. 
Further, Jessop's Strategic-Relational Approach makes use of the concepts 
of form-determination and strategic selectivity2 but argues that such strategic 
selectivity within the state system does not always favour a particular class or set of 
interests. Again his concern for particularisation is relevant here as he once more 
emphasises the importance of `specific conjunctures': 
The state does not exercise power: its powers (in the plural) are activated 
through the agency of definite political forces in specific conjunctures ... 
as in all cases of social action, there will always be unacknowledged 
conditions influencing the success or failure of their actions as well as 
unanticipated consequences which follow from them ... the state 
comprises an ensemble of centres which offer unequal chances to 
2 'The emphasis here is on the ways in which the very structure of the state system itself ensures 
that the interests of capital are favoured in policy making and implementation. The structural 
selectivity of the state means that it is not a neutral instrument equally accessible to all social forces 
and equally adaptable to all ends. Instead it has an in-built, form-determined bias that makes it more 
open to capitalist influences and more readily mobilised for capitalist policies. ' Jessop, 1990: 147. 
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different forces within and outside the state to act for different political 
purposes. 
Jessop, 1990: 367. 
Through his concern about the differences between capitalist states and his desire to 
avoid the problems of structuralism and determinism, Jessop has lost much of the 
heart of a Marxist account of the state. To accept that the state is part of the social 
relation specific to capitalism, which thus involves the exploitation of one class by 
another for the extraction of surplus value (thus activating class conflict), 
necessitates an analysis which de-emphasises other social divisions, such as the social 
cleavages of race, gender and nationality, as admitted into the analysis by Jessop. In 
this sense the relationship between social relations and the operation of the 
capitalist system has to be maintained as a fundamental element of a Marxist 
analysis. If class struggle is removed from the heart of the analysis, this denies the 
central significance of the social relations which must underpin any Marxist 
perspective on political economy. Otherwise there is nothing distinctive about a 
Marxist approach, and the need for a deductive approach loses its force. Thus it is 
argued that to attempt to avoid determinism to the extent of permitting an analysis 




It could be argued (and has been, in particular by Hay) that Jessop provides a 
sophisticated Marxist account of the state, which avoids the problems of 
determinism and instrumentalism which have previously weakened other Marxist 
accounts. It could also be argued, however, that Jessop's account is not essentially 
Marxist. The similarities between this type of approach to the state and the 
sociological formulations of structure and agency (notably by Giddens, Hay and 
Archer) as outlined in Chapter Two, are clear. Interestingly, Hay's description of 
Jessop's contribution on the state uses strikingly similar (non-Marxist) language to 
that used in his own work on structure, agency and power. He writes, 
All social and political change occurs through strategic interaction as 
strategies collide with and impinge upon the structured terrain of the 
strategic context within which they are formulated. Their effects 
(however unintentional, however unanticipated) are to transform 
(however partially) the context within which future strategies are 
formulated and deployed 
Hay, 1995: 170 
Further the idea that the state is the crystallisation of past strategies conjures up the 
time-space formulation of Archer's morphogenetic approach. That is, that the state 
is indeterminate and contingent rather than being structurally determined. If we 
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refer back to the broad outline of a Marxist theory of the state in section 6.2, we 
can see that some key elements are manipulated within Jessop's approach. This 
perhaps indicates that the distinctiveness of Marxism is lost in this particular 
account. 
It is contended that a Marxist approach to the state would require at least 
one element which is not found in Jessop's account: the centrality/primacy of class 
struggle - as opposed to other social divisions; thus retaining the economic 
basis for 
understanding the nature of the structural arrangements as well as the method of 
transformation of the system. As Hay indicates, class does not have the same 
centrality in Jessop's work as we would understand from Marxist analyses of 
capitalism and its transformation, 
For if we are to apply the strategic-relational approach, they (crises) are 
contingent upon the balance of class (and other) forces, the nature of the 
crisis itself and (we might add) popular perceptions of the nature of the 
crisis - in short, on the strategically selective context and the strategies 
mobilised within this context. 
Hay, 1999: 170-171 
and Hay adds that 
The strategic-relational approach offers no guarantees - either of the 
ongoing reproduction of the capitalist system or of its impending demise. 
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(Though, given the strategic selectivity of the current context, the odds 
on the latter would appear remote. ) It is, in short, a statement of the 
contingency and indeterminacy of social and political change. The 
casualty in all of this is the definitive (and very illusive) Marxist theory of 
the state. 
Hay, 1999: 171. 
So, the critique which Jessop provides is useful, but the positive formulation 
he offers as an alternative is less Marxist than his terminology implies. 
Consequently this type of state formulation can do two things which may explain 
its contemporary appeal. Firstly it can more easily be integrated into pluralism in 
political science generally. Secondly, precisely because of this fundamental lack of 
conflict with pluralism, this type of Marxist state theory can also be integrated with 
neo- pluralist approaches to policymaking. In fact in his work on the convergence 
of Marxism and pluralism, Marsh persuasively argues that the problems of network 
approaches can be solved through their integration with a strong state theory. The 
force of his argument lies in his claim that any theory of the state can be used in 
this way, including a Marxist one. However, the Marxist approach he uses to 
illustrate his point is that of Jessop (see Marsh, 1995: 273). This is contrary to the 
claims made here that a uniquely Marxist approach could not provide an easy fit 
with neo-pluralism. An approach which does fit pluralism, therefore, cannot meet 
the criteria for the distinctiveness of Marxism. 
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To criticise Jessop and others in this way is not to fall into the trap of 
economic determinism. The basis of the argument presented here is a recognition 
that adequate political inquiry requires an approach which can examine all actors 
within the context of capitalism. This requires a theory of capitalism, which only 
Marxism attempts to provide. Marxism has at its heart the notion of classes and 
class struggle, which is underpinned by an analysis of the mode of production. This 
is not determinism but a lens through which the political economy is viewed, 
which is lacking in all non-Marxist analysis. The reflex of non-Marxists still is to 
assert that such an approach is invalid as it renders investigations of the meso and 
micro-levels of the political economy useless. On the contrary, the differences in 
political outcomes within capitalism necessitate precisely that type of inquiry. 
Further, given the claims which Marxism makes about the means of transforming 
structure, it is clear that it takes the power of agents seriously. As Wright, Levine & 
Sober note, 
We believe that tendencies to radical holism are better ascribed to 
intellectual sloppiness than to considered philosophical commitment ... 
But it is neither necessary nor helpful to frame the call for micro- 
foundations as a call for methodological individualism ... Micro- 
foundations are important for macro-social theory because of the ways 
they enrich our answers. But there is much more to science than 
elaboration. 
Wright, Levine and Sober, 1992: 126-7. 
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It seems clear that the advantages of making use of a combination of methods are 
great. The currently dominant frameworks for analysing the policymaking process 
are inadequate because they do not seek to, and cannot, elaborate a perspective on 
either the state or the structural context. There are a number of non-Marxist strong 
state approaches which can go some way towards balancing out the emphasis on 
non-state social actors. However, the definition of states in capitalism which 
underpins all such approaches means that they do not have the capacity to 
illuminate the structural context any more than neo-pluralist accounts can. A 
theory of structure, a theory of capitalism, is only provided by Marxism, and this 
has significant implications for the way in which we conceptualise the state. This is 
fundamentally at odds with the view exhibited in non-Marxist frameworks and 
thus indicates that an attempted integration of the two is not a real possibility. The 
only way that this would be possible would be to dilute Marxism. To avoid such a 
position should not invite charges of either determinism or instrumentalism, as the 
relationship between state action and the social relations of capital are far more 
complex than these imply. In addition, the implication of determinism and 
instrumentalism is that empirical inquiry is removed from the analysis. It has been 
argued throughout that this would be an absurd position to adopt. There is not a 
contradiction between a Marxist analysis of capitalism and micro and meso-level 
investigations. Thus the case becomes one of harnessing the benefits of meso and 
macro analysis through a dynamic and dialectical understanding of structure and 
agency. 
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6.10 A dual approach 
Having made the case for a Marxist approach to policymaking in order fully to 
appreciate the structural constraints on meso and micro level autonomy, it is 
important to highlight the proposal for a dual rather than an integrated approach to 
analysing political outcomes. It is significant that this distinction is made, given that 
the discussion so far has indicated that it is not possible to integrate a Marxist 
theory of state and structure with existing neo-pluralist frameworks. The 
integration of the two is not possible for strong reasons of methodology: use of an 
inductive rather than a deductive approach. Rather, the ability to harness the 
benefits of a structural account with the need for empirical investigation of specific 
cases calls for a dual framework, one which is rooted in a dual concept of power. 
Just as other theorists have made claims about the necessity of perceiving 
power in more than one dimension, a dual approach requires power to be 
understood as both a stuctural and an individual concept which thus may be 
exercised and distributed differently at different levels of the polity. Structural 
power takes its meaning from the Marxist interpretation of the means by which the 
social relations of capital constrain the autonomy of meso-level actors. Individual 
power is that which is exercised at the meso-level and can be key in shaping specific 
short-run outcomes in particular policy fields, at particular times. It is not however 
a power which ultimately shapes the macro context of future actions. One way of 
distinguishing between these different power dimensions is to refer to them as 
conduct- and context-shaping power (adapted from Hay, 1997). 
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Conduct-shaping power refers to the exercise of power by individuals or 
groups at the meso-level, which recognises that different types of actor can 
dominate in different spheres at different times. For example, epistemic 
communities may exert conduct-shaping power in a specific policy domain where 
scientific expertise is significant currency in being able to translate preferences into 
policy actions. Context-shaping power refers to the macro-level constraints on the 
autonomy of, for example, epistemic communities which seeks to explain those 
constraints through reference to the social relations of capital. In other words, 
conduct-shaping power is more limited and is delineated by the terms of context- 
shaping power. 
Such an analysis of structure and agency requires that political inquiry is in 
fact conducted at both the macro and meso levels rather than reducing all political 
outcomes to either individuals and groups in society or to structure. A complete 
picture of long-run policy development can only be uncovered through an 
examination of meso-level interactions firmly rooted in an understanding of the 
constraining context of capitalist social relations. 
6.11 Conclusion 
In order to understand the policymaking process, it is essential to understand 
capitalism as the context within which policy decisions are taken. There may be 
factors relevant to the organisation of capitalist society which can illuminate more 
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precisely the mechanics of the policymaking process. It does not seem unreasonable 
to assume that the way in which society is organised (according to the mode of 
production) has an impact on the political outcomes generated within that political 
economy. This implies that there may be something significant about the 
institutional arrangements or the structures of the political economy which 
enhance or constrain social action within that context. 
In that sense we can agree that one thing which may be a significant 
omission from the network model is an analysis of this macro-level of potential 
constraints on individual agency. Having established that we want to investigate the 
relationship between structure and agency for the purposes of clarifying the picture 
of policymaking, it is important to establish an approach which can account for 
structure, and also one which can be used in conjunction with meso and micro- 
level inquiry. The state seems to be key in this respect. As part of our 
understanding of capitalism as structural context, unravelling the institutional 
arrangements relevant to that context requires an investigation of the state. 
Further, it seems likely that, in accepting structure to be important, the state would 
have a role in mediating or regulating the context of social action. 
The examination of a range of pluralist accounts of the state in Chapter Five 
showed that, although such approaches take the state seriously, there is no 
indication of either their clear added value for the networks approach or of their 
being a sophisticated means of analysing capitalism specifically. The main problems 
for a pluralist analysis of the state (statism) lie in their emphasis on 
particularisation. That is, pluralist analyses do not see beyond the differences 
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between actually existing capitalist states. It is suggested that the crux of 
understanding the policymaking process is to discern the extent of the impact of 
agents on structure and vice versa. We have claimed that social system analysis is a 
necessary part of understanding the nature of the policymaking process, but that in 
no way can a purely structural approach replace the need for the examination of 
agency also. In other words, we need an analysis of the duality of structure and 
agency, or at least one which recognises their relationship to one another, rather 
than judging each in isolation. In accepting that structure and agency are conjoined 
in a dynamic and reciprocal relationship, what is particularly important is to 
understand the reach of the action of each. On that basis, neither the discussions 
around social action provided by Giddens, Hay and Archer nor the non-Marxist 
theories of the state help to elaborate the reach of the specific, social organisation of 
the system. 
Because of the emphasis on difference (particularisation) within non-Marxist 
approaches, there can be no significant contribution to our understanding of the 
way in which capitalism, as a specific mode of production, may impinge on agency. 
This results, at least partly, from the reliance on an inductive approach. This means 
that within these approaches it is impossible to generalise about the actual or 
potential impact of structure on agency, and vice versa, within the specific 
historical context of capitalism. This would require acceptance of deductive 
arguments. 
If we were to accept the non-Marxist position, the most concrete thing we 
could say about structure and agency is that each affects the other. In terms of 
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conclusions about policymaking then, these would necessarily be limited to 
discussions of political outcomes (policies) as the result of the interrelationships of 
individual actors and, in some cases the intervention of structure, perhaps through 
the resource of the state. 
It is suggested then, that this does not carry us very far forward in terms of 
our comprehension of political economy and its meso-level activity - 
policymaking. Here the clear added value of a Marxist approach is apparent. In its 
emphasis on explaining the nature of capitalist political economy, Marxism 
incorporates questions of structure and agency and the method of transformation 
of social structure, as well as having the capacity to engage in more limited 
observations of the means by which specific policy outcomes are produced. 
If there is a clear advantage in taking a Marxist approach, then analysing the 
state is key as- within Marxist theory it has an important role in the reproduction of 
the social relations of capital. As has been discussed in the foregoing sections, there 
are many perceived difficulties in adopting such an approach, in particular it invites 
charges of determinism or instrumentalism. Within existing accounts, it seems that 
we have needed to accept that either Marxism falls into one of these two traps or, 
in order to avoid such unhelpful structuralism, we accept that the Marxism of the 
future is that conceived in Jessop-type terms. The case seems to have been made 
that to have a dynamic, dialectical conception of structure and agency means 
effectively to do away with any perspective which attributes any general 
characteristics to capitalist societies. 
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The evolution of Marxism has seen the development of accounts of 
structure and the state which claim that the state is indeterminate and contingent, 
offering no guaranteed outcomes for the continued reproduction of capitalist social 
relations and so on (see Jessop, 1990). This is clearly a new direction within 
Marxism, but should not represent the only possible configuration. To maintain 
the distinct advantage of a Marxist approach for understanding the policymaking 
process, arguably requires maintaining something distinctly Marxist about the 
analysis. It is suggested that it is possible to avoid crude determinism and still retain 
a Marxist analysis through developing a more sophisticated framework. This would 
have a dialectical understanding of structure and agency, whilst investigating the 
general characteristics of structural constraints in the capitalist mode of production. 
Thus, the method of transformation of structure is more precise than either 
Giddens's `theory of structuration' or Archer's `morphogenetic approach' imply. 
Additionally, Jessop's contribution would not be appropriate as it in fact provides a 
relatively easy fit with pluralism: in its admittance of other relevant social divisions 
(for example, race and gender), and in its claim that, although the state may be 
strategically selective, there are no guarantees that state actions will work in the 
general interests of capital in the long-run (Hay, 1999: 171). Thus it has lost the 
distinctiveness of a Marxist analysis, even though Jessop continues to characterise 
society in terms of its class structure. 
It can be also be argued that the charge of over-structuralism levelled at 
Marxism is an exaggeration, given that agents organised in the form of classes 
(rather than the more amorphous pluralist groupings) have the capacity to 
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transform structure. In order to do so however, there needs to be a broader 
coincidence/configuration of forces for that transformation to be successful (for the 
transformation from capitalism to communism). The elements required for a 
Marxist analysis then are the following: an historical method; an analysis which 
recognises the centrality of class struggle and defines classes in terms of their 
relationship to the means of production; and an understanding of the state as part 
of the social relation specific to capitalism. 
It has been noted that to attribute needs or purpose to structure is to invite 
criticism of determinism, functionalism and reification. Whilst acknowledging 
these dangers, we can point out that avoiding them does not require abandoning 
the distinctiveness of Marxism altogether. We should be willing to claim more than 
that structure and agency are interrelated -- who could disagree with any such 
claim? In order to attempt the more difficult task of answering `how and to what 
extent does structure limit social action? ' and `to what extent, and under which 
circumstances, can agents transform the structural context of political economy? ', it 
is essential to utilise a framework which is prepared to make statements about the 
character of structural constraints. We should be willing to adopt the hypothesis 
that capitalism entails certain kinds of structural constraint, which are distinctive to 
its mode of production. It is contended that Marxism is the only existing theoretical 
framework which can truly claim to do this. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 The limitations of pluralist theories of policymaking 
The opening part of this thesis suggested that the application of network type 
approaches to policymaking is limited. The argument was developed in terms of 
the types of information which could be discovered about a policy domain, as well 
as the kinds of questions not posed within neo-pluralist models. There are two 
main aspects to the critique of network models which, it was proposed, are relevant 
to all network formulations. One problematic area was suggested as the omission of 
the state as a constraint, either arising from it status as a key social actor, or from 
its location in the structural context. The second area of weakness was argued to be 
the structural indeterminism of neo-pluralist inquiry. 
The overview of network models in Chapter One found that although the 
Oapplication of these approaches could provide useful and interesting information 
about the actor composition and policy interaction of a given policy domain, this 
type of information may be secondary to that which can be found through 
alternative perspectives. In other words, any assessment of the impact of network 
actors on political outcomes may only have significant meaning if understood 
within a framework which can identify both network relationships with other key 
social actors (perhaps the state) and any more general, structural constraints on 
agency. 
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The case study presented in chapters Three and Four illustrated some of the 
benefits and stated weaknesses with these approaches. The Task Force 
Environment: Water was chosen as a typical network type case study in which a 
formal network consultation was created in order to produce policy proposals for 
the EU's water management agenda. In mapping out the organisation of the 
consultation and the key social actors, it was possible to test for some of the policy 
hierarchies which contemporary network models claim can be found, for example 
policy communities and epistemic communities. 
Observations of the network found that there was some evidence of an 
increased weight of inputs by some actors according to key characteristics identified 
in certain network models. In particular both a professional-industry bias and a 
dominant insider organisation were found. The possibility of an epistemic 
community was more difficult to determine, as some policy relevant actors who 
may also claim to have expertise in this field were excluded from the consultation. 
These organisations were the environmental groups who may be considered as 
campaigning organisations and, as such, were felt by core network leaders to be less 
directly relevant to the process. 
Application of a networks type approach then provided a useful overview 
of the range of actors involved in the consultation process. It was also able to 
identify those groups who were able to maximise their input through closer contact 
with policy implementors or were policy leaders owing to existing, established 
links in the sector. In this sense the core actors were perceived as those with the 
most policy expertise derived from long a association and strong contacts in the 
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field. This type of approach was also able to highlight the marginal status of other 
non-industry groups, in particular environmental and consumer organisations. In 
addition, it was possible to identify some of the constraints on actor autonomy, 
arising from the EU's agenda setting and the difficulty for new actors (and thus 
new thinking) to penetrate a well established policy network. 
It was clear then that network approaches are able provide a wide range of 
interesting and useful information about a specific policy domain, at a particular 
time. What is more difficult is to establish is whether there are any further 
constraints on actor autonomy than those which can be readily identified from 
direct observation of the field. As already indicated, the very nature of neo- 
pluralism as a mode of inquiry places limits on the information it can provide. 
Although this does not necessarily negate the network outcomes discovered, the 
possibility that network actors are interacting in a more limited environment or are 
unable to pursue their own agendas exclusively, raises questions about the force of 
theories generated from their application. That is, without a direct engagement 
with potentially decisive factors such as the state and structural context, the 
accessibility of decision makers and the autonomy of network actors, it is claimed, 
may be overstated. 
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7.2 Power, structure, and agency 
In light of the importance attached to the limitations of network analysis, the 
relevance of alternative perspectives on the power holding capacity of society-based 
groups and individuals vis-a-vis the state and social system is significant. It was 
suggested that the weaknesses identified in neo-pluralism had their root in the 
method of investigation used and therefore the ensuing assumptions about the 
distribution and exercise of power. Consequently relevant literature on power, 
structure and agency was considered, in order to provide a firmer basis for the 
argument pursued: the need to consider system type constraints as part of the 
explanation of political outcomes. 
The contributions from sociologists on the importance of avoiding 
reductionism in social and political inquiry were found to be very persuasive. It is 
argued by Giddens and Archer that a mode of analysis which reduces explanation 
to either the individual or to the social system is not only undesirable, but is a 
misunderstanding of the dynamic relationship between the two. That is, there 
exists a duality of structure and agency such that each is formed by and generates 
the other. This indicates a more dynamic and reciprocal relationship than that 
found in the main schools of though such as pluralism and Marxism. In each of 
these, the definition of the exercise and distribution of power as being either with 
individual agents (more closely associated with pluralism) or with structures (more 
closely associated with Marxism) misses the fact that the two are conjoined. 
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With a dual formulation then, power capacity in terms of the environment 
of social action, the social interaction within it and thus the ways in which either of 
these can be changed, must be explained through reference to both structure and 
agency. Two important points arise from this analysis. Firstly, that in explaining 
political outcomes it is necessary to consider the actions of individuals as well as the 
structure of the environment in which they take place. This requires a dual concept 
of power in order to identify the distribution and exercise of power at different 
levels of the polity. Secondly, existing dual formulations do not attribute any 
general character to social structure such that it shapes the rules of society and 
social action in particular ways. This, it was argued, weakened existing perspectives 
on the duality of structure and agency as it limits what can be said about the ways 
in which structure limits social action. The proposal then is, in order to embrace 
the duality of structure and agency and give it meaning, it should be an historically 
rooted perspective. This would allow us to be able to say more definite things 
about the (more specific) ways in which structure impacts on agency. 
7.3 Statism 
The next theoretical development of the argument concentrated on the omission of 
state theory from network analysis. It has already been noted that the state, may be 
a constraint on the shape of the network and network actor autonomy. In order to 
be clear about whether the state can have this type of influence, it was argued that a 
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theory of the state was required. Chapter Five provided an overview of statist 
literature which emphasises the centrality and autonomy of the state as a distinct 
social actor in decision making. 
The contributions of Nordlinger, Krasner, Skcopol and Mann highlighted 
the significant shift away from society-centred accounts to state emphasising 
explanations of political outcomes. Although there are some key differences 
between these statist contributions, they all emphasise the autonomy of the state 
insofar as it should be understood as a distinct social actor which has its own 
preferences and the power to translate them into policy, despite countervailing 
social pressures. This strong state vision further emphasises the variability in state 
organisation and action such that it is necessary to consider each state 
independently, rather than to generalise about all states. In fact two things became 
clear in the assessment of statism. Firstly that state autonomy was actually relative, 
as all contributions indicated the importance of the strength of social groups as well 
as the organisation of the particular state institutions as potential limits to 
autonomous state capacity. Secondly the variability of states was taken as evidence 
that generalisation about states was invalid. Modern states exhibit fragmentation 
within the organisation of the state as well as differences in state capacity in 
different policy domains. Thus states are multi-dimensional and multi-functional. 
The claim made by statists then is that it is important to talk of `states in 
capitalism' rather than `capitalist states'. 
This conclusion was considered very significant, and difficult to reconcile 
with the stated desirability of an historically rooted conceptualisation of structure. 
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Given the logic of capital accumulation and the social relations of production in 
capitalism, it was argued that a dislocation of the state from this type of structural 
context, as found in statism, is likely to underestimate the potential invariability of 
the capitalist mode of production. 
In terms of the lack of state theory in neo-pluralism, it was felt that in this 
single regard, statism could provide a solution. In other words if the only failing of 
network analysis was its lack of state theory then the introduction of a statist 
perspective would alleviate this difficulty. It was further argued that an integration 
of statism and neo-pluralism is possible. The problem with this integration 
however, would still be the structural indeterminism manifest in both approaches. 
So the second condition for establishing a strong theory of policymaking, that of a 
direct engagement with structure, was not resolved by the contributions of statism. 
7.4 The superiority of Marxist theories of the state 
What distinguishes his [Marx's] analysis so radically from classical political 
economy is that it creates no sharp discontinuities between economic and 
political spheres; and he is able to trace the continuities because he treats 
the economy itself not as a network of disembodied forces but, like the 
political `sphere', as a set of social relations. 
Meiksins Wood, 1981: 68. 
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Given the two features of state and structure which, it is argued, are fundamental to 
policymaking analysis, and which are omitted from dominant policymaking 
models, it is appropriate to discuss Marxist theory as it directly engages with both. 
The advantage of Marxism, it was proposed, is that it resolves the enduring 
difficulty of pluralist and statist approaches in that it locates the state and social 
action in their structural context. The fact that the state and social action are 
understood as aspects of capital and, thus, inseparable from structural context is 
considered as a distinct improvement on other perspectives. 
The argument conceded that it is important to avoid the reductionism to 
structure which can be a feature of Marxist analysis, as this was identified as invalid 
in Chapter Two, following the argument of Archer. Chapter Six thus outlined the 
changing contributions of Marxism and neo-Marxism to state theory, highlighting 
the difficulties of functionalism and determinism which are found in some 
formulations. Given the significance which has been attached to understanding 
structural context is necessary for an analysis of action within that context, neo- 
Marxist theories which indicated a discontinuity of the economic and political (as 
functionalist and instrumentalist interpretations similarly disengage the state from 
context in the way that statists do) were rejected. 
Having accepted the advantage of Marxism as an analysis of policymaking, 
precisely because it is a theory of capitalism (which therefore theorises social 
system and social action), it was considered important to retain the key Marxist 
concept of the social relations of production at the heart of the analysis. 
Consequently, more recent formulations in the Marxist tradition, which do not 
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retain class struggle at the core, (in their admission of other social divisions and 
their potentially decisive relevance) were seen as weakening the value of a Marxist 
analysis. 
7.5 A dual approach? 
Overall, the argument pursued has been that the dominant method of 
policymaking analysis has limited utility. Network type theories produce useful 
and interesting information about network actors and their interaction. However, 
assessments of the extent of their impact on political outcomes are restricted by the 
exclusive emphasis on individual and group actors. It was argued that, as a result, 
the type of information gained through the application of network analysis may be 
secondary to a broader analysis of both other social actors and the structural 
context of policymaking. In other words, network analysis has little meaning if not 
understood within this broader context. 
Although it is relatively easy to introduce state theory to neo-pluralist 
analysis in order to overcome the weakness of its very society-centred approach, 
statism cannot resolve the significant structural indeterminism of neo-pluralism. A 
direct engagement with structure is argued to be necessary in order to understand 
social action at either the level of the individual or at the level of the state. The 
difficulty thus becomes one of method rather than just style. The argument, then is 
for an approach which makes use of deductive as well as inductive arguments. This 
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requires a theory of capitalism and thus effectively rules out anything other than a 
Marxist analysis. One problem, however, is that Marxism can encounter its own 
difficulties of reductionism. So the problem is one of how to develop a method 
which recognises the duality of structure and agency and thus avoid any form of 
reductionism. In other words, the neo-pluralist inductive method cannot serve the 
need for structural analysis, but structuralist analysis has a tendency to marginalise 
agency. A method of inquiry which can account for both, therefore, is desirable. 
The solution, in order to conform to our assessment that structure and 
agency are conjoined, is firstly to theorise structure (as logically prior) and couple 
this with investigations of social action in particular contexts. This is a dual 
approach for the following reasons. Firstly, a theoretical integration of neo- 
pluralism and Marxism is not possible due the significant differences in method. 
However it is necessary to have a dual concept of power in order to make 
statements about the `reach' of structure and agency and, thus, the ways in which 
one can impact on the other. A dual power concept is needed as the exercise and 
distribution of power is different as between structure and agency. Hay's 
terminology of conduct and context shaping power may be helpful in this regard. 
Conduct shaping power can be used to refer to the power capacity of dominant 
individuals and groups in policy domains, who have the power to shape the 
behaviour of other network actors and effectively command meso-level processes. 
Context shaping power is a term which can be used to facilitate a description of the 
importance of the structural context, the mode of production, to political 
outcomes. To accept that capitalism as a distinct mode of production has no 
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explanatory force for political outcomes unique to this context, is to make a 
fundamental error. As Marx claimed: 
But all is not what the economists are really concerned with in this 
general part. Their object is rather to represent production in 
contradistinction to distribution - see Mill, for example - as subject to 
eternal laws independent of history, and then to substitute bourgeois 
relations, in an underhand way, as immutable natural laws of society in 
abstracto. This is the more or less conscious aim of the entire proceeding. 
Grundisse, McLellan, 1990: 348. 
But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition 
of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of 
freedom, culture, law etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the 
conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as 
your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a 
will whose essential character and direction are determined by the 
economical conditions of existence of your class. 
Communist Manifesto, McLellan, 1990: 234. 
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7.6 Questions for further research 
Some significant questions have arisen in the course of this discussion which have 
been beyond the scope of this thesis. These questions relate directly to the 
conclusions already reached, as well as to ways in which the work can be moved 
further forward. 
It is clear that we need a Marxist theory of the state which avoids 
functionalism and determinism yet maintains the centrality of class struggle and the 
structural location of it within capitalism. The overview provided in Chapter Six 
argued that a precise elaboration of the state which meets these two conditions 
remains elusive. The problem is to locate the state in its structural context (as an 
aspect of capital) without conceiving of it as a distinct social actor which is an 
instrument of the ruling class, or in functionalist terms. 
Also an attempt must be made to answer questions raised about macro 
constraints on meso level agency. That is, it has been contended that the meso level 
interactions emphasised in network analysis may be subject to constraints 
emanating from the state and/or from structural context. It is necessary to 
investigate the extent to which the state or structural context can and do have this 
impact on agency and the consequences, therefore, for our interpretation of social 
action. In particular it is relevant to pursue the issue of the impact of state action on 
agency, relative to the impact of social structure, as this would enable us to clarify a 
theory of the state which could conform to the model indicated above. 
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In addition, an elaboration of the distribution and exercise of power in 
terms of the notions of conduct and context shaping power capacity is necessary. It 
would be valuable to develop a model for understanding this relationship of duality 
between structure and agency, such that individual action is considered as having 
conduct shaping capacity, and the social organisation of capitalism is understood as 
having context shaping capacity. This would further enable an elucidation of the 
relationship between the two, to aid our understanding of how structure limits 
social action as well as the circumstances under which social action can successfully 
challenge the structural context and thus effect a transformation of the system. 
Essentially we require further investigations into the policymaking process 
in order to provide more substance to claims made about the limited autonomy of 
actors at this level. In addition to providing a reservoir of important information 
about policy interaction, this type of inquiry may also allow the identification of 







There were three main sources for the empirical work contained within this thesis. 
Firstly, EU documents relating to the operation of the Task Force, the Mirror Task 
Force monographs and documents outlining the nature and objectives of 
organisations involved in the policy process, were consulted. Secondly, 
questionnaires were sent to all participants requesting information about their 
experiences of the consultation, the operation of the Task Force more generally 
and the outcomes of the process - in terms of direct benefits of participation as well 
as longer-term outcomes for the policy domain. Finally, interviews were conducted 
with the core Mirror Task Force personnel of each of the UK-based networks. 
1. Task Force documents: Key documentation was provided by the EU's 
Directorate General XII (for research), relating to the creation of the Task Force, 
the philosophy behind the development of this kind of policy tool as well as both 
the framework within which the national/sectoral submissions should be made and 
the intended outcomes of the process. Interim reports, which detailed the evolution 
of the Task Force from the perspective of the Commission and gave an insight into 
the intended `means' and `ends' of using this type of policy tool, were also used. 
Further detail on the precise nature of the process was uncovered from the reports 
of the two UK-based Mirror Task Forces. These provided information on the 
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structure of their consultations as well as their priorities concerning the problems 
of pan-European water management. Using the information contained within these 
documents, contact was made with the wide range of bodies and individual actors 
who had either responded to the EU's initiative directly, or who had become part 
of the Task Force via the UK Mirror Task Forces. This provided further 
documentation which gave supplementary information on each of the bodies 
involved in the consultation, their location in the policy domain and main areas of 
interest. 
2. Elite interviews: Interviews were held with the main Task Force 
secretariat (chief officers) of both the professional and national Mirror Task Forces. 
The managers of each Task Force were interviewed, along with other employees of 
those organisations (Techware and the Foundation for Water Research) who were 
`hosting' or coordinating the Mirror Task Force submissions. It transpired that the 
core actors within each Mirror Task Force were even more dominant than had 
been originally assumed. The key individual(s) within each Mirror Task Force were 
the locus of influence, and the broader team had a more marginal role in the 
formulation of proposals and the drafting of the documentation. 
Telephone interviews were also conducted with the National Contact Point 
(NCP) at the DTER and with the key figure in the Scottish Office submission. The 
NCP provided very useful information about the nature of the bidding process by 
research organisations with the government in the UK. The NCP also indicated the 
extent of the DTER's detachment from the Task Force on a day-to-day basis, but 
in terms of investment of time and resources in establishing the national UK 
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response, they were concerned that there should be tangible outcomes from the 
consultation. Eight elite interviews were conducted with the core actors within the 
UK Mirror Task Forces. Each interview lasted for half a day, with additional time 
to consult documentation held at the offices of each. In all cases, subsequent 
telephone calls followed, in order to follow up points raised, or to request further 
relevant documentation. Each interview took the form of a semi-structured 
conversation. The reason for this is due firstly, to the need for clarification of 
precise dates of different stages of the Task Force process as well as to establish the 
secretariat's perspective on the formal structure and organisation of the 
consultation, managed by the EU. In other words, there was some detail which it 
was necessary to gain from the interview. However, it was not desirable to have a 
very structured technique, as both the internal dynamics and the very personal 
perspectives on the relative merits of participation would not be reproduced in any 
documentation. Further, it was clear that individuals had specific points to make 
about their experience and, thus, it was felt that these would give better insights 
into the dynamics of the process (and interrelationships), than very formal 
questioning. 
3. Questionnaires: The bulk of the empirical detail on the interactions of the 
consultees within the established networks (their impressions of the operation of 
the Task Force process generally and their perception of what they could gain 
through participation) was gathered through responses to questionnaires with 
supplementary correspondence, where required, to clarify any points being made. 
All organisations listed as having been consulted, in the Mirror Task Forces 
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documentation, were contacted in this manner with the length and quality of the 
responses varying. Where no immediate response was made, follow-up letters were 
sent on two further occasions. 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth were also contacted (as organisations 
omitted from the national/sectoral consultation) in order to gauge opinion on the 
reasons why they were excluded. 
The DGs directly involved in the Task Force were also asked to respond to 
a separate questionnaire and, in the case of DG XII, this was followed up with 
further correspondence for the purposes of clarification. 
A total of 44 questionnaires were sent (39 to Mirror Task Force participants 
and 5 to the relevant Directorate Generals in Brussels), using the national Mirror 
Task Force's list of consultees and the additional contact list which was drawn up 
after the Commission circulated its `second Call for Ideas'. Responses were received 
from 21 Mirror Task Force participants and 3 Directorates General. In some cases 
these took the form of a letter detailing answers to questions posed, in those areas 
which they felt they had a particular insight or additional information to give. 
Again, in six cases, these initial contacts were followed up with further 
correspondence where it was felt that the organisation/individual could provide 
further context or detail relating to their participation. In two or three cases, the 
named individual or organisation from the contact list was not the relevant 
individual or was no longer available. In these cases, the response to the 
questionnaire received, was a copy of the UK Report. 
A copy of each questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5. 
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2. Obstacles in the process 
Due to the nature of the consultation process initiated at the national level, the 
majority of organisations and individual representatives of smaller bodies, were 
actually much more marginal to the process than had been indicated in the Task 
Force reports. As a result, those organisations which had a long-standing 
relationship with the core actors (Techware and FWR) were reluctant to express 
any opinions, without a clear statement by the researcher as to what had already 
been discussed with the core actors. Further, the researcher was always 
recommended to contact the managers of the UK submissions, as they could 
provide the `whole story' without the need for further clarification by other actors. 
They felt they could add no more to the opinions already expressed by the core 
actors. 
Those bodies who had no previous experience of working in this manner 
and with, therefore, no pre-existing links with those central to the consultation 
were more forthcoming about their experiences. The extent of the dissatisfaction 
with the organisation of the process and lack of return for their investment was 
very clear from the correspondence. 
A further point of interest is in those organisations which had claimed 
greater knowledge and therefore authority in the Task Force process, than those in 
the position of managing it. The input of these groups and individuals was 
invaluable in their uncovering of the nature and inflexibility of the EU agenda, 
prior to the initiation of the public consultation. 
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The case study chosen was useful in that it was relatively easy to see the 
hierarchies of input, the limited nature of the consultation and close relationships 
which existed between the core members (notably between the two chairs of the 
respective Mirror Task Forces). The EU role was, however, less transparent. Much 
of this could be claimed to be the result of the level of bureaucracy involved in the 
Task Force process, as well as the reluctance of individual officials within the DGs 
to take responsibility for the nature of the organisation of the Task Force and the 
Commission's management of it. 
It was expected, from the outset, that the case study could be of only limited 
utility in terms of the arguments made within the thesis about the relationship 
between theory and evidence in political science inquiry. Having clarified the 
nature of the theoretical approach which the researcher wanted to pursue, the task 
of choosing a case study was thought to be on the one hand very difficult and, on 
the other, that the exact nature of it was less relevant. In other words, it was 
accepted that, in light of the arguments made for the desirability of more 
structuralist type assumptions about the macro context of policymaking, no case 
study evidence alone could explain any such constraints to meso-level autonomy. It 
certainly would have no explanatory force in terms of any constraints attributable 
to capitalism, as a specific mode of production. However, it was important to find a 
case study which could demonstrate both internal network relationships (to 
identify dominant conduct shaping power actors) and one where it was possible to 
hypothesise about external constraints. 
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This particular case study then seemed, at the outset, to have those qualities 
(leaving aside the specific problems of demonstrating the validity of Marxist 
claims): it was a relatively new policy area, thus it was hoped there would be 
greater transparency of relationships. The ownership of policy relevant knowledge 
or expertise was also likely to be crucial in this particular case, given that the goal 
of the process was to improve the EU's competitive market position in water 
quality and management. Also, the overlap of EU and national competence in this 
policy domain was considered an additional benefit - in terms of gaining insights 
into the relationship between national and EU policy actors as well as having 
further evidence of the fact that research organisations now look increasingly to the 
EU for financial support. 
Further, at the start of the fieldwork, the EU had not produced the final 
document which was supposed to both synthesise the range of European inputs, as 
well as to demonstrate the concrete links between the consultation process and the 
Fifth Framework Programme. There was certainly an extra twist in the story as a 
result of this bureaucratic delay, and the UK actors felt that this was a realisation of 
all their fears about making their ideas available to outside bodies. Their fears were 
not entirely realised, however, as the final EU document was eventually released at 
the end of 1998 (one year late). 
By the close of the fieldwork, however, two things became clear. On the 
positive side (in terms of significant information gained), the investigations had 
shown that the EU had not intended to use the public consultation as an agenda- 
setting exercise, as this had already taken place prior to the `Call for Ideas' being 
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made public. Secondly, within the framework as set by the EU, it was clear that the 
dominant conduct-shapers were those with pre-exiting relationships, professional- 
water industry commonality and thus relatively developed shared expertise about 
the nature of the problems for water management, and the best means for their 
resolution. 
The case study was able to test some of the claims made in network 
approaches and found that the policy community and epistemic community 
models were, at least partly, reflected in this particular case. This also pointed to 
the limitations of these approaches however. Firstly that having identified 
particular policy hierarchies here, this still would not enable us to say anything 
about the policymaking process more generally, as the outcomes are policy specific 
and time bound. Secondly, although the approach is able to identify that there may 
be constraints outside of the network, the model itself has no explanatory force in 
this regard. These two factors seemed to add weight to the proposal for a dual 
approach, which would be able to locate the empirical findings in their structural 
context such that more general statements may be possible about the nature of the 
policymaking process. 
3. General comments on methodology and the specific case study 
As outlined above, the methods of investigation used in this thesis were a 
combination of documentary sources, questionnaires and elite interviewing. A 
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problem for research in this (very) specific area was the lack of any other 
commentaries on the nature of the Task Force process. In addition, given the 
newness of the particular Task Force under discussion, which was intended to 
provide a more fruitful area for analysis due to the lack of entrenched relationships, 
in fact presented an area of investigation with very few documentary sources. 
Importantly, evaluating the influence of various actors was key to the analysis of 
the case study material, particularly in light of the theoretical claims made in the 
opening chapters. 
Given the `underdeveloped' nature of the area and the aims of the 
investigation there was, necessarily then, more reliance on primary sources 
(interviews, questionnaires and internal documents). This also resulted in the 
selection of contacts being general: all individuals and actors who had participated 
in some capacity in the Task Force consultation. The only limit which was placed 
on selection was (due to time and resourcing constraints) that they should be based 
in the UK. This constraint was justified, in that the focus of enquiry was the nature 
of consultation networks on a sectoral - rather than level of governance - basis. 
Such a reliance on first hand accounts of the policy process, magnify the 
problematic issues of using interviews: limited and selective information'. Despite 
using a combination of structured and semi-structured techniques, it was not 
always possible to cross-reference the information provided, with other sources. It 
became clear through the process of information gathering, however, that the 
distribution of questionnaires to non-core participants, gave a very useful reservoir 
1 See chapters by Bartow and Stedward in Burnham, P. (1997). 
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of information against which to consider the opinions and comments of the core 
actors. 
The central problems of the information gathered from interviewing these 
core actors were: an underlying dissatisfaction with the outcome of their 
participation; a sometimes overblown account of their ability to manage the 
process successfully and a reliance on vague statements about a `convergence of 
priorities' within the public consultation. 
The information garnered from the questionnaires (and supplementary 
correspondence) completed by the consultees, thus provided very useful insights 
into the experience of the network consultation from the point of view of `being 
managed' rather than `doing the managing'. It was hoped that this would go some 
way towards counterbalancing the problems of certain biases expressed in the 
information from core actors. It was important, however, to also assume that the 
nature of those responses was highly subjective: perceptions of the success of the 
process based on individual expectations (which may have been unreasonable), of a 
greater claim to knowledge and authority in the field than those chosen to manage 
the consultation, of being considered (by the managers) as marginal to the process. 
The volume of responses to the questionnaires and requests for interview 
was limited in a number of ways. The Task Force Environment-Water is a 
relatively narrow focus for study. Although it is a part of a much broader 
`environmental policy strategy', as a water management policy tool it was only a 
small focus of interest for environmental and environmental-research organisations. 
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Secondly it is, clearly, an EU policy initiative. For those involved in a 
complex of policy arrangements, consultative networks and research activities, 
again it was only a part of a much broader set of national, EU and pan-European 
concerns. In other words, it was only marginal to the day to day business of many 
of those involved in the consultation. 
Thirdly, many of those individuals and organisations who did not have 
their proposals reflected directly in the final documents did not respond. It was very 
important (and provided the most useful information) that some of those who had 
a poor experience of the UK Task Forces did respond. However, the broad 
categories of `environmental-research' and `academic interest' were 
underrepresented relative to water managers and water industry professionals. 
Finally the Task Force process, despite the implied on-going policy and 
research links, was an isolated policy consultation that was completed in two years. 
Within that time, of course, those submitting their proposals would have 
completed their active role (as opposed to being circulated with updates on 
progress) at an early point. An additional problem then, was the feeling that the 
process was finished and concerns had moved on. 
The outcome of these limitations, on the nature and volume of the 
responses from interviews and questionnaires, was that a majority of responses 
were from those who had something particular to say about the process. The 
managers of the UK Task Forces were dissatisfied with the conduct of Commission 
officials and the organisation of the process by the EU. From shifting deadlines and 
changes in procedure to long delays in the publication of the final report, the UK 
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managers were keen for someone to highlight the inefficiencies of the EU (as they 
had, after all, been spending tax payers money). Some consultees were motivated to 
respond either to indicate their poor experience of the UK consultation or to 
clarify the more dominant role they had, `behind the scenes'. 
Generally then the problems of limited and selective information were 
evident: those individuals and organisations who were concerned to make a 
particular point were more responsive than those who did not have any strong 
feelings about the process. 
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Appendix 2. 
Organisations consulted by UK national MTF 
Organisations consulted by UK MTF 
Association of Independent Research & Technology Organisations (AIRTO) 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council 
British Water 
British Waterways 
Building Services Research and Information association (BSRIA) 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
Chartered Institution of Water & Environmental Management (CIWEM) 
CNS Scientific and Engineering Services 
Council for Environmental Education 
Country Landowners Association 
Department of the Environment 
Drinking Water Inspectorate 
Economic and Social Research Council 
Environment Agency 
Environment and Heritage Agency, Northern Ireland 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
Environmental Industries Commission 
Foundation for Water Research 
HR Wallingford 
Institute of Freshwater Ecology 
Institute of Hydrology 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
Natural Environmental Research Council 
Northern Ireland Water Service 
Office of Science & Technology (Natural Resources and Environmental 
Panel) 
Office of Water Services 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
Scottish Natural Heritage 
Scottish Office 
Scottish Research Liaison Group 
Scottish Water & Sewerage Customers Council 
UK Water Industry Research Ltd 
Water Industry Suppliers Group 
Welsh Office 
Water Companies Association 
Water Services Association 
WRc p. l. c. 
CEN 
EURAQUA 






Organisations whose responses to the EU call for ideas 
were copied to the UK national MTF 
*e* 




Building Services Research and Information Association 
Department of the Environment 
Drinking Water Inspectorate 
Environment Agency 
HR Wallingford Ltd 
Institute of Freshwater Ecology 
Institute of Hydrology 
Kaiak Ltd 
Office of Water Services 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
Scottish Research Liaison Group 
Scottish water & Sewerage Customers Council 
University of Hertfordshire 
University of Hull 
University of Leeds 
University of Newcastle 
University of Oxford 
University of Salford 
University of Sheffield 
Water Industry Suppliers Group 
Water Companies Association 
Water Services Association 







Sample Questionnaire 1 
Section-1 : About the National Contact Point/Mirror Task Force 
(1). Who is represented in the Mirror Task Force and how were they initially nominated? / How were 
you nominated as the national contact point? 
(2). How do you see your role in the Task Force network? 
(3). Which organisation/'institutions/associations/mdividuals will you be approaching for the 
consultation process? 
Section 2: About the aims of the Task Force 
(1). According to the documentation, the aim of the Task Force is to set up "an agenda for water 
research in Europe" - what areas do you envisage being covered by such an agenda? 
(2). Given that the aim is for a consensus to emerge, how do you hope to ensure a broad consensus is 
achieved? 
(3). Is it a priority to enhance the role of scientists and technology experts in this particular policy 
process or agenda setting? 
(4). How do you see the Task Force moving policy forward in this area? 
Please tum over 
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'on 3: About the operation of the task Force network 
(1). How can you ensure that consumer interests are effectively channelled into the consultative 
process? 
(2). How can you ensure that ecological concerns are effectively channelled into the consultative 
process? 
(3). How do you see the network operating? 
(4). How is it intended that it will interact with national governments' policy priorities? 
(5). Are you concerning yourselves with proposals for action which, it is felt, are better or necessarily 
achieved through a cooperative approach, or do they address identifiable gaps in policy at any level? 
(6). How would you prioritise these end goals, as identified by the Task Force: 
(Rank each goal from 1 to 5, where I is the most important end goal) 
* socio-economic cohesion 
* the achievement of a Single Market 
* safeguarding Europe's position on the international scene 
* promotion of competitiveness for business 
* Europe's engagement in development cooperation 
(7). What are the current gaps in policy which you identify at the EU level? 
Please turn over 
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(8). Will this Task Force resolve any of the problems you have noted in question 7 above? 
-- (9). **in terms of the actions tobe considered, who pays? -- 
(10). In terms of the specific nwasum to be taken, in concert with the four proposed actions, how 
would you prioritise: 
(Rank each from I to 5, where I is the most important) 
* scale and urgency of the problems 
* prospects offered by science and technology 
* market opportunities 
* Europe's competitive position 
* potential applications of the research results 
(11). Any documents available? List of particiPanb? 
(12). Any other remarks: 
Thank you very much for your time 
313 
Appendix 5. 
Sample Questionnaire 2 
Section 1: About the Task Force 
(1). Who is represented in the Task Force and how were they initially nominated? 
(2). How do you see your role in the Task Force network? (e. g. manager, consultant) 
(3). Which other DGs and EU organisations/oMcials will you be approaching for the consultation 
process? 
Section 2: About the aims of the Task Force 
(1). How did the Task Force decide on the priority areas for the framework of the Preliminary Report? 
(2). According to the documentation, the aim of the Task Force is to set up "an agenda for water 
research in Europe" - what areas do you envisage being covered by such an agenda? 
(3). In the schematic of the structure of the Task Force, it is described as a "network, " of DGs and a 
range of socio-economic actors : What are you attempting to convey by using fi Wrnunology? 
(4). Is it a priority to enhance the role of scientists and technology experts in the agenda setting for 
this particular policy area? 
(5). How did the Task Force discover the principal preoccupations of citizens (noted as: combating 
pollution; rational use of water, combating chronic water deficits; prevention and management of 
crises)? 
(6). Do these priorities coincide with existing EU policy targets? 
Please tum over 
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Section 3: About the operation of the Task Force ndwork 
(1). How can you ensure that consumer interests are effectively channelled into the consultative 
process? 
(2). How can you ensue that ecological concerns are effectively channelled into the consultative 
process? 
(3). Is the Inter Service Group (ISG), a representation of the Commission opinion, or a combination 
of the differing interests of the DGs involved in the process? 
(4). How do you see the network operating? 
(5). How is it intended that it will interact with national governments' policy priorities? 
(6). Given that the aim is fora consensus to emerge, how do you hope to ensure a ti}is is achieved? 
(7). In what way is the `level of support' from institutions and organisations in the proposals for 
action, important? 
(8). How would you prioritise these end goals, as identified by the Task Force: 
(Rank each goal from I to 5, where I is the most important end goal) 
* socio-oonomic cohesion 
* the achievement of a Single Market 
* safeguarding Europe's position on the international scene 
* promotion of competitiveness for business 
* Europe's engagement in development cooperation 
(9). What are the current gaps in policy which you identify at the EU level? 
Please tarn over 
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(10). Will this Task Force resolve any of the problems you have noted in (question 9) above? 
(11). How do you see the Task Force moving policy forward in this area? 
(12). In terms of the specific Measures to be taken, in concert with the four proposed actions, how 
would you prioritise: 
(Rank each from 1 to 5, wc: +e 1 is the most impartant) 
* scale and urgency of the problems 
* prospects offered by science and technology 
* market opportunities 
* Europe's competitive Position 
* potential applications of the research results 
(13). Any other remarks: 
Thank you very much for your time 
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Appendix 6. 








Bristol BS 12 4UD 
11 September 1997 
Dear Mr. Bramley, 
PAISLEY CAMPUS 
Department of Applied 
Social Studies 
High Street 
Paisley PAl 2BE 
Scotland 
Tel: 0141.848 3000 
Fax: 0141-848 3891 
In May this year I originally wrote to you, enclosing a questionnaire, relating to your 
role in the EU Task Force: Environment: Water. I am researching this EU initiative in order to 
establish both the role of scientific expertise as well as the compatibility of EU and UK goals in 
this policy area. I am also particularly interested to learn the mechanism through which such a 
network is established. 
Thank you for your response to my initial enquiry. I have now been able to read 
through some of the documentation which was sent to me by the MTF, in particular, the Report 
of the executive. Therefore, I am now in a position to follow up my initial enquiry to try to get 
a better picture of how the MTF set about organising the call for ideas and putting together the 
subsequent report. 
I understand that, with other commitments, you may not have very much time 
available, but I would very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you in person about 
the on-going work of the Task Force. Any comments made would not necessarily be `on the 
record' or attributed, if that is your wish. 
I must apologise for the delay in following up my previous enquiries and hope that we 
can arrange a meeting in the near future. 




Jean Monnet Chair: European Integration and Public Policy 
Dept. of Applied Social Studies 
University of Paisley 
Paisley, PA! 2BE. 
Tel.: 0141 848 3953 
fax.: 0141 848 3891 
e-mail: kier-as0@paisley. ac. uk 
Head of Department Professor John 0 Foster MA PhD 
Associate Head of Department Tony Clarke BSc PhD 
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